

THE
L I F E
OF
GENERAL DUMOURIEZ.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. III.

NON OMNIS MORIAR.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR J. JOHNSON, NO. 72, ST. PAUL'S
CHURCH YARD.

1796.



CONTENTS

OF THE

THIRD VOLUME.

BOOK V.

CHAP. I.

SITUATION of the French armies, p. 1.—Luckner enters the Austrian territories, 5.—The suburbs of Courtrai burnt, 8.—Arrival of Dumouriez at Valenciennes, 9.—Character of Luckner, 11.—The duke of Orleans appears at Valenciennes, 13.—Camp of Famars, 14.—Dumouriez forces an interview with Luckner, 16.—Lafayette's arrival, 17.

CHAP. II.

Camp of Maulde, p. 19.—Two female warriors, 25.

CHAP. III.

Lafayette's army and Luckner's change situations, p. 27.—Dumouriez has an interview with the two generals, 30.—Dangerous situation of the frontier, 34.—Attack of Orchies, 36.—The duke of Saxe

Teschen invades the French territory, 39.—Council of war at Valenciennes, 40.

CHAP. IV.

State of affairs, p. 43.—Camps of Maulde, Maubeuge, and Pont-sur-Sambre, 53.—Affair of the 10th of August, 56.—Oath administered to the troops, 58.—Lafayette's insurrection, 60.

CHAP. V.

Commissioners from the national assembly, p. 63.—Dumouriez appointed commander in chief, 65.—The Prussians enter France, 72.—Longwy surrenders, 74.—Dumouriez goes into Champagne, 75.—State of Lafayette's army, *ib.*

CHAP. VI.

Council of War, p. 79.—Thouvenot, 86.—The forest of Argonne, 88.—Engagement at Stenay, 99.—Camp of Grandprey, 100.

CHAP. VII.

Capture of Verdun, p. 103.—Kellermann appointed to the command of the army of the Moselle, 107.—Luckner at Châlons, 108.—Out-posts of Dumouriez attacked by the Prussians, 115.—Consternation at Paris, 119.

CHAP. VIII.

Misconduct of Custine, p. 123.—Fault of general Dumouriez, 127.—The pass of Croix-aux-bois forced, 130.—Retreat from the camp of Grandprey, 134.—Prince Hohenlohe demands an interview, 140.—Fugitives, 143.—A new alarm, 145.

CHAP.

CONTENTS:

v

CHAP. IX.

Camp of St. Menchould, p. 149.—Junction of Kellermann and Beurnonville, 154.—Misconduct of the federates, 157.—Action at Valmy, 160.

CHAP. X.

Position of the Prussians, p. 169.—Wants of the army, 179.—Monarchy abolished, and a republic established, 183.

CHAP. XI.

Conferences, p. 189.—Partial suspension of arms, 192. Negotiations, 194.—The duke of Brunswick's manifesto, 199.—Recommencement of hostilities, ib.

CHAP. XII.

Retreat of the Prussians, p. 203.—Remissness of the French generals, 207.—Misconduct of Kellermann, 208.

CHAP. XIII.

Events in the northern department, 221.—Rout of the camp of Maulde, 229.—Attack of Lisle, 231.

CHAP. XIV.

Reflections on the campaign, p. 233.

BOOK

B O O K VI.

CHAP. I.

Dumouriez arrives at Paris, p. 254.—Assassination of four emigrant deserters, 257.—The girondists, 263.—Danton, *ib.*—Sentiments of Dumouriez, 264.

CHAP. II.

Situation of France, p. 268.—Designs of the girondists, 272.—Plan of the Campaign, 275.

CHAP. III.

Plan of the campaign in the Low Countries, p. 288: Dumouriez arrives at Valenciennes, 291.—Pache minister at war, 292.—Labourdonnaye, 294.—Delays occasioned by the minister at war, 303.

CHAP. IV.

Position of the duke of Teschen, p. 311.—First movement of the armies, 315.—Actions at Thulin and Bouffu, 319.

CHAP. V.

Battle of Gemappe, p. 330.

CHAP. VI.

Berneron at Ath, p. 348.—Capture of Tournay, 351, Nieuport, Ostend, and Bruges, 355.

CHAP. VII.

Capture of Mons, p. 356.—Baptiste recompensed for his gallantry at Gemappe, 359.—Anecdote of Lanoue, 360.—Engagement at Anderlecht, 363.—Entry into Brussels, 367.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Embarrassments of Dumouriez, p. 369.—Committee of purchases, 370.—Administrative body formed at Brussels, 375.—Encampment at Cortenbergue, 379.—Mechlin taken, *ib.*—The army crosses Louvain, and encamps at Pellenberg, 380.—Battle of Tirlemont, 381.

CHAP. IX.

The commissaries arrested by order of the convention, p. 384.—Ronsin appointed commissary-general, 385.—Affair of Varoux, 393.—Entry into Liege, 394.—The castle of Namur surrenders, 395.

CHAP. X.

Political embarrassments, p. 396.—Miranda at Ruremonde, 408.—Dumouriez prepares to invest Maestricht, *ib.*—But is forbidden by the minister, 410.

CHAP. XI.

Distress of the army at Liege, p. 412.—Capture of Aix-la-Chapelle, 416.—Winter-quarters, 417.—Imp practicable orders sent by the executive power, 418.—Injustices towards the Belgians, 423.—Dumouriez resolves to repair to Paris, 427.—Trial of Louis XVI, *ibid.*

CHAP. XII.

Reflections on the campaign in the Low Countries, p. 429.

181

1. The Commission has been informed that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines has agreed to accept the Commission's findings and recommendations in the report on the investigation of the alleged human rights violations in the Philippines.

[illegible]

XVI. 1111

Reference on the sample in the last column.

of the case which general Dumouriez had
taken during his abdication, to court the
neutrality of the circles, and the princes of
the empire. **THE LIFE**

OF
GENERAL DUMOURIEZ.

BOOK V.

CHAP. I.

Camp of Valenciennes.

DUMOURIEZ, on his acceptance of an office which he never was desirous of retaining long, took care to keep his rank of lieutenant-general. He had the choice of serving under Luckner, Lafayette, or Montesquiou, each of whom commanded an army. This appellation was not given to the body of troops assembled in Alsace under lieutenant-general Lamorlière, which maintained only a very slight defensive system, that frontier being not so much as menaced, in consequence

VOL. III. B of

of the care which general Dumouriez had taken during his administration, to court the neutrality of the circles, and the princes of the empire, but more especially the circle of Suabia.

This neutrality had enabled him to withdraw some troops from the army of Alsace, especially the *corps* of carabineers, and also general Luckner, who had been appointed, through his influence, to succeed the marshal de Rochambeau, the latter having, on account of the bad state of his health, resigned the command of the northern army.

Lafayette, who was already at open war with all the council, and particularly the minister for foreign affairs, beheld himself, in consequence of the selection of marshal Luckner, foiled in the hope he had entertained of uniting this command to that he already possessed, which would have extended his military authority from Bitche to Dunkirk.

Dumouriez had not been instigated to this new disposition of the armies by any private passion; he was directed entirely by a spirit of justice. Lafayette had acted amiss at the opening of the campaign, and afterwards, in concert

concert with marshal Rochambeau, had thrown the blame on the ministry, but especially on Dumouriez, whom he accused of having formed plans for the campaign which were absurd in their nature, and could not be carried into execution. This young general had acted a very brilliant part during the American war, but he had never been invested with the chief command. His first step as general against the Imperialists did not evince talents of a superiour order. Luckner, who was a marshal of France, possessed a great reputation joined to much ardour.

The armies of the Rhine, of the Moselle, or the centre, and of the north, formed three bodies of fifty thousand men each, including the garrisons. It would have been unjust to have banished into a place, where he must have remained on the defensive, the sole marshal of France, and the only warrior she possessed, after having diminished the number of his troops, in order to reinforce the northern army and that of the south under general Montesquiou, and then to confer the command of the two armies on Lafayette. The council had even deemed it prudent by

means of this arrangement, without however any appearance of such an intention, to place Lafayette, who they were afraid might seize upon the dictatorship, under the command of an old foreign general, who, as he did not appertain to any faction, was more immediately at the disposal of the executive power.

The following was the situation of the French armies at this epoch. Marshal Luckner commanded that of the north, Lafayette that of the centre, and Montesquiou that of the south, which was then but just forming, for it was by mere dint of talents, genius, and patience, that this general succeeded in creating an army, and effected the rapid conquest of Savoy, and of the county of Nice, in spite of obstacles of every kind, and notwithstanding the slowness with which his forces were assembled had afforded sufficient time to the Piedmontese to prepare for their defence. The campaign was conducted on his part with equal vivacity and prudence. His negotiations with Geneva, and the Swiss cantons, were such as became a just, and sagacious man. He was the ablest of the three commanders in chief; and if Dumouriez had consulted

consulted only his own inclinations, he would have joined him, and put himself under his orders: but he was prevented by a weighty consideration, in consequence of which he served with the northern army.

About a month before this period marshal Luckner, who then passed through Paris in his way to the northern army, had agreed with him to re-establish the offensive system of war in the Low Countries, in order to restore that energy and confidence to his troops which they had entirely lost. Luckner at that time loudly complained of the conduct of marshal de Rochambeau and Lafayette, and promised to repair the checks experienced at the beginning of the campaign. Dumouriez had requested the king to present him with horses, and his majesty had lavished his caresses on him at the same time, so that an entire confidence was established between him and the council.

Luckner proved faithful to his promise; and nearly at the same epoch that Dumouriez effected a change in the administration, he entered the Austrian territories, and advanced with his army, which consisted of

about twenty-two thousand men, to Courtrai and Menin. However, he had scarcely arrived at his head-quarters when he became anti-ministerial, and his last letters to the minister, even while executing what had been agreed upon between them, were rude and unmannerly. Berthier, who was at the head of his *staff*, Charles Lameth, Jarry, Matthew de Montmorenci, and all his *aides-de-camp*, appertained to the faction of Lafayette, which obstinately persisted in considering Dumouriez as the ringleader of the Jacobins and Girondists, notwithstanding this was a contradiction in terms, and although that general, on his quitting administration, was on the point of becoming the victim of all parties at one and the same time.

There were only two general officers in Luckner's whole army, who were hearty in the expedition into the Low Countries: these were Biron and Valence. The first was desirous of making amends for his disaster before Mons; the second, equally unconnected with all parties, consulted only his civism, his honesty, and his desire of distinguishing himself. Both of them were in disgrace with
 marshal

marshal Luckner; notwithstanding this, being supported by pressing letters from the minister, they had dragged and forced him to march forwards.

But no sooner did Luckner learn that Dumouriez had given in his resignation, than, instead of advancing into Belgium, he thought of nothing but regaining the frontiers, pouring forth invectives at the same time against the disgraced minister, complaining that he had inveigled him into a foolish enterprise, and prophesying that he would be very cautious how he presented himself to his army. Biron and Valence, in the mean time, transmitted letter after letter to Dumouriez, pressing him to repair quickly thither, as, if he neglected so to do, all was lost, the marshal being about to retreat.

Dumouriez had written the general a letter replete with respect and confidence, in which he informed him, that so far from regretting the loss of his office, he considered it as a great happiness that he was about to serve under him, in order to labour for his glory.

At the same time he made all the haste in his power to settle his accounts as minister

for foreign affairs, in order to leave Paris. He had sent before him one of his *aides-de-camp* and his horses, with instructions to proceed through Lille to Menin; he himself followed the same route on the 27th of July, and on his arrival at Douay learned, that Luckner, after having held a council at war, although there was no enemy to oppose him, had evacuated Courtrai and Menin, and was returning with his army to the camp of Valenciennes.

All his exploits performed during this inroad into the Low Countries were confined to the burning wantonly, and without any necessity, the suburbs of Courtrai, under pretext of enabling the French to defend it, and that too only an hour before its evacuation*. Perhaps if Dumouriez had arrived two or three days sooner, he might have prevented this shameful retreat, which evidently proceeded from party-spirit, in consequence of some

* It ought here to be remarked, to the honour of the National Assembly, that it reprobated this rash act, which was committed in consequence of orders from an officer who soon after *emigrated*, and ordered the sufferers to receive an adequate compensation.—*Transf.*

great project broached by Lafayette's faction, of which poor Luckner, who was beset by his own staff officers, was at once the instrument and the dupe.

He joined the army at Valenciennes, and was very ill received by the marshal, the general officers, and those belonging to his staff. Wagers had been laid that he would never dare to join this army ; sums had been betted that his services would not be accepted. Bertier, who was at the head of the staff, did not notify his arrival in the order of the day, although, as there were only Biron, who was his senior, and himself, who were lieutenant-generals, he ought naturally to have taken the command of the left. Neither the counterfig, nor the military regulations were communicated to him, and he was not attended by any guard of honour ; in short, he remained during several days at Valenciennes, as a private individual. As there was not any enemy in the field, or a plan for the campaign formed, or even an order of battle, and still less any discipline or military spirit in this army, he waited in patience, during a few days, without uttering a single complaint, or making

making any representation whatever, being employed in examining the disorder of the troops and the incapacity of their general, who waited, according to his own account, for the arrival of Lafayette, in order to concert a defensive plan along with him, for it was to this that these generals had resolved to confine the war: the marshal, on purpose to excuse his shameful retreat from Menin, and to cast the whole blame on the temerity of the offensive system planned by the minister; Lafayette, on the other hand, instigated by the same motive of hatred against Dumouriez, and by a combination of more profound views, which at length ended in an explosion that proved the ruin of himself, and the faction of Lameth, Duport, Beaumetz, and others, who had the entire management of this general, and misled him, by their endeavours to elevate him to the dictatorship.

Thus having escaped at Paris from the factions of the Gironde and the Jacobins, Dumouriez found in the army another faction entirely *aristocratico-revolutionary*, whose intentions in respect to him were equally

8

active,

active, and to the full as dangerous. He had but little difficulty in penetrating into their sentiments, in consequence of the contemptuous and scoffing manner with which he was treated by the staff officers, and the blunt demeanour of the marshal himself, whose character and abilities were far inferior to his reputation.

Luckner was not devoid of talents, but his mind was contracted. He was actuated by a sordid avarice, and he was destitute of education. His turn of mind, and his habits, had always accustomed him to act a subordinate part. The consequential airs assumed by Lafayette imposed upon him, and the moment he found any one to put above himself, he instantly forgot his own rank, and took the second place; he still retained the corporal activity of a hussar, but his mind was exceedingly confused. He was never able to comprehend the plan of the campaign of the Low Countries. His ideas could reach no further than the vanguard, and to all the explanations of the minister, he constantly replied: "Yes, yes, mi vill turn by de right,
turn

turn by de left, and marsh vick *." In truth, he considered it in the light of a mere *foraging party*.

He was affrighted at the number of the retainers, and especially of the carriages, belonging to his own army; he constantly used this as an objection to all the movements which were proposed to him. Although a general, he would have willingly allowed his troops to have trifled away the whole campaign in the camp of Valenciennes, while he himself would have acted as a partisan; at the head of an advanced guard, he would have led the army to the end of the world.

In the morning he was entirely devoted to the nation; in the evening wholly attached to the king. He had not any conception of the revolution. He confounded different objects and different parties together, and constantly complained of being surrounded by factious men, which was indeed but too true.

* *Oui, oui, moi tourne par la droite, tourne par la gauche, & marcher vite.—Orig.*

The

The duke of Orleans made his appearance, without any one being able to discover the motive, at Valenciennes; this, however, did not make any impression on the soldiers, with whom he was not a favourite; and, instead of balancing the party of Lafayette, it added to its strength.

Luckner detested and despised the duke of Orleans, but did not dare to bid him withdraw. Biron protected this detestable prince, who saw nobody but him belonging to the army, and he was on very bad terms with the marshal. Dumouriez had been intimate with Biron during twenty years, and acquainted, although upon rather cool terms, during the same period with the duke, but thenceforward he distinguished his two sons, who were very unlike their unworthy father.

Lafayette was expected hourly. Three days before his arrival Dumouriez forced the marshal to grant him a conference, which he had hitherto endeavoured to avoid. The latter, who was accustomed to rise before day-break, mounted his horse, without any other aim than to shew himself to his
 soldiers,

soldiers, returned at a late hour, dined very uncomfortably, scolded every body, signed letters which he never read, and retired to bed at nine o'clock. Dumouriez had presented himself several times at his levée, and rode out with him. On these occasions the marshal spoke very big, and very freely, relative to his predecessor Rochambeau, Lafayette, and the French generals; he also acknowledged his camp to be detestable, and he was in the right. But when Dumouriez happened one day to ask him why, instead of remaining in a camp which was bad in its own nature, and evinced a certain degree of timidity, he did not assume a better and more formidable position before Quievrain, Luckner falling into a passion, told him with many oaths, that it was not his place to give him advice, and that every general officer who reasoned ought to be cooped up in a citadel.

This famous camp of Famars, which the imperialists afterwards took with so much facility in the month of April 1793, was in truth far from being good. Its proximity to Valenciennes kept the troops in a state
of

of debauchery and insubordination. Officers, soldiers, and generals, were both day and night in that town. This camp had the Scheldt in its rear, which could not be crossed, in case of a retreat, except by means of three bridges, two of which situated on the right flank could have been easily seized upon by the enemy, who might have arrived in order of battle on this side as far as the rear of the encampment, being sheltered from the redoubts and batteries of this flank, as they did not command the intervening low ground.

Along the front of the camp ran a little river called the Ronelle, which might have been forded almost every where; and it was pent up by means of banks, which rising on both sides in the form of an amphitheatre, afforded an equally advantageous opportunity for the play of the artillery belonging to either party. The left flank, approaching towards Valenciennes, was covered by two very dangerous villages, for if either of them were forced, as there was not sufficient ground for the troops to form and give battle in the front of the camp, the army must have been separated

separated into two parts, one of which would have precipitated itself into the Scheldt, the other would have fled to Valenciennes, and the enemy, pursuing the troops with rapidity in their retreat, might have entered the town with the fugitives. In general it ought to be avoided to station camps too near great towns, more especially when they are at the same time fortresses, and have magazines in them. In addition to this, our cowardly position in the camp of Famars rendered the enemy masters of the plain situated between Conde, Quesnoy, and Valenciennes.

Dumouriez presented himself one morning before marshal Luckner, and after shutting the door, entered into a detail of the various complaints which he had to make against him; he informed him at the same time, that he was the mere puppet and instrument of Lafayette's faction, and he made him ashamed at being led by the nose by such boys as Charles Lameth and Matthew Montmorenci. The marshal acknowledged the truth of these observations, and swore at them, termed them intriguing and factious

factionous men, then wept, and promised to alter his conduct.

They afterwards conversed about the bad position of the camp of Famars, the little order that prevailed in the army, and also the want of any fixed plan. Luckner promised that every thing should assume a new face. He happened that day to dine with him, a circumstance that but seldom occurred. The marshal reprimanded Lameth and Montmorenci at table, and also scolded Bertier, who next morning made his appearance for the first time, after a lapse of ten or twelve days, in order to pay a visit to general Dumouriez, who had made him major general, and who then told him with much seriousness, but at the same time with great good nature, that it was time to finish this comedy, and to think of making war in earnest.

Lafayette arrived two days afterwards. Luckner paid his court to him with the most abject humility. All the general officers were ordered to receive him at the head of their respective divisions. Biron, not having been informed of this regulation,

and Dumouriez, not having any post as yet assigned to him, were not present during this parade. Lafayette remarked this, more especially as they were the only two lieutenant generals at that time with the army; he had even the weakness to complain of it, and the marshal was once more angry with them.

Dumouriez had a second explanation with him; it was severe on his part. Luckner, after falling into a passion, became calm, wept once more, and employed many caresses and protestations. On the next day but one, he however announced to him that he must take upon him the command of the camp of Maulde; Biron also received orders to put himself at the head of the little army in Alsace.

CHAP. II.

Camp of Maulde.

MARSHAL Luckner had no more than five lieutenant generals in his whole army; Biron, who was sent to command in Alsace; Lanouë, who was in the camp of Maubeuge; Carle, stationed at Dunkirk; d'Harville, who commanded at Valenciennes; and Dumouriez, whom he sent to the camp of Maulde: he was thus destitute of a single general officer of this rank, and was still more than ever in the power of the children belonging to the faction that governed him. Biron being gone, Dumouriez, who was then the senior of the four other lieutenant generals, ought either to have had the command of the camp of Dunkirk, or that of Maubeuge; instead of this, eight battalions and ten squadrons posted at Maulde, were put under his orders.

As the camp of Maulde has become famous, it deserves a particular description: its form is that of a horse shoe; it consists of several sand hills, and has in front the village of Maulde, and on its right flank that of Mortagne, where there is a bridge at the junction of the Scarpe and the Scheldt. In the rear is a marshy country extending as far as St. Amand, and along the whole of its left flank a wooded plain, sprinkled with farm houses, and villages. The heights had been crowned with seven redoubts, and a few inefficient works were thrown up in the front of Maulde.

This would have been a good camp for ten or twelve thousand men, by forming a line of posts along the left bank of the Scheldt as far as Condé; by establishing another chain along the left through Rumegies, by fortifying Orchies in a strong manner so as to protect the communication between Douay and Lille, and also by fortifying the source of the Scarpe at St. Amand.

But with only eight battalions this camp was extremely dangerous. If the enemy
should

should turn the left flank, they might either intercept all communication between it and the main body, or cut it entirely off, and render themselves masters of St. Amand, before the troops posted in it had time to retire. If they attacked the bridge of Mortagne by sending a detachment across the Scheldt, the communication with Condé, Valenciennes, and St. Amand, would be cut off, and the troops forced to flee towards Orchies. In short, if they chose to attack it with an equal force, on the right, the left, and the front, at the same time, the eight battalions would not have proved sufficient to have defended the redoubts, which were weak and negligently constructed, and might be carried sword in hand.

Beurnonville, a major general, and formerly confidential *aide-de-camp* to Luckner, but who had been supplanted by the young men belonging to the court, commanded in this camp; Berneron, an old officer, distinguished on account of his activity and experience, was at the head of his staff. They were fully acquainted with the danger of their position, but they were careful to

conceal it from the troops ; on the contrary, they had inspired them with great confidence in their situation, and also great boldness, by a constant succession of skirmishes on the side of Tournai and Bury. By remaining thus upon the offensive, they had prevented the Imperialists from dreaming of attacking them, although the latter consisted of ten or twelve thousand men, and they themselves did not exceed three or four thousand.

Dumouriez was well assured that he had been sent thither, not only with a view of getting rid of a disagreeable censor, but in all probability, with the hope that he might receive a check. He communicated his suspicions to some persons in Paris, that in case of any sinister event, the blame might not attach to him alone.

He first established his head-quarters at St. Amand, and transmitted some observations from that place, but the staff-officers belonging to the marshal, so far from sending him the reinforcements he demanded, did not deign even to make a reply.

The camp of Maulde was very necessary to cover the rich plains between Lisle, Douay,

Douay, Bouchain, Valenciennes, and Condé. This tract of country, which is intersected by rivers and canals, abounds with forage. The northern department was in the right to attach much importance to it, for it was absolutely necessary to maintain it.

Dumouriez, seeing himself abandoned to his own resources, left St. Amand and resided in the camp itself, with his two brave companions Beurnonville and Berneron ; this procured him the friendship of the troops, who were pleased to behold him participating in their midnight toils and fatigues. He began by establishing a regular communication with general Marassé, who commanded at Douay, and Labourdonnaye, the commanding officer at Lille: he even had an interview with them, on purpose to resolve on certain combined movements in case of need.

He supplied, by means of small posts, the chain of great ones which would have been necessary to protect this frontier ; he caused batteries to be erected at the entrance into the town of St. Amand, and he multiplied the incursions on the side of Tournai, Bury, Antoing, and Leuze, to make the enemy

believe he was in force. He established a line of posts between the camp, St. Amand, and Orchies, by the Celle, and the castle of Loir; in short, he fortified Orchies, and stationed a battalion of the garrison of Douay there and another at Marchiennes. He gave in a report of all these dispositions to Luckner, who approved of them.

He thenceforward continued his inroads with some little success; which was the more noticed, because this was the only quarter through which the Imperialists did not penetrate into our territory, and where we maintained an appearance of offensive operations. Every where else, and more especially in the front of our army, the hulans laid waste our plains, while our own troops trifled away their time in the most shameful inactivity.

The soldiers stationed in the camp of Maulde, on the other hand, acquired a certain degree of hardihood and discipline, which distinguished them during the whole of the campaign. He thus converted to his own advantage, that very project which seemed to have been formed in order to hurt him.

He

He employed his time also in perfecting the project of an invasion into the Low Countries, and although he was now on the spot, he did not find it necessary to alter any part of that plan which the generals had so badly executed at the beginning of the campaign, and which he himself has since followed.

He took advantage of an extraordinary incident to elevate the courage of his troops. A register of the name of Fernig, who had been formerly a quarter-master of hussars, resided in the village of Mortagne. He had five children, one of whom was a young man, who had a commission in a regiment, the other four were girls. Two of these maidens, the one twenty-two years of age, and the other seventeen, both little, delicate, well educated, and modest, had often accompanied the French detachments in their incursions. They were extremely brave.

He encouraged them, made them march along with all the detachments, and published an account of their conduct. They afterwards accompanied the troops from the camp of Maulde to Champagne, returned with them to carry on the war in the Low Countries,

Countries, distinguished themselves during every action, and rendered themselves still more extraordinary by their modesty and virtue, than by their bravery. The Convention presented them with a house; but as they were present at the arrest of the commissioners on the 2d. of April, and afterwards left the army along with general Dumouriez, they have since been outlawed as well as all his other adherents. The soldiers manifested an equal degree of friendship and respect for these two heroines, and he often held out their conduct as an example to his army.

CHAP. III.

Movement of the Armies.—Arrival of Lieutenant-General Dillon.—Council of War.

WHILE thus kept at a distance from headquarters, and entirely ignorant of what occurred there, his mind wholly occupied about his camp at Maulde, and his frequent skirmishes, great commotions were hatching as well in the faction of the *constitutionnels* in the capital, as in the armies. The journey of Lafayette to Paris had afforded some suspicion of his designs. The National Assembly distrusted him, the Girondists declaimed loudly against him, and the Jacobins spared him less than ever. The ministry, on the other hand, were entirely devoted to him, and the king had been induced to throw himself into his arms. Dumouriez was never acquainted with his projects, and does not therefore choose to offer his own conjectures as facts.

But

But whatever might be the aim of Lafayette and the faction attached to him, he deemed it proper to change his command for that of the army of the north, which brought him nearer to Paris, and to banish Luckner to the centre. These generals, like Cæsar and Pompey, considered themselves as the proprietors of their respective armies. Each believed himself greatly beloved by his own troops, and did not choose to relinquish them. However the war then appeared likely to become more brisk on the frontier, towards which Luckner was sent, for the Prussians were assembling in the province of Luxembourg, and the electorate of Treves. One part of the Imperial army had at the same time crossed through the Low Countries, under the command of general Clairfait, in order to join them, and the emigrants flew thither in crowds along with the king's brothers.

It was at a moment like this, when every one ought to have remained at his post on purpose to defend that part with which he had made himself acquainted, with troops also accustomed to the country, that the minister at war and the two generals concerted a most extraordinary

extraordinary and dangerous movement : this was no less than to transport Luckner's army to Metz, and that of Lafayette to Valenciennes. In consequence of this, both the frontiers were stripped, during several days, of their protection, the two armies were fatigued by a march of eighty leagues in the month of July, and this was also so far remarkable, as it produced a re-union, during two days, of all the troops, and both the generals at an internal position, towards Cappel, within forty leagues of Paris.

If it were the plan of this faction to march the two armies to Paris, it is at least certain that Luckner had not been apprised of, and did not consent to it. This circumstance renders the punishment, which the ferocious Jacobins inflicted upon him, still more barbarous and unjust. But there was no manner of occasion either for him or his army, as on the receipt of an order from the king to march toward Sedan, he would have instantly obeyed; and the twenty thousand men under Lafayette would have been sufficient to have effected a revolution in Paris. Would to God, that he had executed this project
with

with rapidity ! Whatever state of things might have resulted from it, France would not at present have been covered with crimes, opprobrium, and ruins ; Lafayette would have been the restorer of his country, and the saviour of the royal family : but Providence decided otherwise.¹

Be that as it may, on the 10th of July, while Dumouriez was busied in causing some small works to be traced out, for the purpose of fortifying Orchies, he received a courier from Luckner with orders to repair instantly to Valenciennes. He set off immediately, and was not a little astonished to learn on entering the marshal's apartments, that Lafayette had just arrived, and was shut up with him. He knocked at the door of his closet, and Luckner gave him a most gracious reception. Lafayette, abashed at seeing him, assumed an air of cool dignity, which he returned.

The marshal then explained to him the movements of the two armies, informed him that lieutenant-general Dillon would arrive on the 20th at Valenciennes with eight battalions and six squadrons, and that he himself

self was to leave the camp of Famars on the 12th with his army; that he should not withdraw any of the troops either from Dunkirk or the camps of Maulde and Maubeuge; that he was to leave his rear-guard, consisting of six battalions and five squadrons in the camp of Famars, and also the command of the whole northern department, until the 20th, under his charge, when he was to resign to general Dillon, and rejoin him at Metz, making the same marches as the army had done; and if during these eight days any important event should occur, he was to render an account of it to general Lafayette, and receive his commands. He then presented him with the same orders signed by the minister.

He replied to the marshal, that although he deemed this great movement very imprudent, and extremely ill-timed, he would execute the orders which he had received; then addressing himself to Lafayette, who had remained all this time with his eyes fixed upon a map, he said to him, "You are doubtless sorry as well as myself, that I should be for a few days under your command; I
however

however promise in the presence of the marshal, to serve you faithfully in every thing that may tend to your real glory, provided you but labour for the good of your country. But you may easily imagine that I cannot forget your conduct, and I swear to you that we shall determine our quarrel at the conclusion of the war." Lafayette wished to enter into some explanations, but Luckner stepping in between them, they all three left the closet; on this, the marshal said to his *aides-de-camp*, "Dumouriez is very generous; he has postponed his resentment until the conclusion of the war." It was this adventure that gave rise to the story at that time in circulation, that these two generals had fought together, and that Lafayette had been wounded.

He had always loved Lafayette, although he was well acquainted with his defects; he esteemed his good qualities, and he discovered in him, in an especial manner, those external requisites so necessary in a commander in order to make an impression on the people. Before his entrance into the administration, he had always given him the most
useful

useful advice : during the time he was in office, he had supported him against the Jacobins, and with the Girondists, even at the moment when the unfortunate Lafayette, misled by the intriguers who beset and ruined him, loaded him with public and intolerable injuries. If Lafayette had seized this opportunity for an explanation, and had had sense enough to have listened to his ambition rather than his vanity, the reconciliation would have been sincere and prompt, and perhaps great advantages would have resulted from this circumstance to their country, their king, and themselves : but scarcely had he left the closet, when seeing himself surrounded by his courtiers, he instantly resumed his haughty demeanour, and appeared by his gestures to insult Dumouriez, who on this day seemed to be more out of favour, and more despondent than usual.

No sooner had Lafayette taken his departure, than the marshal confessed the imprudence of the transposition of the two armies ; but he was well pleased to return to Metz. Beurnonville was greatly vexed at being abandoned by the marshal, and did not for-

give him for leaving him under the orders of Lafayette, whom he did not love. Luckner set off on the 12th, and Dumouriez remained at Valenciennes, occupying a camp with only six battalions, that required thirty thousand men.

D'Harville had pretended to dispute the command with him, but the question was decided by the marshal in favour of seniority : on this D'Harville received leave of absence, and departed. Lieutenant-general Lanoue, who commanded a camp of five or six thousand men at Maubeuge, and who, as well as his troops, was exceedingly attached to Lafayette, considered himself independent, and gave notice that he would not execute any order that was not prescribed to him by the commander in chief. Lieutenant-general Carle, who had nearly the same number of troops under his orders, expressed at Dunkirk a similar opinion.

In the mean time, the duke of Saxe Teschen assembled at Mons an army of about twenty thousand men, and the camp at Tournai contained ten or twelve thousand more. In case of an irruption,
Dumouriez

Dumouriez had only fourteen battalions and seven squadrons at his disposal, and these were distributed in the camps of Maulde and Famars. It was to be expected that the Imperialists, now no longer kept in check by Luckner's army, would invade the northern department. Dumouriez had announced this to the marshal, and the minister at war, who was no longer Lajarre, but d'Abancourt, a young man entirely under the influence of Lafayette's faction, and who, from a simple captain, had become minister.

The fortresses in Flanders were not sufficiently provided with provision. The garrisons were weak ; none of the out-works were pallisaded, the proper disposition of the artillery was not made, and ammunition and canoneers were every where wanting. There was a breach in the wall of Douay of more than three hundred fathoms in length. In no place could the inundations be effected, and Condé alone would have been able to have sustained a siege, by the care of its excellent commander, general Omoran.

On the 14th of July, at the very moment when Dumouriez had caused the festival of

the federation to be celebrated in his camp, a false alarm was given, and he was informed that the enemy's columns were marching through Sebourg towards Valenciennes. He accordingly went thither, but did not discover any hostile appearance; a few hussars only had been seen.

But during the night between the 13th and 14th, nearly five thousand Imperialists, setting off from Tournay, marched and attacked Orchies, where there was a battalion of the volunteers of la Somme, with two field pieces and thirty dragoons. They assaulted the place furiously at the two gates on the side of Douay and Lille, for they had not yet time to throw up the different defensive works enjoined by the general. This battalion defended itself with the utmost courage, and made good its retreat towards St. Amand, with the loss of one of its cannons. A captain of the name of Thory acquired much glory by saving this garrison. Two columns of Imperialists fired on each other, and the enemy lost five hundred men.

Dumouriez having received intelligence
of

of this attack in the course of the night, instantly removed his camp from Famars, and arrived at St. Amand on the 15th, by break of day. He transmitted orders to Beurnonville to leave only a guard in the camp of Maulde, and to march immediately to Rumegies in order to cut off the enemy's retreat, while he with his six battalions, and the three others which he was to draw from St. Amand and Marchiennes, marched and attacked them in Orchies. General Marassé, the commanding officer of Douay, without waiting for any orders, sallied out at the same time at the head of 800 of his garrison, and marched also towards Orchies. Thus the enemy would have been surrounded, if they had not made haste to retreat in the course of the night between the 14th and 15th.

On receiving information of this event, Dumouriez re-established the same garrison at Orchies, and also took it upon him to assemble fifteen battalions and five squadrons in the camp of Maulde, that he might at least have his little army united in one point. A regiment of horse chasseurs re-

fused to enter the camp, and returned to its cantonments behind Condé. He transmitted orders to lieutenant general Carle immediately to send five battalions and two squadrons from Dunkirk to join him, but they did not arrive until long after. He then returned and reassumed the command of the camp of Maulde, whence he began once more to harass the enemy, on purpose to restrain them, and to familiarize his own troops with war.

On the 20th general Chazot arrived at Valenciennes with eight battalions belonging to Lafayette's army. He began by declaring that he would not execute general Dumouriez' orders, but wait for the arrival of general Dillon. He however at length yielded to the earnest solicitations that were made him, and permitted his troops to be cantoned between Condé and Valenciennes, along the Scheldt.

Dumouriez took care to render an account of all these events to the minister, Luckner, and Lafayette.

On the 22d Dillon arrived, after conferring with Lafayette at Sedan, and passing through

through Maubeuge, Avesnes, and Landrecies. He was followed by four or five battalions, which he had collected during his journey. Dumouriez had on his side given orders to draw an equal number from the garrisons of Picardy and Artois, besides the five battalions and two squadrons which he expected from Dunkirk.

He joyfully resigned to Dillon the office of commander in chief, contenting himself with the camp of Maulde; but he depicted to him at the same time all the dangers of his situation. On the 22d the duke of Saxe Teschen leaving Mons, thought proper to invade the French territory, and encamp at Bavay. On this it became impossible for Dumouriez to obey Luckner's orders, and set out with six battalions, and five squadrons for Metz, leaving Flanders unprovided with troops at the very moment when the enemy had penetrated into it.

Dillon himself opposed the idea. But this was too direct an act of disobedience, for the two generals to take the responsibility upon themselves. Dumouriez in particular foresaw that it would be construed into a crime

on his part. The first letter which he received from the marshal, who blamed the assembling of the troops in the camp of Maulde, and an insolent one on the part of Bertier, made him perceive the necessity of making use of a great degree of prudence on this occasion. However, the safety of Flanders was at stake; every other consideration was subordinate to this great event, and the pretended disobedience, which arrested the progress of the enemy, actually saved every thing.

Dillon is a very brave and honest man, and far too passionate to be a cunning one. He possesses military talents, and great ambition. He had been made to suspect general Dumouriez, who on his side entertained prejudices against him, knowing how much he was connected with Lafayette and his faction. But circumstances were too critical not to smother all personal resentments, and the appearance of the enemy produced a sincere reconciliation.

Dillon assembled a grand council of war, consisting of all the general officers, at Valenciennes; he exposed to them with much force

force and precision the weak state of the fortifications; the small number of troops which he had to oppose to the two bodies of the enemy, one of which but a few days before had taken Orchies, while the other was at present encamped upon our own territories; the necessity of retaining general Dumouriez with his division in Flanders; the impossibility of permitting their departure without exposing the northern department to certain ruin, and the protest of the administrative body of the whole department against this measure. He afterwards detailed in a very methodical manner his plan of defence, and in pursuance of the unanimous opinion of the council of war, general Dumouriez was enjoined to remain with his division under the command of general Dillon, until the Imperialists had retired and ceased to menace the French territory.

The chief commissary Malus drew up an account of this important deliberation, in which the motives of the council of war were ably recapitulated by him, and copies signed by all the members were immediately transmitted to the president of the national assembly,

assembly, and the minister. The two generals on their part dispatched others to marshal Luckner and general Lafayette. They were thenceforward occupied with nothing but preparations for repelling, or stopping the enemy. Dillon charging himself with those at Bavay, and Dumbouriez with those on the side of Tournay.

CHAP. IV.

Camps of Maulde, Maubeuge, and Pont-sur-Sambre. Affair of the 10th of August. Oath administered to the Troops. Lafayette's Insurrection.

WHAT Dumouriez had foreseen actually occurred. Luckner told him that henceforth he should no longer consider him as appertaining to his army. He transmitted complaints, reclaimed his troops, and wrote to the king to demand his punishment. It is said that this prince, forgetting his last conversation with Dumouriez, assured the marshal that he should take upon himself the task of revenging him. This is doubtful. However the unfortunate Louis, although he entertained but little respect for Lafayette, whom he had many inducements to hate, was at that period entirely in the power of his

his faction, which solaced him with the hopes of a speedy realization of all his wishes. It is necessary however to separate his private inclinations from the actions suggested by the perfidious men who surrounded him. This prince was good, but he was unfortunate, and he had been violently insulted on the 21st of June, by the vile Santerre at the head of the rabble of Paris.

Instead of avenging the affront offered to the king; an affront that recoiled upon the nation itself, since, according to the constitution which was at that period the law and the idol of the French, he was clothed with a sacred and inviolable character; the assembly had aggravated this injury by appearing to approve of the excesses of the populace: a constitutional party, but one that aimed at the establishment of two chambers, and the English constitution, flattered him, on the other hand, with the expectation of a speedy deliverance from this degrading state of slavery. They had already nearly come to blows. The faction, and especially Lafayette himself, had conceived too great a hatred against Dumou-

riez to confide any of its secrets to him : his sacrifice, therefore, was become a matter of political necessity. This state of affairs sufficiently justifies the king.

As to Lafayette, he is also excusable, as he was nearly in the same predicament with his majesty. During the first legislature, he had possessed, in the highest possible degree, the confidence of the people, the adoration of Paris, and the love of all the national guards throughout the kingdom, more especially those of the capital. The arts of the Jacobins, whom he did not manage with sufficient adroitness, and the inconstancy of the people, had bereaved him of all these advantages, which were however more brilliant than solid.

On this he retired to his estate ; but the prospect of war, and the credit of the minister Narbonne, had placed him at the head of an army that was attached to him. The marshal de Rochambeau entertained the same sentiments. Luckner, who had succeeded the marshal, was a mere cypher, to whom they had given Charles Lameth as a superintendant. It might be safely affirmed, that all
the

the distinguished officers of this army were destined to become future members of the upper chamber.

The national Parisian guard was filled with indignation at the insult offered to the king. Eight thousand worthy citizens had inscribed their names on purpose to defend him; twenty thousand more followed their example. They were in the right, and their conduct was conformable to law. Great dependence was placed upon this confederacy, against which the National Assembly opposed the decree of the twenty thousand men; they reckoned also on the three armies.

Lafayette, who was puffed up with great expectations, committed but one mistake respecting Dumouriez; this was, in neglecting to cause him to be sounded, and in not communicating his plan to him, to which he would have instantly acceded, preferring the English constitution to anarchy, and *ochlocracy*. He had indeed no other resource, for he had left Paris exposed to the hatred of the Jacobins, and the faction of the Gironde. But Lafayette had offended Dumouriez too much to believe that he could
pardon

pardon him, and no longer hoping to draw him over to his party, because he had not attempted it, he endeavoured to ruin him. This personal animosity on the part of Lafayette and Lameth against Dumouriez has perhaps been the cause of all the evils that have occurred to France.

It accordingly happened, that, as soon as the proceedings of the council at war had reached Paris, d'Abancourt, the minister, went to solicit a decree, subjecting every general officer to the sentence of a council of war, who should disobey the commander in chief. This was ridiculous. The military laws, which were not as yet abrogated, were clearly in favour of the minister's proposition. All that was necessary, on this occasion, was for him to have possessed the audacity to cause general Dumouriez to be instantly arrested, and sent to Metz, there to be tried by his colleagues, all of whom appertained to this faction. But the precaution taken by Dillon and Dumouriez, to transmit the proceedings to the president of the National Assembly, prevented him from hazarding this stroke of authority,^s and restored Dumouriez,

mouriez, without his either seeking, or supposing it, to the favour of all the parties who opposed Lafayette. The demand of this decree enlightened the Assembly relative to the views of that faction, and the proposition of the minister was unanimously rejected.

In the mean time Lafayette, who entertained no manner of doubt as to the success of d'Abancourt on the present occasion, sent an express order to general Dillon to arrest Dumouriez, and send him to the citadel of Metz. Dillon possessed wisdom enough not to attempt to execute this injunction, and sufficient fidelity to conceal it; for he never revealed the incident to general Dumouriez until after Lafayette's unfortunate flight.

It must seem likely, that in consequence of these circumstances, and the respective position of Dillon and Dumouriez, these two generals would have formed the closest connection; but several motives concurred in producing a disunion: 1. Dillon, who had declared that he would not carry on any other than a defensive war, scouted his colleague's offensive

offensive plans, and replied to all his propositions, that the invasion of the Low Countries was foolish and chimerical : 2. His flatterers had made him believe that Dumouriez was an obstacle to his authority ; that this general had seized the opportunity of the invasion of the Imperialists in order to cover his disobedience, and render himself independent ; and that being the enemy of Lafayette, he would seek every opportunity to sacrifice his lieutenant, in order to get possession of the chief command in Flanders : 3. Dumouriez was born in the Low Countries, and the northern department had been saved by his resolution to remain there ; the constituted authorities had written to the National Assembly, and requested that this proceeding might receive their sanction ; they also reposed a greater degree of confidence in this general than in Dillon. The troops belonging to the camp at Maulde never mentioned their commander but with enthusiasm, and neither the emissaries of Lafayette, nor of Dillon, had been able to succeed in their attempts to diminish the affection which the soldiers bore toward him. Dillon himself, having unexpectedly made

his appearance there, displeased them greatly by criticising their camp, which they deemed impregnable, and had met with a very cool reception. Thus Dillon's jealousy, which was at its height, laid his mind open to all the unfavourable ideas that were continually suggested to him. However, Dumouriez must render him this honourable testimony, that amidst all these sinister sentiments he always remained faithful, and never once acted in a dishonest manner.

He esteemed Dillon, and loved the frankness of his character. He was of too open a disposition for any one not to discover all the affections of his mind. Dumouriez was grieved at this, more especially, on account of the evil that resulted from it to the public. He easily perceived that, instead of carrying on the war seriously, they were amusing themselves with intrigues, stripping the frontiers of the troops destined for their defence, and while the enemy menaced them on every side, they fatigued and ruined the army in consequence of long and useless marches, which by their direction seemed to threaten Paris.

During his frequent conferences with Dillon, he submitted all these reflections to him, and strove to prevail upon him to act. At length, in order to do away his jealousy and his suspicions, he proposed to him to unite all the troops, and to march in concert against the duke of Saxe-Teschen. Dillon, including the draughts from the garrisons, might have assembled forty-five battalions, and twenty squadrons, the amount of which would have been to from twenty to twenty-five thousand infantry, and three thousand cavalry. He, however, refused to adopt a plan, which, whatever his views might have been, could not but prove advantageous to him.

Dillon was undoubtedly acquainted with secrets, of which his colleague remained ignorant, and waited until the projects of Lafayette should be disclosed, that he might then act accordingly. As to Dumouriez, who was not intrusted with these, he had nothing but the war present to his imagination, an enemy on our territory, whence it was necessary to chase him, and the possibility, by following him, to enter the Low Countries successfully, on account of the disposition of the inhabitants,

which had been long known to him, and which was indeed so friendly, that even the follies of the French had not been able to cool it.

The invasion of the Netherlands, in short, appeared to him to be decisive as to the safety of his country. All France seemed to be in consternation on account of our bad success hitherto, and the assembling of 80,000 Germans on the frontiers of Champagne. It would have given energy to the nation, and have doubled the strength of the armies. In short, it would have inspired all the factions with a more noble interest than that with which they were occupied; for by uniting them against the external enemy, it would have destroyed their dangerous activity, which he perceived would lead to a speedy catastrophe, that could not fail to ruin all by engendering a civil war.

Every thing conspired to produce the ruin of France, and of the king. Dillon, confining himself entirely to the defensive system, which he was doubtless ordered to do, would not assemble his army, lest he should be forced by circumstances to change his plan :

plan : he accordingly divided the troops into three separate camps.

That of Maulde, which remained under the direction of Dumouriez, consisted of twenty-three battalions and five squadrons, including the garrisons of Orchies, Marchiennes, and St. Amand. That of Maubeuge, under the command of lieutenant-general Lanoue, contained twelve battalions and six squadrons, and that of Pont-sur-Sambre, eight battalions and five squadrons. Dillon himself commanded the last; it was a situation of his own choosing, and a very bad one. The forest of Mormale, which extended between this camp and that of the Imperialists at Bavay, prevented the French from attacking the enemy, who indeed had rendered inroads on that side impracticable, by stopping up the roads with trees. This camp had the Sambre in the rear, and on its two flanks, by which means it became a peninsula, and there was only one bridge to serve in case of a retreat. In front there was not any space between the forest and the camp, and the Imperialists might have

easily succeeded in carrying it, had they but made the attempt.

This separation of troops augmented the schism still more. The camps of Maubeuge and Pont-sur-Sambre became entirely attached to the party of Lafayette: the camp of Maulde was totally devoted to Dumouriez. It was this disjunction that sensibly divided the army into two factions, the more inflamed, because the two generals, now removed to a greater distance, saw each other but seldom. One small advantage however resulted from it; this was an emulation in harassing the enemy by means of detachments, a circumstance which inured the troops to warfare.

General Dumouriez, shut up within his own camp, no longer occupied himself about any thing else than the disciplining and training of his little army, and the forming of its officers. The troops of the line, the volunteers, the officers, and the soldiers, were all replete with confidence and good will, but they were raw and inexperienced.

He began by forming two flanking *corps* of four or five hundred each, which went daily

daily a skirmishing; they were renewed, both officers and soldiers, every week, except those belonging to the staff; and all the battalions took their turn of service, so that every one might be employed, and all be accustomed to fatigue and the fight of the enemy.

Every commanding officer received a paper of instructions from the hand of the general, on the back of which was traced a map of that part of the country through which he was to pass; on this were also laid down the various roads, bridges, villages, farm-houses, and mills, near which they were to march in going and returning home, the spots where troops were to be posted, the points of attack, &c. These detachments for the most part proved successful, and brought in horses and prisoners to the camp. They received orders to keep on good terms with the inhabitants, and the general caused the property that was stolen to be restored.

During all this time, the battalions were exercised daily, and assisted in erecting palisadoes on the redoubts, in throwing bridges

over the Scarpe, and in digging trenches, The tour of duty in the camp, and in the various detached guards, was extremely severe. Every man had his proper post assigned to him, in case of surprise. Neither idleness nor cabals prevailed in the army; there were neither jacobins nor feuillans there; the newspapers were but little read; and the twelve or thirteen thousand troops, of which it consisted, became perceptibly more warlike.

While employed in occupations purely military, the general received intelligence of the frightful catastrophe of the 10th of August. This event, the particulars of which were but little known to him, or his troops, did not occasion any very lively impression either for or against the king; they continued to think only of the enemy. As to the general, he had long foreseen the struggle between the two factions, the superiority of either of which must render Louis unfortunate.

As both of them equally supported themselves on the basis of the constitution, he considered the king as being almost left
to

to be pitied, while a prisoner to the victorious faction, than when exposed to the malevolence of both at the same time. He had been highly blameable on account of his flight during the course of the preceding year; and the general, who had been so lately a member of the administration, well knew that this unfortunate prince was surrounded by a certain description of men, who would not fail to afford ample cause of complaint against him.

He hoped that his inviolability would be respected; that the constitution would repair all; that the nation, now unanimous, would no longer occupy itself with any other object than the external enemy; that the war would accordingly be of shorter duration; that at the peace, tranquillity would ensue, and the executive power being once durably fixed, that the king would resume his place, in the same manner as had happened in a nearly similar situation, in the course of the former year. The manner in which the national assembly at first treated him and his family, in the prison of the temple, confirmed him in his opinion, and precluded
the

the anticipation of those tragical and criminal events which have since ensued.

A few days afterwards, he received a copy of an oath which had been taken by the troops encamped at Maubeuge, and Pont-sur-Sambre, accompanied by a very short and blunt order, to administer the same to those in the camp of Maulde. It resembled the ancient one, " I swear to be faithful to the nation, the law, and the king;" but was now both dangerous and ill timed. This unhappy oath, joined to Lafayette's insurrection, is one of the causes of that violent commotion, which has produced the ruin of the constitution, of the king, and of France.

His majesty had become the prisoner of a faction, and by this oath the army would have declared itself in favour of the party that had been forced to succumb. This was tantamount to the declaration of a civil war. The king was in the hands of a triumphant, and irritated faction, which wished to avenge the loss of more than ten thousand citizens, that this victory over foreigners and revolted nobles had cost: he must therefore

fore of necessity fall a victim to the jacobins, after such a declaration on the part of the army.

The king was perhaps culpable; in that case the law would pronounce the forfeiture of the crown. This was a subject for a civil trial, and it did not belong to the army to decide on the case; for if it took a side without being acquainted with the particulars, it would aggravate its wrongs. In short, more than one hundred and twenty thousand Germans, or Italians, were on the borders of France, and were ready to take advantage of our internal troubles, in order to invade it. This was not a proper moment for us to occupy our attention about the person of the king, who, all august as he was, was no more than a secondary object; or to sacrifice our country to this consideration.

Dumouriez transmitted these observations to Dillon, and did not permit the oath to be administered. Unfortunately, Dillon caused the oath accompanied by his own order to be published in the newspapers; he was then obliged

obliged to assign the motives of his disobedience in the same journals.

The national assembly, which was exceedingly discontented with the oath in question, dispatched commissioners, chosen out of its own body, to all the armies. Lafayette raised the standard of revolt. He caused the three commissioners destined for his camp to be arrested. He ought to have marched instantly to Paris. Dumouriez was utterly unacquainted with Lafayette's proceedings. He cannot blame his conduct, for he afterwards found himself precisely in the same situation, when exactly the same events ensued.

All that can be said, in order to justify either of them after their ill success, must arise from this consideration, that the impetuosity of the nation, and all the events of the revolution, have been instantaneous, and unforeseen; that measures have never kept pace with catastrophes; that the jacobins have always been more active and more powerful than men of worth, because they practised upon a greater mass of people, consisting

of those possessing least reflection, the most violent, and the most easy to be carried all lengths, as they had not any thing to lose, love blood, and had every thing to gain by crimes and massacres.

As a proof that Lafayette had not time to perfect his project, or to combine his movements, he had come to no agreement either with the Imperialists, or the Prussians, and was, as well as the companions of his flight, arrested by the latter, and delivered over to the king of Prussia, who still detains him in prison, without having any right to do so; for he possesses no jurisdiction over this unfortunate general, who was not taken in the course of war. He cannot be considered, therefore, either as being subject to his authority, or as his prisoner. It is an arbitrary act exercised against a man, who might have proved serviceable had he been but properly managed. At least, some respect ought to have been shewn him, on account of the effort made by him to save Louis XVI. If he had not been deemed in the smallest degree serviceable, it would have been but just to have allowed him to have passed through Holland,

Holland, in order to retire to America, where he might have wept over the evils he had brought upon his country by a revolutionary zeal but ill understood, and a bad imitation of his model, Washington. But the unreflecting rage of the emigrants misled the justice of the Prussian monarch, who has become the instrument of their vengeance.

C H A P. V.

*Commissioners from the National Assembly.
Dumouriez Commander in Chief. He goes
into Champagne. State of Lafayette's army.*

ON the 14th of August, three deputies from the national assembly arrived at Valenciennes; these were Delmas, Dubois-Dubays, and Bellegarde. They had brought severe instructions relative to Dillon, whom the circumstance of the oath had rendered suspected, and they had orders to depose him, as well as general Lanoue. There was at this time at the baths of St. Amand a deputy of the name of Couthon, who had lost the use of both his legs. This man, who acts a great part in the revolution, with a mild appearance, and the reputation of being a good friend, a good husband, and a good father, is yet one of the most cruel and dangerous tyrants of the anarchical faction, in consequence of the
excess

excess of his fanaticism, which is unbounded. As men's minds were not then exalted to that degree of ferocity to which they have since arrived, Couthon was a reasonable being, and the baths being in the neighbourhood of the camp of Maulde, he had had several conferences with the general, with whom he became intimate.

He immediately set off to join his brethren, who, before they saw general Dumouriez, had had an interview with Dillon, whose excuses they had received, and whom they had retained in his command. This was a decision injurious to general Dumouriez, and displeased the army at Maulde. The general disapproved of the precipitation of the commissioners, without however uttering any complaint. He easily perceived, that Lafayette, who was not yet known to have declared himself, was about to be at least dismissed; Dillon would then take his place, and he of course would assume the command in the room of the latter, which would enable him to recommence an offensive system of operations, and to execute his plan of invading the Low Countries.

Couthon

Couthon enlightened the commissioners relative to the fault they had committed, in so hastily confirming Dillon in the command, who was at least suspected, and perhaps by this time accused, at Paris. They, in order to repair their fault, visited the camp of Maulde, where Dumouriez waited for them in tranquillity. They were however relieved from their anxiety, by a courier who arrived unexpectedly from the national assembly, and announced Lafayette's defection, and the nomination of Dumouriez as commander in chief of the two armies. The camp of Maulde discovered inexpressible joy, more especially when he assured his soldiers, that he would not forsake them. This was, in truth, his first project; he hoped to be able to act upon the offensive, and to carry the war into the Austrian Low Countries.

Dillon, who was his senior officer, who had formerly commanded him, and been recently confirmed in this command by the commissioners, found much difficulty in consenting to serve under him; but Dumouriez soon made him easy, by proposing that he should put himself at the head

of Lafayette's army, assuring him at the same time, that he should sincerely labour to render his situation independent, and that he should no longer be subjected to his orders, than until the council had decided favourably on his proposition.

He accordingly composed, and transmitted by the same courier, a memorial to the executive power, in which he stated, that the command hitherto conferred on Lafayette, from the frontiers of Alsace to Dunkirk, was far too extensive for the moral and physical faculties of any one man; that it embraced two very distinct species of warfare, and an immense detail relative to the fortified towns, the provision, contracts, and movements, which a single head could indeed comprehend in a general point of view, but which it was impossible for it to follow through all the minutiae.

He was of opinion, that it would be extremely useful to the country, were this charge, too extensive in its own nature, separated into two independent commands, of which the connection should be immediate, but the responsibility distinct, the present
general

general responsibility being calculated to frighten every man who wished to do his duty. This memorial was sent off, and Dillon was contented.

The faction of the Gironde was at this time predominant in France, and it had just humbled Lafayette's party, by the assistance of the Jacobins. It had restored Servan to the war, Roland to the home department, and Clavieres once more superintended the public contributions. These had been turned out on the 12th of June, by Dumouriez : but perceiving that this general was the only one whom they could oppose to Lafayette, and the enemies now about to enter France, these three ministers felt it required of them to sacrifice their resentments, which they did with sincerity, and transmitted letters of felicitation to the general, with which he was much pleased.

As their confidence in Dillon was not as yet fully re-established, the answer to the memorial was at first procrastinated, and the request at length negatived : thus Dumouriez found himself charged with the whole burden of the war. His determination to send

Dillon to take the command of the army of the centre proceeded from his attachment to his favourite project, as he wished to prove, by executing the plan presented to the two generals in the month of April, and afterwards to Luckner, that if we had not succeeded, and had now actually made less progress than at the commencement of the war, this did not arise from any defect in the project, but the generals themselves.

He hoped to have time sufficient to prepare for all events. Marshal Luckner was along with his army at Metz, and would naturally form a junction with general Dillon, for the defence of the department of the Ardennes. This department was protected by a line of fortresses, which must have been taken before the enemy could penetrate into Lorraine, or Champagne. These sieges would of course produce delays, which would afford him time to enter the Austrian Netherlands, and change the nature of the war. He therefore instantly dispatched Dillon, accompanied by general Chazot, who was well acquainted with the country, by having long commanded there. He gave him general Vouillers,

Voulliers, who was to act as the head of his staff; this officer commanded at Valenciennes, and was perfectly acquainted with all the details relative to the infantry.

He then occupied his whole time about the northern army, which he wished to form and assemble. He made a promotion of five lieutenant generals, and seven major generals. The five former consisted of Moreton, whom he put at the head of his own staff; Labourdonnaye, commanding officer at Lille; Marassé, who commanded at Douay; Omoran, who commanded at Condé; and Beurnonville, who although recently made a major general, had well deserved this rapid advancement, on account of his having boldly retained his position at the camp of Maulde, during the whole summer, with scarce three thousand men, against forces greatly superiour.

The commissioners received orders to make a very scrupulous examination into Lanoue's conduct, who commanded the camp at Maubeuge, and even to dismiss him. Dumouriez had known and esteemed him during the space of thirty years, although

they had become cool to each other in consequence of party disputes. He sent for him to Valenciennes, became security for him to the commissioners, and prevailed upon them to continue him in his command, which was in very good hands.

It was necessary to be certain of the troops in the camp of *Pont-sur-Sambre*, who were entirely Fayettezied. The general had a man of very great merit in the camp of Maulde: this was a colonel of dragoons of the name of Duval. He was an old officer, and had served during the wars of Hanover and Corsica in the legion of Soubise. Duval joined all the civil virtues to great military talents, and this affair was entirely accommodated with only the dismissal of a colonel of dragoons, and two lieutenant-colonels of infantry.

The national assembly had dispatched three new commissioners to Sedan, in order to force Lafayette to liberate the others. On their leaving Paris, they had written to Dumouriez to engage him to march with his army against the rebellious general, with which he could not however comply, on account of
the

the proximity of the enemy; although, in consequence either of a singular accident or extraordinary combination, the duke of Teschen had seized this opportunity to decamp from Bavay, and retire to Mons.

The moment he received his commission, he had written to all the constituted authorities of the department of the Ardennes, more especially to those of Sedan, to command them to set the commissioners at liberty, and to arrest Lafayette. He had transmitted similar orders to all the military commanders, under the most severe penalties. These had reached Sedan on the 20th.

Lafayette abandoned his camp on the 21st, with nearly all his general officers, and the whole of his staff. Of all those belonging to his army, there only remained three major generals; Ligneville, shut up in Montmedi, nearly invested by the Prussians; Dangest at the head of the artillery, who now also commanded the army; and Dietmann, an old officer, brave, but of limited talents. Lieutenant general Leveneur was the last who departed; he returned afterwards in order

to resume his post, which Dumouriez would not permit; on this he served during three weeks as a simple hussar, and after this expiation the general restored him to his rank: he is a very brave and ambitious man, but is destitute of judgment; the soldiers love him because he is affable, and wears an enormous pair of whiskers, and a cap like those formerly used by the officers of police; he has committed many follies since, with the best possible intentions.

Dangeft transmitted all these particulars to the general, conjuring him at the same time to repair quickly to head quarters, acknowledging that he himself was incapable of conducting an army discouraged and disorganized by the defection of its leaders, for in addition to the generals and officers of the staff, nearly all the colonels and lieutenant colonels had gone off, and among others one of Dumouriez' own cousins, the last of his relations who had not emigrated.

Dangeft, who indeed was incapable of commanding the army, at the same time informed him that the enemy had entered
France

France in two columns, one of which menaced Thionville, while the other laid siege to Longwy. The general, who knew that Longwy was a strong place, and the commanding officer old and experienced, was not very uneasy about it, and did not think it incumbent on him to alter his dispositions. Dillon too, who was on his journey, would of course assemble the army, and either relieve, and throw supplies into Longwy, or retard the siege.

He therefore continued his preparations with the chief commissary Malus, and Moreton, who was at the head of his staff, in respect to every thing necessary for opening the campaign. As the Swiss regiments had just been disbanded, and there were three of them in garrisons on the northern frontier, he gave orders to enlist all the non-commissioned officers and soldiers who might present themselves, and he intended that these should form the basis of eight independent battalions, of eight hundred men each, into which also the Austrian deserters were to be incorporated, in virtue of the *impracticable* decree, which granted each of them one hundred

hundred *livres per annum*, and fifty *livres* by way of gratification. He also gave orders to increase to six thousand men the body of Belgians intended to act as the vanguard of his army. He demanded an augmentation of troops and of arms from the minister of war, and he procured a further supply from Holland, by the way of Dunkirk.

The ministers had dispatched several of their emissaries to Lafayette's camp, and among the rest an Alfacian called Westermann, who had distinguished himself greatly at the Thuilleries on the 10th of August; he had received the *brevet* rank of lieutenant colonel. He was intimately connected with Danton, at that time minister of justice. This man possesses an infinite share of audacity, a sly and affable disposition, and is very faithful in his attachments. He arrived from Sedan during the night between the 24th and 25th; he informed the commissioners and the general, that Longwy had surrendered on the 22d, after a siege of two days, that the army was reduced to despair, and on the point of disbanding; that it loudly demanded its general; and that if he did not
 instantly

instantly arrive, all was lost. There was no longer any room for deliberation.

The general spent the whole of the 25th, and the night between the 25th and 26th, in communicating instructions for continuing the preparations for the expedition into the Low Countries; he specially entrusted this business to Malus and Moreton, and he transmitted orders to Labourdonnaye to resign the command of Lisle to Ruault, who had been just made a major general, and to set out for Valenciennes, in order to put himself at the head of the army during his absence. He announced that he should return at the expiration of six weeks, that he would still undertake the expedition into Belgium in the course of that year, a circumstance to which nobody gave any credit, and he set off on the 26th, in company with Westermann, a single *aide-de-camp*, and his faithful *valet-de-chambre* Baptiste.

On his arrival at Sedan on the morning of the 28th, he discovered the evil to be far greater than it had been described. The army was divided into two bodies. The advanced guard, consisting of six thousand
chosen

chosen troops, occupied a camp on the right banks of the Meuse, and the heights of Vau, that would have required forty thousand men to have defended. The main body, composed of seventeen thousand men, was posted three leagues in the rear, on the heights that overlooked Sedan. This camp was not a good one.

The consternation was general. The soldiers considered all the officers as traitors, and this made a pretext to neglect all discipline and subordination. No one took upon him to issue orders, and assuredly, if the duke of Brunswick, between the 22d and 28th, had but pushed forward a body of only ten thousand men toward Sedan, this army would have either dispersed itself among the fortified places, or fled as far as Paris. The members of the departments and districts expected a counter-revolution, and were far from being displeased at the idea; and the three commissioners who had been arrested, and afterwards released, had returned with precipitation to Paris, which augmented the confusion and alarm.

The general, who had not brought his camp equipage along with him, appropriated Lafayette's horses and domestics to his own use. After assembling and encouraging the administrative bodies of Mezières and Sedan, he went to visit the troops. These had been long since prejudiced against him, and he perceived a sullen air to prevail every where, more especially among the cavalry. On passing along the front of a company of grenadiers appertaining to a regiment of the line, he heard one of them exclaim: "It is that b—— who brought on the war." This being one of the motives by which they had striven to render him odious, he instantly stopped and said: "Is there any one here so great a coward as to lament the war? Do you hope to gain your liberties without fighting for them?" This produced a good effect, and served to reanimate every body.

He learned, in the course of the same day, that the king of Prussia was marching against Verdun. That town is far from being strong; it was full of provision, and yet its garrison did not consist of more than two battalions, commanded by the brave Beauregard.

Galbaud,

Galbaud, lieutenant-colonel of artillery, was well acquainted with the place, where he had commanded, but Lafayette had withdrawn him. Dumouriez instantly appointed him a major-general, on purpose to confer authority upon and inspire him with emulation, and he dispatched him in the course of that very day (the 28th) with two battalions, one of which consisted of troops of the line.

Galbaud in vain pressed forward his troops, for Verdun was already completely invested. He could march no further than Dun, where he was in danger of being taken prisoner; thence he retired with his two battalions to St. Menehould, across the forest of Argonne. This circumstance perhaps precipitated the fate of Verdun, but it is one of the causes of the safety of Champagne and of France. He found there the two battalions of the garrison of Longwy, which had also retired thither.

CHAP. VI.

*Engagement at Stenay. Capture of Verdun.
Camp of Grandprey.*

AFFAIRS at this moment were nearly desperate. The army was destitute of generals and superior officers, and divided into factions. More than one half of the soldiers lamented the loss of a leader whom they had adored, and considered his successor as the author of his ruin, and his personal enemy; the remainder was entirely unacquainted with the new general, who, never having had a separate command, did not possess any reputation, and was represented to them as a man conversant in civil affairs alone. On the other hand, he himself did not know any one of the regiments, or officers of this army; he had neither general nor staff officers to assist him; he had never been
before

before in the country which he was now about to defend; he every where perceived terrour or disinclination prevalent; he could not, after the fate of Longwy, depend on the resistance of any of the fortresses; he knew that Sedan, if attacked, was incapable of making a defence, and that Mezières was not in a better state; he had no more than about twenty-three thousand disorganised troops, to oppose to upwards of eighty thousand well disciplined men, conducted by a powerful monarch and celebrated generals, and he could not muster above four or five thousand cavalry, against a body of horse four times as numerous, and possessing a great reputation.

He was obliged too, to quit his present position, in a hilly country, to march first to defend the extensive plains of Champagne, and afterwards, all the open country between the Marne and the Seine. It must be recollected also, that he had not any confidence in the support of marshal Luckner, a man worn out with age, and his personal enemy, who had thrown himself with nearly twenty-five thousand men into the
camp

camp of Richemont, in order to cover Metz, which had been neglected to be put in a state of defence; besides this, he could not rely on speedy succour, on account of the distance of the northern army; he did not expect from Paris and its neighbourhood any other than new raised battalions, destitute of officers and discipline, badly armed, and ignorant even of the manner of firing a musket; and as to his cavalry, that entirely consisted of national gendarmes, that is to say, of the *maréchaussée*, who were incapable of forming and manœuvring in squadrons, or of light horse of the new levy, which could not be opposed to the Prussian and Austrian cavalry.

Although deeply impressed by this melancholy picture, Dumouriez opposed to it the firmness of his own character, and the appearance of the greatest confidence, and even of the greatest gaiety. He assembled on the evening of the 28th a great council of war, composed of lieutenant-general Dillon, and his four major-generals, Vouillers, Chazot, Dangeft, and Dietmann, Petit his principal commissary, a man of real merit, and his

own staff, which consisted of three officers. He presented a map of Champagne, and then told them : “ that the king of Prussia having taken Longwy, and sat down before Verdun, while another body of the army advanced beyond Thionville, and menaced Metz, there were no means left, either to form a junction with marshal Luckner, or to receive succours from any other quarter, in time to march against the Prussians and deliver Verdun ; that he had dispatched general Galbaud thither with two battalions ; that whether he did or did not succeed in throwing himself into a place, with the weakness of which every body was acquainted, it ought to be regarded as lost, for it could only hold out a few days, more or less, according to the success of Galbaud’s mission ; that whatever might occur, he could not receive any reinforcements for more than a fortnight, and that even then, these reinforcements would be very scanty.

“ Accordingly there was nothing to be depended upon but the little army which they had along with them, and which was entrusted with the salvation of their native country ; it did not,

in truth, amount to one quarter of the enemy's forces, but, on the other hand, the cavalry was composed of the best regiments of France, and consisted of upwards of five thousand men; more than one half of the infantry, which exceeded eighteen thousand, was formed of regiments of the line, the remainder of battalions of national guards, well disciplined, rendered warlike by a year's encampment, perpetual marches, and continual skirmishes with the enemy: the artillery was numerous and excellent, there being more than sixty pieces in the park besides the battalion guns.

“ That with these means, and the advantage of acting in their own country, every thing was to be expected, because the Prussians would of course be retarded by the necessity of undertaking sieges, the difficulty of finding provision, the delays incident to their convoys, their own numbers, and above all, by the formidable quantity of their artillery. Their numerous cavalry, the brilliant equipages of so many princes, the quantity of draught horses necessary to transport their

cannon and provision, would render their march tedious and embarrassing. That it was impossible to remain inactive in the position before Sedan, and that it was necessary on the instant to take some decided part."

Dumouriez assembled this council of war for no other purpose than to make himself acquainted with the talents and characters of his generals; for, during the whole time he commanded an army, he has ever acted in consequence of his own suggestions, and never held any council but that at Sedan: he even thinks, that the communication of plans to subalterns is befitting weak and hesitating generals alone, who are anxious to find an excuse for their conduct.

Lieutenant-general Dillon began by stating it was his opinion, "that we ought to leave the Marne between us and the enemy, and reach Châlons before they had gotten thither. He proved by a reference to the map, that the Prussians were nearer Verdun than we were to Sedan. He observed, with abundance of reason, that in case they anticipated us, they would then be between Paris and the army, and that the safety of the capital was

was of more consequence than the preservation of a country which we were unable to defend."

He concluded by proposing, "to leave general Chazot with a few battalions in the entrenched camp before Sedan, and to make a rapid march with the remainder of the army, behind the forest of Argonne, by way of St. Meneshould, in order to reach Châlons, and even Rheims, if Châlons should be previously occupied; to post ourselves behind the Marne, to defend the passage of that river, and to wait for the reinforcements which would pour in from all parts, and enable us once more to advance."

This opinion was supported by such forcible reasons, that it was adopted by the whole council. The general then rose, said that he would reflect upon it, ordered Dillon to go, and withdraw the vanguard, the command of which he conferred upon him, and to bring it back to the left of the Marne, where he was either to encamp with it, or put it into cantonments around Mouzon; he at the same time intimated to him, that he should soon receive further orders.

The council having broken up, the general retained none of the members with him except Thouvenot, who was then only an adjutant-general and lieutenant-colonel. During the whole of the conference, he had attentively studied the physiognomies, characters, and opinions, of all present, and he thought that he discovered in this officer a transcendent genius, and a certain similarity of character and opinion with his own, although he had not explained himself, and had neither supported nor opposed the ruling opinion.

He was not deceived; Thouvenot from that moment became his friend, and his confident; he is indebted to him for part of his success, and what is very singular, they always hit upon the same plans, and the same means for carrying them into execution. Thouvenot has attained much knowledge, more especially relative to the details of reconnoitering, encamping, and marching; he also possesses great courage, infinite resources in the time of action, an indefatigable degree of exertion, and extensive views. Lafayette had employed and placed the utmost reliance in

in him, without taking any care, however, about his advancement ; he had not even forewarned him of his flight.

The moment they were alone the general said to him : “ that he did not approve of retiring to Châlons, as this would be abandoning Lorraine, the Bishopricks, and the Ardennes, which they could not re-conquer ; that besides this, it would be a fresh inducement for the Prussians to pursue them, and in such cases, a retreat would soon degenerate into a flight ; that on retiring behind the Marne, it would be absolutely necessary to burn Châlons, and sacrifice Rheims and Soissons ; that all communication between our army and that of the north, on one side, and with the troops under Luckner on the other, would be then entirely at an end ; that the Prussians would find abundance of provision, after having traversed Champagne-pouilleuse, in the rich countries around Rheims and Epernay ; that our position at Châlons would enable them, either to march to Paris by the road leading through Rheims and Epernay, or by Vitry and Troyes, unless they rather chose

to employ the two remaining months of the campaign in conquering Lorraine and the Ardennes; that even if they were inclined to cross the Marne at Châlons, it would be impossible to defend that river, which might be passed either above or below the town; that Châlons itself would afford a certain passage, even should the inhabitants permit them to burn the place; that the enemy would then proceed skirmishing all the way to Paris, there not being a single good position between Châlons and the capital; and that the army would be destroyed, even before their arrival there, by the numerous cavalry appertaining to the Prussians."

Then pointing to the forest of Argonne upon the map: "Behold," continued he, "the Thermopylæ of France; if I have but the good fortune to arrive there before the Prussians, all will be saved." Never was an electric shock communicated with more rapidity than the impression produced by this opinion to the mind of Thouvenot: replete with confidence from that movement, towards each other, they swore a lasting friendship, and no longer thought of any thing but

but the detail of this new plan. The general had not slept since the 24th; he went to bed that night; and his mind having become tranquil in consequence of his resolution, he enjoyed a repose during some hours, which had become very necessary to him.

The forest of Argonne is a belt of wood, which extends from within about a league of Sedan, and runs east and west, as far as Passavant, a little more than a league beyond St. Menehould; other tracts of wood, intermingled with plains, running in the direction of Rêvigny-aux-vaches, stretch towards Bar-le-duc; but the forest of Argonne, properly so called, does not extend further than Passavant, which makes its length thirteen leagues; its breadth is very unequal, being in some parts three or four leagues, while in others it does not exceed a league, and even sometimes half a league.

It separates the Bishopricks, a very rich and fertile country, from Champagne-pouilleuse, the most frightful desert in all France, the soil of which is a cold and viscous clay, and where there is neither water, wood,
nor

nor pasturage, but only a few miserable villages scattered over a steril plain, a few parts of which alone rise almost insensibly above the rest. The borders of the forest at the two extremities present a country rich in pasturage, and well stocked with inhabitants.

It is intersected with mountains, rivers, rivulets, lakes, and marshes, which render it impenetrable to the march of an army, except in five openings, which present an equal number of roads, leading from Champagne to the Bishopricks.

The first of these is *Le Chêne-populeux*; it is entirely uninclosed, and has a road through it, leading from Sedan to Rhétel. The second is *La Croix-aux-bois*, two leagues further to the west, where there is a waggon road through the forest from Briquenai to Vouziers. The third is *Grandprey*, of which a description will be found hereafter; at a league and a half from *Croix-aux-bois*, by the way of *Grandprey*, the great road from Stenay to Rheims passes. The fourth, at two leagues and a half from *Grandprey*, crosses from Varennes to St. Menehould, and is termed *La Chalade*. The fifth, situated a
little

little more than a league west, forms the great road from Verdun to Paris through St. Menehould ; it is called *les Islettes*.

Such is the forest that was to be occupied, and the five passes that were to be guarded, and disputed with the enemy. It was necessary for this purpose, to dispatch general Dillon with the advanced guard to St. Menehould, in order, that by means of a camp placed at Islettes, and a position assumed by him at Chalade, he might be enabled to shut up the two great roads of Clermont and Varennes, while he himself took post at Grandprey, on purpose to command the road leading to Rheims, and that of Croix-aux-bois ; a sufficient number of troops did not remain to block the passage of Chêne-populeux.

He however hoped that Verdun, into which he believed Galbaud had thrown himself, would at least hold out during a week. On the morning of the 29th he dispatched a courier to lieutenant-general Lanoue, commanding him instantly to detach four battalions and three squadrons to Avesnes. The same courier was to proceed to general Duval at Pont-

Pont-sur-Sambre; he carried him an order to strike his camp instantly, to repair to Avesnes, where he would meet the detachment from the camp of Maubeuge, and to be at Chêne-populeux, by means of forced marches, on the 7th. This division formed nearly six thousand good troops. Duval executed this urgent order with a precipitation so much the more marvellous, as the season was rainy, and the roads nearly impracticable.

The Prussians to the number of 40 or 50,000 men were besieging Verdun. From Verdun to Islettes there is only about six leagues distance, either through Clermont, or Varennes. Dillon was at Mouzon. From Mouzon to Islettes by Varennes, was nearly about ten leagues, passing along in front of Stenay, and consequently in the face of general Clerfait's army. To reach that place, by taking a circuit in the rear of the forest, would have doubled the distance. General Clerfait, with twenty thousand men, was at Stenay. From Stenay to Grandprey, is six leagues. General Dumouriez was at Sedan, and from Sedan to Grandprey,

prey, by Yon and Buzancy, the distance is twelve leagues ; in passing behind the forest it is more than twenty.

There were two roads leading to the defiles of Argonne. The one, further about, but safer in appearance, was to follow the great highway from Rhétel by Chêne-populeux, and thence to file off towards the left by Vouziers and St. Menehould ; the other, which was shorter, to traverse the plain between the forest and the Meuse.

If the general followed the first, he would discover his project. General Clerfait on this would have marched towards Grandprey ; detachments of Prussians would have made for Islettes ; he would have been anticipated in his plan of occupying the passes, cut off perhaps from all communication with Châlons, and forced to retire by Rhétel to Rheims. It was necessary, therefore, to take the road leading across the plain, but he had still an option. If setting off from Sedan and Mouzon, he marched through Tannay, Armoises, and Stone, skirting the forest at the same time, he would here again render his project evident, and general Clerfait could then,
either

either wait for him at Grandprey, and anticipate him at Vouziers, or attack him in his march, and at least take from him his artillery and baggage.

He adopted a third mode, more audacious than any of the other two, in which he succeeded. He had calculated from the beginning, that since general Clerfait had not advanced against him, and remained on the borders of the Meuse with a small advanced guard, posted on the left banks of that river, before Stenay, he headed no more than a *corps* of observation, to cover the siege; that therefore he did not wish to give battle on the left bank of the Meuse, but inclined, on the contrary, to leave that river between his own troops and the French army, if any disposition were made to march against him.

There is a most excellent position on the other side of the Meuse, in the rear of Stenay, called the camp of Brouenne. He had no manner of doubt, but that the moment he perceived him advancing against him, he would occupy this camp. He divided his army into three bodies. His vanguard received orders to march against Stenay, which

which they were to make. He himself conducted the main body, composed of twelve thousand men in order of battle, but without baggage, to support its vanguard ; and general Chazot with five thousand escorted the baggage and artillery, through Tannay and Armoises.

Before he proceeds in the narration of events, it will be necessary to point out the remainder of the measures adopted by him during the three days employed in making the necessary preparations. He transmitted orders to Beurnonville to bring with him twelve battalions and three squadrons from the camp of Maulde, also the French light infantry, and those of Belgium and Liege, forming eight or nine thousand men ; and he expressly enjoined him to be at Rhétel on the 13th of September. He asked the minister at war for the rank of lieutenant-general for Dangeft, Dietmann, and Ligneville, who, resisting the pernicious example held out to them, had remained faithfully at their posts ; he bestowed the same rank on Chazot, a very brave and exact old officer. He also appointed three new major-generals,

and

and Miaczinski, who had just arrived from Paris, made the fourth. He had now four lieutenant and eight major-generals, and he also augmented his own staff.

He dispatched couriers and officers by several different roads to Metz, on purpose to bring him intelligence. He gave orders to send ammunition from Fère and Douai, for he had no more than what would serve during a sharp action of four hours, and he could not strip either Mezieres, or Sedan, which might be soon besieged, of this article.

He pointed out first Châlons, and afterwards St. Menehould, as the place of rendezvous for all the reinforcements of infantry and cavalry, which might be sent him from the interior. He dispatched orders to general d'Harville to assume the command at Rheims, and to assemble troops there. He caused ovens to be constructed at Vouziers, Châlons, St. Menehould, Rhétel, and Rheims; and he gave directions for conducting to these towns all the provision and forage hitherto sent to Sedan, of which, with Verdun, Lafayette had made use for the deposition of his magazines,

zines, although Sedan was upon the extreme frontiers.

He shewed himself to his troops daily, and promised that in a short time they should be led against the enemy. He issued a new order of battle for his army, and as Dillon was to be detached immediately with his vanguard, he formed another, the command of which he bestowed upon Stengel, colonel of the regiment of Berchiny, for whom he demanded the *brevet* of major-general. He then spent two days with Thouvenot, Vouillers, who was at the head of the staff, Petit, commissary-general, and the superintendants of provision and forage, in arranging the business of the different departments, and he found them all actuated with much zeal and ability.

On the 30th he received a letter from Galbaud, dated at St. Menehould; who informed him, that he had not been able to enter Verdun, that he had been in some danger of being taken at Dun, and that he had retreated towards St. Menehould, where he found two battalions of volunteers of the garrison of Longwy without arms.

He commanded him instantly to take post at Islettes, with his four battalions, his four four pounders, the troopers belonging to the *maréchaussée* in the neighbourhood, and all the volunteers of the country, to form *abatis*, and throw up entrenchments and batteries, and not to abandon this post, whatever might occur, promising at the same time to send him a speedy succour.

This intelligence afforded him the utmost pleasure. He discovered the post at Islettes to be of much more importance than Verdun, and yet two days after, he was in danger of losing it. A detachment of emigrants and Prussians having entered Varennes, the troops who guarded the post of Islettes became panic struck, and carried Galbaud with them in their route as far as St. Menchould; if but only fifty Prussian hussars had advanced along the great road, St. Menchould also would have been abandoned, and the troops would have fled to Châlons. Luckily, however, the detachment of the enemy retreated from Varennes, and Galbaud resumed his position.

On the 31st of August, after arranging the garrison,

garrison, consisting of four battalions, which he left at Sedan, he made a movement with his army and artillery, that he might be ready to march the next day. He ordered general Dillon to send general Miaczinski with fifteen hundred men to attack Stenay, recommending it to him to support them, and to take post opposite that place on the left bank, and also in the wood of Neuville. General Miaczinski executed this order with the greatest vigour; a sharp action ensued, and a very warm engagement between the cavalry; the imperialists at length fell back, and Clerfait, as had been foreseen, withdrew his posts, and occupied the excellent camp of Brouenne. Dillon, not only neglected to support Miaczinski, but he made him retire to Mouzon, where he remained inactive.

On the 1st of September, the general marched towards Mouzon; he was astonished to find Dillon there, with his camp standing, believing him to have been ever since the preceding evening at Stenay; he himself had intended to have encamped at Mouzon, but he now continued his march, and encamped

by the side of the great road leading to Stenay, with his head quarters at Yon. He posted some infantry in the wood of Neuville, and along the borders of the Meuse; nobody occupied Stenay, some of the inhabitants of which came to join him. On the 2d he himself encamped at Berlière, and Dillon at St. Pierremont. On the 3d Dillon arrived at Varennes, passed through the defile of Chalade, and took post at Islettes. The army rested that day at Berlière, in order to allow Chazot's column to pass, and on the 4th it occupied the camp of Grandprey.

This camp is situated between the Aisne and Aire, the left being flanked by the village of Grandprey, and the right by that of Marque. It consists of a grand amphitheatre, very much elevated above a meadow, terminated by the river Aire, which separates Grandprey from the site of the encampment, thence running by the end of the village of Marque, and all along the front of the camp. This amphitheatre is skirted by the forest towards the right, and bounded by the river on the left.

In

In the rear of this camp is the village of Senucque, where the park of artillery was stationed. The communication across the river was kept up by means of a stone bridge, and the Aisne was afterwards passed on a second bridge, at the village of Grandcamp. The Aisne runs behind the camp, and is bordered by rising grounds, elevated above the level of the camp.

A strong advanced guard was posted in front of the Aire, forming a half moon, and passing from the right to the left by St. Jouvin, Verpelle, Bessieu, and Mortaume. St. Jouvin is a flat and circular spot, easy of defence. Colonel Stengel was posted there; his retreat was secured by means of two bridges opposite Marque. Verpelle and Champigneul were only points of communication; the retreat thence was towards Bessieu. Bessieu is a village protected by a woody mountain, extending along the front of the camp. The point of retreat was towards the village of Chevières, by means of two bridges, under the fire of the castle of Grandprey, and all the batteries of the camp. Mortaume, which protected the

left, is situated on a height that overlooks the plain, and almost joins the forest.

In order to force this camp, it would be first necessary to attack and carry all the posts of the advanced guard, and afterwards to cross the Aire. The enemy would then find themselves within a basin surrounded by fire, proceeding as well from the heights of Marque, and the castle of Grandprey, as from the front of the camp. The French could not be forced hence without the loss of fifteen or twenty thousand men. They might then resume a second formidable position behind the Aire, on the heights of Autry. This camp may be considered as impregnable, more especially when defended by a numerous and excellent park of French artillery,

C H A P. VII.

Kellerman appointed to the command of the army of the Moselle. Luckner at Châlons. Consternation of Paris. The Prussians before Grandprey.

VERDUN surrendered on the 2d of September, without making any defence. The first intelligence of this event was circulated on the morning of the 3d, but it happened very fortunately that no one believed it. On the 4th, the general had scarcely arrived in the camp of Grandprey, when he received a confirmation of this news. He also learned the particulars of the capitulation, and the heroick despair of Beauregard, who, forced by the magistrates and the people, and not finding a sufficient support in a weak and slender garrison, destitute of experience, to enable him to resist terror or treason, had killed himself, in order that he might not

survive that cowardice, which he could not prevent. When this event, and all the particulars that accompanied it were made known, far from discouraging the army, it rather redoubled its confidence in its leader; it waited patiently for the arrival of the Prussians; it beheld itself in a strong camp, whither it had been conducted very opportunely; it considered itself as the sole resource of France; and it was fully penetrated with the importance of the post which it was destined to sustain.

The general immediately wrote a very laconick letter to the minister Servan: "Verdun is taken. I expect the Prussians. The camps of Grandprey and Islettes, have become the Thermopylæ, but I shall prove more fortunate than Leonidas."

In another epistle, he particularized all the advantages of his position, and all his wants. He communicated the orders transmitted to Beurnonville and Duval, to form a junction with him; he enclosed a copy of the instructions which he had dispatched to Labourdonnaye, for the defence of the northern department, and to Moreton and Malus, for

hastening the preparations to enable him to carry on an offensive war in the Low Countries; assuring him at the same time, that he had no manner of doubt but he should still be able to effect this expedition, in the course of that very year, provided he were but properly seconded.

He informed him also, that he should remain long enough in the camp of Grandprey to receive succours from Flanders, and all the reinforcements which he might be inclined to send. He besought him to detach from the army of the Rhine, which had nothing to fear, a body of five or six thousand men, to reinforce that of Metz, and to order Luckner to put his troops in motion, to take the Prussians in flank and rear, as soon as their plans had been fully developed, making a circuit at the same time by Ligny and Bar le Duc, to be at hand to cover the Barrois, Vitry, and St. Dizier, through which Charles V had formerly penetrated into Champagne.

He begged that Luckner might approach nearer to him, so as to have it in his power either to form a junction of the two armies,

or

or at least to send him a reinforcement equivalent to that which he himself was to receive from the army of Alsace. He detailed to him all the various events likely to ensue, and more especially what the Prussians might possibly undertake after the capture of Verdun. The season was far advanced, and rainy. He foresaw that they would choose to advance directly to Paris, rather than consume the remainder of the campaign in sieges. He mentioned as a proof of this, that they had neglected to take Montmedy, which they had left in their rear, although it could not fail greatly to interrupt their communication with Luxembourg, whence they must draw their supplies. In truth, in consequence of the activity of general Ligneville, the garrison of Montmedy was of great disservice to them.

He was firmly of opinion, in consequence of the preference given to Verdun over Montmedy, the false hopes with which the emigrants fed the monarch of Prussia, and the entreaties of the king's brothers who accompanied him, that this prince seeing no strong place between his army and Paris, by

the road leading from Châlons, would select that as the readiest and least difficult route ; and, imagining it would be extremely easy to drive the French from the forest of Argonne, he would attack them there, that he might not leave behind a body of troops to harass him, not doubting, after having overcome this trifling difficulty, to arrive in seven or eight marches at Paris, without meeting with any other obstacle. He dispatched at the same time some intercepted letters to the minister, all of which demonstrated the certainty of the intended march to Paris, and the firm persuasion on the part of the emigrants of immediate success.

He also communicated these ideas to marshal Luckner, then at Metz : he had in the mean time taken care to post officers and other persons, on whom he could depend, at different stations, to keep up an uninterrupted communication by means of couriers. The answer which he received very speedily from Metz, was written by Kellermann, who, with five thousand men belonging to the army of the Rhine, had arrived there to succeed the
 marshal,

marshal, the latter having been sent for to Paris, less with a view of evincing any confidence in, than of getting rid of him, on account of his inactivity. However, as the ministry did not choose to shock the remaining prejudices of the people, who still retained some confidence in the reputation of this old general, he was sent to Châlons to superintend the troops that were assembling there, from all quarters, and to give his advice to the two acting generals, without possessing however any authority over them.

He however proved not only useless at Châlons, but even hurtful, because the crowd of newly levied Frenchmen, that hurried thither, ridiculed his orders and his person, the latter of which was more than once exposed; because speaking French badly, and being destitute of understanding, he was unable to make himself obeyed; but still more, because by his counsel and his commands, he prevented general Kellermann from effecting a junction with general Dumouriez. At length, the executive power was first
constrained

constrained to appoint Lacos as his assessor, without whose consent he was prevented writing a single letter, and afterwards to recal him.

These are all the the services which France has reaped from a general, whom the duke de Choiseul *purchased* in 1763, to whom thirty six thousand *livres* had been paid in the course of thirty years, and who would have proved very useful if he had never been created marshal of France, or appointed commander in chief. The cannibals have since made this old warrior perish beneath their infamous and unjust guillotine.

Kellermann intimated to Dumouriez, that an army under the princes of Hohenlohe and Condé was besieging Thionville; that he had great reliance on the talents of general Wimpfen, who commanded in that place, and also on the strength of his garrison; that he was about to augment the garrisons of Toul and Metz, and should instantly march with the remainder of his army, which would still amount to eighteen or twenty thousand men, by Ligny and Bar, on purpose to approach the point of *Revigny-aux-vaches*,

as

as had been requested. According to a calculation of his marches, the junction might be effected on the 14th or 15th, and then the two armies united to the two divisions from the northern department, would have produced a mass of nearly sixty thousand men, with whom it would have been possible to have stopped the progress of the enemy.

Dumouriez daily expected the appearance and attack of the Prussians; he did not lose a single moment in making preparations to resist them, and he found himself warmly seconded by the ardour of his troops. He had pointed out to every one the mode of defence most conformable to his situation. He had ordered the inhabitants to form *abatis**, along the skirts of the forest, and he excited them by proclamations, to take up arms the moment they should hear the alarm bells rung; but he did not find them heartily disposed towards the service. This canton is full of ennobled tradesmen, who,

* These consist of trees cut down, and laid in a horizontal position, with their branches towards the enemy, the roots being interred, and the branches pointed.

—*Transf.*

being

being vain of their *brittle* * nobility, damped the patriotifm of the peasantry. A part of this country also appertains to the prince de Condé, who has many partisans there.

He had established a chain of posts, on purpose to keep up the communication with general Dillon through Marque, Châtel, and Apremont, to Chalade and Islettes. He had ordered this general to dispatch to Passavant a body of light infantry, and several squadrons of chasseurs and hussars, to consume the forage on the borders of the Aire, to protect the Barrois, and prevent the enemy from making incursions, and harassing his left flank.

He had posted a colonel of dragoons, with

* This is an allusion to the first tradesman who received letters patent of nobility. As he happened to be a *glass maker*, the courtiers of that day, mortified at beholding a man invested with a title, to which he had no other claim than a laudable and successful industry, affected to be very witty on the *fragility* of the commodity manufactured by him; and the expression here made use of was kept up as a *standing jest* against ennobled tradesmen and their descendants.—*Transf.*

two battalions and two squadrons, at Croix-aux-bois. He transmitted particular instructions to this officer, concerning the manner of fortifying his post by means of felled trees, and entrenchments, his right being strengthened by the rivulet of Longouve, and his left by that of Noirval. He had recommended to him above all things to break up the road from Briquenay and Bout-au-bois, as far as the foot of his entrenchments. It will be seen by the event how important this was, and general Dumouriez will not dissemble that he himself was to blame in this matter. Accurate military memoirs ought to present a lesson to generals, by the narration of faults, as well as by that of the best concerted operations.

He had too few troops to spare any in order to line the opening of Chêne-populeux, which was to be guarded by the division under general Duval. He had however detached thither one hundred infantry, and some dragoons belonging to the garrison of Sedan, on purpose to exhibit an appearance of defence, until the arrival of the division alluded to from Pont-sur-sambre. He was very uneasy about

about this post, between the 4th and the 7th. But the punctual appearance of general Duval on that day, released him from his fears, and at this epoch his whole system of defence was completed, and he was enabled to resist at every point.

He had made draughts from the garrisons of Givet, Phillippeville, Marienbourg, and Rocroy, on purpose to reinforce the garrison of Sedan; these amounted in all to about two thousand men, two hundred of which consisted of cavalry, and he dispatched general Miaczinski with orders to make frequent excursions with large detachments, as well to keep up the communication with Montmedy, as to assist Ligneville in intercepting the convoys from Longwy and Luxembourg. He had sent colonel Nolzer along with him, in order to assist him; he was an officer of very great merit, and well able to defend the place in case it should be besieged. Miaczinski was admirably calculated for this species of warfare, and he accordingly rendered the greatest services. He was at the same time charged with the raising a legion.

The distance is only five leagues between
 VOL. III. I the

the camp of Grandprey and St. Menehould, and ten from St. Menehould to Châlons, along a very fine road. If the Prussians should attack the camp of Grandprey, or endeavour to force the passage at Islettes, the general hoped to be able to repulse them; if they inclined to proceed along the forest, by the left, and penetrate through the Barrois, directing their march towards Vitry, he was sure of anticipating them at the opening of Revigny, and of being joined there by Kellermann, so that they could then cover the Barrois, and the Marne. If, on the other hand, they endeavoured to penetrate by Chêne-populeux; after having disputed that passage with them, he was sure to arrest their progress on the borders of the Aisne, and to be reinforced by Beurnonville's division, and the army under Kellermann, after which he could prevent them from crossing the river, and reduce them to such a state as to die of hunger in the quagmires of Tierrache, whence they would never be able to extricate their baggage and artillery. Thus, from that moment he was well aware that this formidable army had made a bad beginning,

beginning, and that the more numerous it might be, the more likely it was to finish the campaign badly.

The enemy lost much time after the capture of Verdun, and it was not until the 8th, it was discovered lengthening its front, and parading along the extensive plain reaching from Briquenay and Buzancy, as far as Clermont. Its headquarters were at Raucourt. The French army discovered much joy at the appearance of the foe, and this augured very favourably. On the next day the Prussians commenced a series of attacks along the whole front of the out posts, but they were every where repulsed. On the 10th, general Miranda, a Peruvian whom Petion had introduced into our service with the rank of major general, and who had arrived on the evening of the preceding day, withstood a very brisk assault made on the village of Mortaume. General Stengel was also attacked at the same time in the village of St. Jouvin, but the enemy was every where driven back, and none of our posts were forced. In the course of these attacks, or whenever the movements of the enemy intimated such a design, the general caused

twelve pounders and battalions to be brought down from the camp. These could be dispatched any where at pleasure, without being perceived by the Prussians, as the operation was concealed by the mountain of Bessieu; they accordingly always perceived themselves opposed by a front of five or six thousand men, and they themselves could not display a more extensive one. Notwithstanding this, they perceived the French camp on the height to be constantly in the same state, and did not know how to give credit to the report of their spies, who affirmed that the troops there did not exceed twenty thousand men.

While posted in this camp, the soldiers, and even the generals themselves, were attacked by a diarrhoea, which they attributed to the bad quality of the waters, and the abundance of cold rains, as well as to the necessity of frequent night watches. Luckily, however, this malady, which was slight, did not produce any evil consequences; but it left the seeds of the dysentery at Grand-prey, which afterwards proved very fatal to the Prussians.

During

During the first few days it encamped there, the army was often in want of necessaries, because regular provision had not been made for supplying the troops: but they supported this deprivation with the utmost gaiety, and slight skirmishes occurring frequently, they neither became listless, nor disheartened.

It was not the same with the general, and other officers. Every thing appeared tedious and fatiguing to them, and they were dying of hunger, for even at the general's table, which was open to every one that had recourse to it, white bread was scarcely to be procured; besides, they had only bad mutton and garden-stuff to eat, they drank wretched beer, and were supplied, and that too but seldom, with very sorry wine, although in Champagne.

Five general officers called upon him one morning, and demanded a private interview; he perceived by their embarrassed air, that they had something extraordinary to communicate. The person who was appointed to address him, observed, that they could not but applaud the talents he had displayed

in imparting to the army the good disposition that now prevailed in it, and in removing it from the position before Sedan, where it might have been easily cut off, beaten, or had its communication with Paris intercepted, and placing it in a camp that appeared to be inexpugnable; but this camp was unhealthy, disease and disgust were beginning to seize upon the troops, no succours arrived, we had within sight of us one hundred thousand men who were masters of the plain, and they might leave us to *cool our heels* here, march through Bar-le-duc, and reach Vitry, and even Châlons; that it was of the utmost importance to anticipate them, and to choose a good camp behind the Marne, where the army could strengthen itself by means of all the reinforcements that might arrive, and procure provision, and every thing else in abundance.

The general permitted the orator to finish his speech, which was a long one, after which, without entering into any explanation, he addressed them as follows:
 “Fellow soldiers, this has every appearance
 of

of a council of war, and one ought not to be assembled without my orders; when I ask any one of you for his opinion in private, it is his duty to tell me whatever he believes may prove serviceable. I alone am responsible, and I know what I am about; retire each of you therefore to his post, and think of nothing else than how to second my endeavours."

They were silent, and from that moment they never made any further trial of the general's firmness. They criticised however, as usual, and each transmitted his private reflections to his friends in Paris, and also his own plan of the campaign, exaggerating, as if it had been a matter of satisfaction, our sufferings, our dangers, and the force and activity of the enemy. This did not tend to diminish the consternation that prevailed in Paris and the National Assembly, and in a short time, the general received by every courier, solicitations, advice, and even orders from Luckner and the ministers, to retreat behind the Marne. This persecution was carried still further at the camp of St. Menehould. His resistance was even considered as a criminal ob-

stinacy, and he might have said at that time to the French, as Phocion did to the Athenians: " You are very lucky in possessing a leader who knows you ; were it not for that you would be ruined."

On the 10th he made some little change in his position. Hearing daily from Beurnonville, he knew that he would arrive punctually on the 14th at Rhétel. All the different divisions of the enemy's army had formed a junction. General Clerfait had presented himself at the opening of Croix-aux-bois ; the king of Prussia menaced Grandprey ; and the prince of Hohenlohe was before Islettes, occupying Varennes and Clermont at the same time. The attack therefore was confined to this front, and could not extend to Chêne-Populeux.

The general however would not entirely strip that post of its defence, but wishing to make a proper use of the troops in the camp of Pont-sur-Sambre, who were inured to warfare, and more particularly of general Duval, in whom he had good reason to place great confidence, he caused them to be relieved by general Dubouquet with four bat-
talion

talions and two squadrons of dragoons, and ordered Duval to march to the camp of Grandprey, where he took post on the heights of Marque, which the commander in chief had hitherto occupied by means of detachments only, as he had not a sufficient number of troops to include it within the encampment. By means of this reinforcement, he had now gotten together a body of nearly twenty thousand men for the defence of the excellent position of Grandprey.

His greatest vexation proceeded at this period from the *manœuvres* of Kellermann, who harassed his troops by marches and counter-marches, proceeded as far as Bar, then made a retrograde movement towards Ligny, disapproved, like every body else, of general Dumouriez's plan of the campaign, asserted that the Prussians intended to fall on Loraine, while their king was before Grandprey, and intimated to him, that if he wished to form a junction, he must come half way, and that when united together, they would march and give battle to the king of Prussia.

Dumouriez, who, on the other hand, wished to temporize, and ruin the Prussians
without

without fighting them, was very cautious of hazarding an engagement. He denounced to the minister at war the disinclination, or at least, the indecision of his colleague, and he strenuously insisted, that he should issue an absolute order for Kellermann to join him, and no longer counteract his plan of the campaign.

CHAP. VIII.

*The Enemy forces the pass of Croix-aux-bois.
Retreat from the Camp of Grandprey.*

EFFECTIVE orders were accordingly transmitted by the minister Servan to Kellermann, who was at length obliged to obey. It was at this time that general Custine, with a view of making a diversion, was detached from the army of Alsace by Biron, and advanced to Spire, Worms, and Mentz. He might have seized upon Coblenz, and if he had effected this, the retreat of the Prussians would have been very hazardous, unless they had begun it immediately, which they could never have been prevailed upon to do, so great were their expectations, and so favourable the appearances,

Dumouriez wrote repeated letters conjuring general Biron to command Custine to march to
Coblenz

Coblentz and Trêves, on purpose to attack the enemy in flank and rear, by making himself master of the Moselle, which would also have relieved Thionville, and protected the country of Meffin, whence Kellermann was necessarily about to be absent for some time.

Biron issued the necessary orders, but Custine, inflated with his too easy and brilliant successes, shook off the yoke of his general, deprived him of nearly all his forces, in order to form an army of twenty-two thousand men, neglected the capture of Coblentz, and crossed the Rhine, with a design of seizing on Francfort, which interrupted the general plan of the campaign, violated the neutrality of the empire, and produced well-merited disgraces.

The National Assembly and the ministers calculated no better than Custine; they listened to nothing but the glory resulting from conquests; their avarice was seduced by the lure of contributions; they considered the sage representations of general Dumouriez as proceeding from jealousy, the project of creating a military dictatorship, and obliging all opinions to submit to his own;

Custine

Cuffine was accordingly extolled to the skies, and allowed to act at discretion. But that unfortunate general has since paid dearly for this momentary gleam of favour, in consequence of the injustice and ingratitude of his countrymen.

On the side of Flanders the French experienced but indifferent success, and were exposed to frequent alarms, all of which were attributed to the plans of Dumouriez; but as he did not participate in the popular disquietude, he only prevailed upon the minister to dispatch to that army general Labourdonnaye, who had been sent to Châlons to command a body of troops for the purpose of covering Paris; he, at the same time, caused the title of commander in chief to be conferred on him, in order to invest him with more power and consequence.

This project of forming an army at Châlons is a fresh proof of the distrust which had been inspired by terror. It was no more doubted at Paris than in the Prussian camp, that general Dumouriez would be beaten, and taken prisoner; that the king of Prussia would cross the Marne; and that no-
thing

thing could prevent his march to the capital. They had conceived the foolish idea of surrounding and defending Paris, instead of dispatching reinforcements to the armies, then in presence of the enemy; they stripped the northern department of artillery and ammunition, with a view of collecting in the capital the most formidable means of defence; and they formed an entrenched camp near it, in which they were to assemble a central army they were then getting together at Soissons and Châlons.

Luckily, however, the motions of the duke of Saxe Teschen disconcerted this project, which would have ruined every thing, and the letters and the successes of Dumouriez and Custine once more inspired them with some small portion of courage. It was thus that the greatest obstacles and danger originated with the French themselves, and that the general was more embarrassed by the contradictions of his countrymen, than by the eighty thousand Germans with whom he had to contend.

By this time, the 13th of September had arrived, and the rainy season had rendered

the roads extremely bad. The Prussians, after having consumed the provision which they found in Longwy and Verdun, at length ate up this country also, which had been before exhausted by the French army, and were obliged to draw their supplies from Luxembourg, and the electorate of Treves. The garrisons of Sedan, Montmedy, Thionville, and even Metz, at the same time commenced a terrible war against them, by cutting off their convoys.

Beurnonville was expected to arrive on the 14th, at Rhétel, within ten leagues of Grandprey. Kellermann, on the 18th at the farthest, was to reach Bar, after which nothing could prevent his junction. All the attacks of the enemy only served to augment the courage of the army, whose position seemed to be inexpugnable. The fate of the campaign appeared to be decided, and the king of Prussia was on the point of being forced to retreat, as he was no longer in a condition to undertake sieges with an army at once fatigued with toils, and dying with hunger, and in which too the dysentery began to make ravages, when a fault on the part

or

of general Dumouriez reduced France to within a hair's breadth of ruin, and changed the favourable situation in which he then found himself, into a very critical, and very dangerous one.

He had posted at Croix-aux-bois a colonel of horse, with his regiment, two battalions, and four field pieces. This force had appeared to him to be sufficient to defend so difficult a passage, more especially as the colonel had intimated that he had punctually executed his orders, that his entrenchments and *abatis* were impregnable, that he had prolonged them as far as the end of the wood, and had rendered the road impracticable by means of pits and trenches. This colonel also informed him, that in addition to the two he commanded, there was an excellent battalion of volunteers, belonging to the department of the Ardennes, at Vouziers, which had formed part of the garrison of Longwy; that on their being armed, they would prove sufficient for the defence of this passage, where cavalry was useless, and that therefore he besought his permission to return

turn to camp with his two battalions and two squadrons.

The general, without any further examination, and with an unpardonable degree of levity, gave credit to the report of this officer, who had served during the American war, was of a mature age, and did not appear likely to deceive him. The colonel's letter was dated on the 11th, and on that very day the general sent him orders to leave one hundred men in the entrenchments, and return to the camp with the rest of his troops; he at the same time issued the most positive injunctions to the commanding officer of the artillery, instantly to send six hundred muskets to the battalion of Ardennes, accompanied by one hundred cartridges for each, and he ordered the commanding officer of this battalion to march and defend the entrenchments of Croix-aux-bois with his own troops, and sixty horsemen belonging to the *gendarmerie nationale*, who were in quarters at Vouziers.

Although Croix-aux-bois was very near Grandprey, the general had never found time to visit that important post; he had

relied entirely on the fidelity of the maps, and in this he was greatly to blame. He had not even sent Thouvenot, who would have supplied his place in the most satisfactory manner; he had not established any batteries of eight or twelve pounders, although he had plenty of cannon, but had confided in the talents and experience of a subaltern, with whom he was not sufficiently acquainted; and, in short, he had not waited, as he ought to have done, until the battalion had been armed, and relieved the post, but had ordered him to return to the camp, leaving in such important and extensive entrenchments no more than one hundred men, commanded by a captain.

This post was accordingly abandoned on the morning of the 12th. To increase the evil, the officer who commanded the park of artillery neglected to execute his order, although it was couched in very positive terms, and the muskets and ammunition were not sent to the battalion of the Ardennes, which waited in the mean time for them at Vouziers. General Clerfait was instantly informed of this circumstance by the spies

spies belonging to the country, and accordingly on the 13th, at break of day, he sent prince Charles de Ligne to attack the *abatis*. This was very badly constructed, for it merely consisted of trees felled and thrown across the road, without any connection, the branches being neither half interred, nor cut so as to present their sharp points to the enemy.

The Imperialists quickly removed them, and cleared the passage. As to the roads, they were so imperfectly broken up, that the enemy easily marched forward with their cavalry and artillery; the hundred men posted there, after a slight resistance, fled across the woods, and arrived at the camp, where the general happened to be at that moment; it was then about noon, and there was not a single moment to be lost.

He therefore immediately gave command of two brigades and six squadrons to general Chazot, with four eight pounders, besides the field pieces; he ordered him to march with the utmost expedition, and to commence an attack instantly, with fixed bayonets, that the enemy might not have time

to entrench themselves. He sent along with him a waggon full of muskets for the battalion of the Ardennes, and two loaded with tools, on purpose to complete the entrenchments, and form regular batteries. He could not proceed thither himself, or even leave his camp, as he expected a general attack, which actually took place that day and the 14th, when the enemy was repulsed with the usual success.

The whole of the 14th was spent, without general Chazot's making an attack; the commander in chief sent *aides-de-camp* to him every hour, with the most positive orders to attempt every thing, and he reinforced him with two battalions. This delay occasioned the utmost uneasiness, but he himself could not repair to the post without running the risk of having his own camp taken during his absence. At length, on the morning of the 15th, he heard a violent firing in that quarter, and about eleven o'clock he received a note from Chazot, informing him, that after a long and very bloody conflict, in which the prince of Ligne was killed, he had retaken the entrenchments.

ments. The general's joy was very great upon this occasion.

But Chazot forgot to issue orders for the advance of the waggon containing the working tools, and the troops, who were fatigued in consequence of the engagement, and lulled into that security incident to victory, had not even given themselves the trouble to block up the passage. In consequence of this omission, a stronger column of the enemy commenced a fresh attack two hours after, and found means to gain the heights above them; they made but a feeble resistance, and lost some cannon, after which Chazot retreated to Vouziers, without even communicating the event to the general, from whom he found himself separated by the enemy.

It was five o'clock in the evening when the commander in chief received intelligence of this affair from some of the fugitives.

During the engagement at Croix-aux-bois, the body of emigrants presented themselves before the opening of Chêne-populeux. General Dubouquet had repulsed them with great vigour, but learning that the passage of Croix-aux-bois was forced, he took advantage

tage of the night to retreat by Attigny, and Somme-puis, towards Châlons. Thus the princes entered without any difficulty through Chêne-populeux, with an intention to pass on to Vouziers.

Never was any army reduced to a more desperate position, and never did any general extricate himself with greater promptitude, vigour, and good fortune. The number of the troops was reduced to fifteen thousand men by the separation of the detachments under Chazot and Dubouquet. He did not know where they had retreated, but he supposed, that their communication being cut off, they must have retreated toward Rhétel. He had before him a body of at least forty thousand Prussians, and behind him was general Clerfaut with twenty thousand men.

The position of that general at Croix-aux-bois commanded his camp, and he might, by inclining towards the left, descend to Olizy, Termes, and Beauregard, and cut off the passage of the Aire and the Aisne at Senucque. Being, in case of that event, enclosed between the rivers and the forest, destitute of provision, provided with but a
small

small quantity of ammunition, and commanded by rising grounds on the left, he must have either laid down his arms, or held out until his last man was killed, without any advantage or utility. His communication was now intercepted with Beurnonville, who was at Rhétel with nine thousand men destitute of shoes, harassed by fatigue, and unprovided with ammunition, after having uselessly made so many forced marches in order to join him.

Kellermann, on hearing that the defiles were forced, would assuredly either retreat towards Metz, or cross the Marne. It would be necessary to decamp in presence of the enemy, who with a little vigilance might pursue the French with their swords in their posteriors. Thus, in the execution of this indispensable movement, he would not only lose the advantage of the heights, but in crossing the Aire and the Aisne, he would find himself exposed to the fire of the enemy, who would naturally occupy the high ground that he had abandoned, and he might possibly encounter on the other side of these rivers the body of troops under Clerfait, or

possibly a detachment from them, and in that case, being obliged to carry his whole army across a single bridge, the village of Senueque would have been to him the Caudine forks.

But notwithstanding the greatness of the danger, he neither lost that presence of mind, nor appearance of tranquillity and security so necessary in a general, to inspire confidence, and enable those under him to execute those commands issued with coolness, without betraying any confusion on their part. He dispatched his orders and instructions to all the detached troops, by means of *aides-de-camp*, and officers on whom he could depend. He commanded Beurnonville to set off instantly from Rhétel, to follow the course of the Aisne as far as Attigny, and then to march towards St. Menchould, with a view to effect a junction, informing him at the same time, that he himself was about to proceed towards that town, where Kellermann would arrive in a very short time. He also instructed Kellermann to hasten his march by Bar and Revigny, in order to join him in the neighbourhood of St. Menchould.

He

He sent notice to general Dillon to defend the passes of Islettes and Chalade with more vigour than ever, and to push forward his light troops beyond Passavant, with intent to harass the enemy's left flank, and to receive timely intimation of Kellermann's arrival, which he announced to be at hand. He intimated to him at the same time, that he himself was about to fall back to St. Menehould, and that therefore he could only occupy his attention with the enemy in front, without attending to his rear and left wing.

He instructed lieutenant-general Sparre, who commanded at Châlons, to assemble as many of the newly formed battalions and cavalry as he possibly could, and to encamp with them at Notre-dame de l'Epine, a small height at a league's distance in front of that town. He enjoined lieutenant-general D'Harville to collect as many troops as possible at Rheims, Epernai, and Soissons, and after forming them into small *corps*, to advance to Pont-Favergues on the Suippe: these two bodies would increase by little and little, and amount to ten or twelve thousand men each. He had been joined but two days

days before by a very fine *corps*, consisting of eight hundred grenadiers, sent him by the city of Rheims, but the men were as yet unacquainted with the use of arms ; thinking therefore, that they would only tend to embarrass him, he sent them off to Rhétel, along with two companies of the volunteers of Stenay, and of Mouzon ; thence they were dispatched to reinforce the garrison of Sedan, where they were disciplined, and served with applause.

On the heights of Olizy, Termes, and Beauregard, he posted six battalions and an equal number of squadrons, with a few cannon, so as to face Croix-aux-bois, on purpose to arrest the progress of the enemy, and prevent them from descending towards Senucque, and he dispatched three hundred chasseurs to scour the forest as far as Longuêve. He also caused his park of artillery to file off immediately across the two bridges, with intent to gain the heights of Autry, on the other side of the Aisne.

Having at length, about seven o'clock at night, received intelligence from general Chazot, he learned with great pleasure, that
he

he had retreated to Vouziers, and that the enemy had not pursued or even endeavoured to cross the river after him. On this he ordered him to retreat at midnight with his division, and to follow the course of the Aisne as far as Vaux, on purpose to rejoin the army, which on the 16th was to occupy the heights of Autry. He at the same time transmitted instructions, which he enjoined him to endeavour to forward to general Dubouquet, whom he desired to retreat either towards Sedan or Rhétel, if he could not join general Chazot, and he took the precaution to command Chazot not to wait for Dubouquet, whatever might occur, but to execute with punctuality his orders for forming a junction at Vaux.

He now perceived that the enemy was content with getting possession of the passage of Croix-aux-bois, expecting perhaps for a second attack on the next day, and had not pushed on, notwithstanding its success, either on the left or front. He was still master of the whole course of the river Aisne, and if he but succeeded in removing his army from the place where he was now encamped, his
rear

rear guard might indeed be more or less assailed, but he would still be able to stop the enemy sufficiently long on the borders of the Aisne, to dispute the passage with them, and assume a formidable position, in order to effect a junction.

The weather proved at this time intolerably bad, and this circumstance contributed to save him. He was extremely careful not to make any apparent preparations for his departure, or to intimate such an event by any movement, or appearance whatever, more especially in his advanced guard, while daylight lasted. The prince de Hohenlohe, in the midst of all these embarrassments, demanded an interview; this he supposed to be intended, with a view of discovering what was passing in his camp. As he could not go himself, he instructed general Duval to meet him, because a refusal would have led to suspicion. The Prussian general repaired to the place appointed; a great deal of reciprocal politeness ensued, and the prince did not conceal his surprize from general Duval, at seeing so much order in the posts, and so many well-bred officers, decorated with

with ribands and crosses: for the emigrants had assured the Prussians, that the army was entirely commanded by jewellers, taylors, shoemakers, &c.

Duval, an officer rendered venerable by his grey hairs and his majestic figure, completely undeceived him, by telling him, that the greater part of the general officers had served during one or two wars, and that general Dumouriez was a major-general previous to the revolution. The prince de Hohenlohe was not able to discover any thing that indicated a retreat; Duval, on the contrary, intimated to him, that general Beurnonville was to enter the camp, the very next day, with eighteen thousand men, and that Kellermann, at the head of twenty thousand more, was only two marches distant.

As soon as it was night, the advanced guard fell back in three columns without making any noise, or having either augmented or diminished the number of its fires; the right passed through Marque, the centre by Chevières, and the left by Grandprey. It broke down all the bridges as soon as it had crossed. Duval and Stengel
were

were the commanding officers. It halted to give time to the army to begin its march, as it was to serve as the rear guard.

At midnight the general departed from the castle of Grandprey, and ascended to his camp, which he found still standing. The roads between Grandprey and the camp were so bad, and the night so dark, that the orderly men were missing. He therefore caused verbal orders to be carried along from man to man; the army then struck its tents, but did not begin to march until three hours afterwards. This delay, which might have proved fatal, was productive of some advantage, for the army remained ignorant of the cause of its retreat, no alarm took place, it was conducted with more order, and the enemy was not informed of it.

Having reached the heights of Autry, he gave orders for drawing up his men in battle array. The rear guard passed the bridges of Senucque and Grandchamp at eight o'clock in the morning, and also ranged itself in order of battle on the high grounds. The army was now safe; a few tents only, belonging to the battalions which had been detached

tached

tached with Chazot, whose camp was left standing, were lost.

The general, who did not see himself followed by the enemy, and who, from that moment, considered his retreat as secured, ordered the park of artillery to continue its march, and repaired with his staff to Dammartin, on the Hans, to mark out the place where they were to encamp at the end of the first march, at four leagues distance from Grandprey. While employed in tracing this camp, he took notice of the arrival of some fugitives, who cried out that all was lost, that the army was in confusion, and that the enemy was in pursuit. He could not comprehend the meaning of this sudden change. He knew that he had not been pursued, but that he had, on the contrary, been allowed to pass the defiles, without any molestation. He had left his troops in an excellent disposition, and he could not imagine that the enemy had passed the Aisne, to turn his right flank ; he perceived, notwithstanding, that a great disorder had actually taken place, and did not know to what to attribute it.

He

He however thought proper to change his horse, and to return at full speed along with Thouvenot, on purpose to rally his troops. They remarked with pleasure, that all the fugitives belonged to the main body of the army, and they did not discover any appertaining either to the *corps* under Duval or the vanguard. In fine, on their arrival near Autry, they met general Miranda, who with great coolness had arrested the flight of the infantry, and checked the enemy, now in full retreat, as the advanced guard, which had not participated in the terrour, was marching in good order to charge them.

He at the same time received a message from Duval and Stengel, which gave him entire satisfaction. He ordered them to halt on the borders of the morafs of Cernay, with the rear guard, until the whole army had crossed the Tourbe; they were then to advance along the banks of that river, to take post between the main body and the enemy, and to pass the night there. He afterwards returned to Dammartin, and kept the troops all night under arms.

Having

Having been now twenty hours on horse-back, he alighted, and sat down to table at six o'clock at night, but a new alarm took place in his camp. A great clamour was heard on all sides, and every body began to cry out and betake themselves to flight; the artillery was instantly harnessed, and endeavoured to gain a height on the other side of the rivulet of Bionne, which was in the rear of his camp. All the troops too were mingled together in the confusion, and the disorder augmented. He then easily perceived that this commotion was not occasioned by the enemy, because his rear guard remained undisturbed at a league distance, and having mounted his horse, accompanied by his staff officers, his *aides-de-camp*, and his escort of dragoons, and come up with the fugitives, he rallied them by means of blows with the sabre. But as they were all intermingled together, he ordered great fires to be lighted up, and commanded them to pass the night in the position in which they then were. This second alarm certainly took place in consequence of the arts of evil disposed persons, but as it was not attended

with any consequences, he was not in a situation to make the necessary inquiries.

As to the first, it occurred thus : the army after having passed the defiles and the bridges, without being disturbed, had formed itself in order of battle on the heights of Autry, to protect the retreat of the rear guard. The latter was harassed by about fifteen hundred Prussian hussars, who were provided with three or four pieces of horse artillery. Having passed the defiles it drew up in battalia on the heights, and the army marched in column towards Cernay. General Chazot, who, instead of leaving Vouziers at midnight, as he was ordered, had not begun his march until break of day, filed off at this time by Vaux. His division, on seeing the Prussian hussars, precipitated themselves across the column of the army ; the enemy perceiving the disorder, instantly charged ; on this the whole body dispersed, betook themselves to flight, and ten thousand men were pursued by fifteen hundred horse. However, Duval, who had kept the rear-guard in good order, obliged the Prussians, who were not supported, to fall back, carrying

ing off at the same time a couple of cannon, and some baggage. General Miranda rallied the army.

But no troops flee either quicker or further than the French. More than two thousand men belonging to different *corps* precipitated themselves with incredible celerity, to the distance of thirty or forty leagues, through Rhétel, Rheims, Châlons, and Vitry. They published every where, that the army was betrayed and annihilated, and that Dumouriez and all the generals had gone over to the enemy. The latter in particular was the favourite cry of the runaways; they asserted to the general himself that he had deserted, and that too at the very moment when he was belabouring them with the flat side of his sabre. Had it not been for the good conduct of Duval, Stengel, and Miranda, this retreat, so well contrived, and so happily executed, would have degenerated into an irremediable flight, and fifteen hundred Prussian hussars would have annihilated the whole of the French army.

At break of day on the 17th, the general had no little trouble in freeing the camp

from the confusion that prevailed in it; he then crossed the Bionne, and marching in three columns, entered his camp at St. Menehould. The enemy pushed forward with caution, and its advanced guard did not appear in sight of the French camp until the 18th. Twenty-eight fugitives whom general Dillon had caused to be arrested, were brought to the general; he caused their eye-brows and hair to be shaved, stripped them of their uniforms, and dismissed them as cowards. This example produced a good effect.

C H A P. IX.

Camp of St. Menebould. Junction of Beurnonville and Kellermann. Action at Valmy.

THE army was now saved, and at the end of twenty-four hours had resumed all its former energy; but Dumouriez was persuaded that the late momentary disorder, exaggerated by the timid and ill intentioned men, who were very numerous, would produce a terrible effect in Paris. He therefore deemed it best to transmit an account of this event to the national assembly. He accordingly wrote as follows to the president.

“ I have been obliged to abandon the camp of Grandprey; the retreat was completed, when a panick terrour seized on the army. Ten thousand troops fled before fifteen hundred Prussians. The loss does not amount to more than fifty men, and

some baggage. Order is again restored, and I am ready to answer for the event." Having just quitted a post in the administration, where he had displayed too energetic a character not to inspire confidence, in consequence of taking upon himself all the responsibility, his letter produced the best effect.

This adventure, however, demonstrated to him the small degree of confidence which he ought to repose in his army, although it was renowned for its excellence in respect to evolutions, and it also confirmed him in his plan of procrastination and circumspection. He was resolved to select his camps with prudence, and to work upon the minds of his troops in such a manner that to confidence in him, they might at length add confidence in themselves. He did not search after the authors of the late confusion, nor did he indulge himself in severe or frequent reproaches. He assumed with his soldiers the tone of a father who pardons the error of his children, and by that means he found means to gain their attachment.

The excellence of the camp of St. Men-
hould,

hould, and the reinforcements that arrived soon after, at length inspired this army with the courage and constancy necessary to resist so powerful an enemy, joined to hunger and the inclemency of the season. The months of September and October, which were truly horrible, completed the destruction of the Prussians. The French also suffered considerably, but their camp was far better, they had plenty of wood and water, and were never without bacon, fresh meat, rice, and brandy.

In front of the camp of St. Menehould are certain heights consisting of a barren clay, which occupy the intermediate space formed by the rivulets of Tourbe, Bionne, and Auve. Of the two most considerable of these, the one is called l'Yron, in the rear of which are the villages of Courtemont and Dammartin sur Hans, the other la Lune, whence the camp of the king of Prussia has since taken its name, and behind which is Hans, where his head quarters were. Between these heights and the camp is a very narrow valley, where there are however a few rising grounds.

The site of the camp itself commands both these elevations, and the valley; it consists of a height of about three quarters of a league in extent, forming an S, the right flank terminating at the river Aisne, a little above Neuville-au-pont, and the left at the great road leading to Châlons. In a bottom before the centre of the camp are the little village and castle of Braux-St. Cohère, where those ponds and morasses begin which separate the left of the camp from the hill on which is situated the mill of Valmy. In front of the left of the great road is the height of Gizaucourt, in the rear are some of the branches of the river Aube and morasses, behind which is a position well calculated for a small camp, with a village called Dampierre in front, and that of Elise in the rear.

Behind the centre of the camp is the village of Chaude-fontaine. The head quarters were established at St. Menehould, a league in the rear, fronting the centre of the grand army which faced Champagne, and the *corps* under Dillon, which was opposite

posite Verdun, being entrenched in the wood with intent to defend the defiles of Islettes and Chalade.

The general stationed on the right bank of the Aisne a battalion of troops of the line, in the castle of St. Thomas, situated upon a steep eminence that terminated his right flank. He posted three other battalions and some cavalry at Vienne-le-château, Moremont, and Neuville. His right at the same time communicated with the troops that defended the pass of la Chalade, which had been reinforced.

He established batteries along the whole front of his camp, which commanded the valley, and enfiladed it on every side. He established posts as far as the Aube, on purpose to communicate with Châlons. He stationed his vanguard along the Tourbe to retard the enemy's march, with orders to retire slowly, to cut down the bridges as it retreated, to take post afterwards behind the Bionne, and to repeat the same *manœuvre* before it established itself at Braux-St. Cohère, Merzicourt, and Berzieux, at some distance in front of the camp; orders were also

also given to lay waste the country in proportion as it fell back, and if not much pressed, to forage in all the villages on the left from Perte as far as Croix-en-Champagne. As the left of his camp terminated at the great road, he destined the camp of Dampierre, situated to the left of that road, for the army of Kellermann.

His late rout having been greatly exaggerated, and intelligence of it carried to Kellermann, he instantly retreated towards Vitry, a circumstance that once more retarded his junction for the space of two days, and greatly fatigued his army. However, on the arrival of repeated couriers, he resumed his march, and immediately communicated the event.

Beurnonville had learned the news from the fugitives who had reached Rhétel, but having at the same time received the orders of the general, which were communicated to him by a confidential *aide-de-camp*, he deemed it his duty to effect a junction. However, as the confusion had taken place after the departure of the *aide-de-camp*, he advanced with great circumspection, directing his

his march rather towards the Aube, than St. Menehould, on purpose to reach Châlons, whither he supposed the remains of the army might have retired. Dumouriez, who anticipated his perplexity, neglected not to dispatch different officers, but they did not happen to fall in with him.

On the 17th, Beurnonville, who marched with great precaution, arrived near the Aube, and having advanced to the heights of Gizaucourt to reconnoitre, he perceived an army marching in order of battle, and with great regularity, towards St. Menehould. As he was full of the idea of the general's defeat, he could never imagine that this was his army, but on the contrary, being persuaded that it was the king of Prussia's, he made haste to retreat to Châlons. On his arrival there, he met with the officers who had been sent in quest of him by the general, who soon convinced him that he had been deceived.

His division was greatly fatigued, and he was obliged to allow it to rest on the 18th, on purpose to make a distribution of shoes. These brave men from the camp of Maulde,
being

being rendered unhappy by this delay, he at length yielded to their and his own impatience, and set out on the night between the 18th and 19th. This body of men, who exhibited such a proof of an extreme zeal and attachment, accordingly joined its old commander on the 19th, at the very moment when the Prussians began to extend themselves upon the heights, on the other side of the Bionne. Had he remained but a day later, perhaps Beurnonville's communication with the main body would have been cut off, and he himself would have been obliged to have retired once more to Châlons, which would have greatly weakened the army, in consequence of the loss of ten thousand excellent troops.

General Dubouquet, who had retreated without once stopping from Chêne-populeux to Châlons, arrived there also on the 17th, and having communicated this event to the commander in chief, demanded his orders. The latter desired him to place himself under lieutenant general Sparre, in the camp of Notre-dame de l'Epine, where he was to assemble some new battalions,

and some cavalry, and wait for further instructions. It was very agreeable intelligence for him to learn that Dubouquet had saved his division, as he could thus assist general Sparre in forming a body of troops, which might become very useful in the end, and which at that time was very opportunely stationed at Châlons, where the intelligence of his disaster had been productive of much melancholy, and the greatest disorder.

There happened to be then at that place eight or ten battalions of volunteers or fédérés, who on the arrival of the fugitives, instead of arresting them, had pillaged the magazines, and returned by the road leading to Paris, committing the greatest excesses, and proclaiming every where that Dumouriez was a traitor who had betrayed the army. They had cut off the heads of some officers, who endeavoured to make them listen to reason. They tore the epaulets and crosses of St. Louis from the regimentals of the officers belonging to the troops of the line, and they assassinated the lieutenant colonel of the regiment of Vexin, who endeavoured to resist such an insult.

These

These battalions had been formed under the appellation of *federates*, and this name seemed to imprint on them the character of crime and barbarity. They were composed of detached companies belonging to different towns, and even to different departments. They were unacquainted with each other, neither obeyed their leaders nor their generals, and seemed never to have any idea of what union was, but when they were committing atrocities. At Rheims, Soissons, and Châlons, they evinced the same inclinations, and resigned themselves up to similar disorders. The army held them in detestation, and they, on the other hand, threatened to massacre all the traitors; that is to say, all the generals. They had inspired the national *gendarmerie* with the same spirit, and the latter, instead of stopping their excesses, strove only how to rival them. Such were the reinforcements intended to assist the general in repelling the Prussians.

The Prussian army having entered Grand-prey on the 16th, filed off on the 17th by Vouziers and Autry, as far as Cernay. General Stengel had fulfilled his instructions
with

with the utmost punctuality; he had ravaged the country all along his left flank to a great distance, and had retired on the 18th into the villages in front of the camp, after disputing for some time the passage of the Tourbe. On the 19th, the Prussians arrived in good order, and extended themselves along the mountains of la Lune; our advanced guard occupied the mountain of l'Yron.

On the same day the general received intelligence that Kellermann was at last arrived within two leagues of the rear of his left flank; he had left general Labazouillière with a body of about five thousand men to cover Bar and Ligny, and had brought fifteen thousand men along with him, one third of which consisted of excellent cavalry, being almost wholly composed of troops of the line.

The general instantly instructed him to proceed, and occupy, in the course of the next morning, the camp between Dampierre and Elise behind the Aube, which he pointed out with great precision; and as the extension of the Prussian line made him presume that
the

the enemy would perhaps try the fate of an action, he sent notice, that as soon as he had pitched his camp, should the Prussians endeavour to enlarge their front, he might choose his field of battle on the heights of Valmy and Gizaucourt.

Dumouriez committed another fault on this occasion, which luckily did not produce any bad consequences. It was impossible for Kellermann to be acquainted with the ground. He ought to have sent him some officers belonging to the staff, on purpose to point out his camp in such a manner, that he should not confound it with his field of battle; but he had no more than three or four adjutants general capable of fulfilling this mission, and he himself was then busied in stationing Beurnonville's division. Besides, Kellermann was not under his orders; he was a colleague, and a very punctilious one too, who would have been greatly offended, perhaps, if he had traced out his camp for him.

However this might be, he confounded his instructions in such a manner, that mistaking his field of battle for his camp, he conducted

conducted his army thither, embarrassed himself with his waggons, and began to erect his tents. The Prussians perceiving the confusion on the heights of Valmy, strove to extend their left, and marched in several columns, at the same time cannonading the troops that were crowded on the hills of Valmy. Kellermann on this, having placed on the scite of the mill nearly the whole of his artillery, arrested the march of the enemy, and a terrible cannonade instantly ensued between them.

Dumouriez perceiving the mistake of his colleague, who had too many troops on this level spot, and could not extend his line along the high ground of Gizaucourt, because he was already out-flanked on his left, instantly made the following disposition, thanks to the immobility of the enemy. He dispatched general Chazot with nine battalions and eight squadrons, along the great road leading to Châlons, on purpose to get behind the heights of Gizaucourt, where he was to act under the orders of Kellermann. He commanded general Stengel to move on to the extremity of l'Yron, on

purpose to flank the position of Valmy by means of his right, as Chazot did with his left. He sent Beurnonville with sixteen battalions drawn up in form of a column, after Stengel, with a view to extend along l'Yron if the enemy endeavoured to out-flank, or to attack Stengel, and he caused Beurnonville's right flank to be supported by lieutenant-general Leveneur, with twelve battalions and eight squadrons, who was to direct his march from Berzieux towards Virginy, in order that he might turn the left of the enemy.

It unfortunately happened that Kellermann begged at this moment to see him; had it not been for this, he himself would have superintended the movements of his right flank, and the success of this day's action would perhaps have proved complete.

He repaired with the utmost speed to general Kellermann, and found that a very brisk cannonade had taken place, which was not likely however to produce any thing. General Valence with the *corps* of grenadiers was posted in order of battle, in an intermediate position between the mill of Valmy and general

neral Chazot, who was stationed along the great road leading to Chalons. They had neglected to make him occupy the heights of Gizaucourt, whence he might have attacked the Prussian columns in flank, and the king of Prussia, who had taken advantage of his omission, had sent troops, and established a battery there, which flanked the position at Valmy.

The day was spent in this manner, and the general perceiving that it would end in a fruitless cannonade in this quarter, returned to his own army. It was the post occupied by Stengel, who flanked the enemy, and opened a sharp fire on the left of their attack, that checked the Prussians, and prevented them from attempting the position at Valmy. Had it not been for him, Kellermann would have been surrounded and beaten. His baggage would have choaked up the great road leading to St. Menchould, which was the only one by which he could make good his retreat ; for in order to reach the camp of Dampierre, all his army must have passed over a single bridge ; he could not have retreated towards the left of Du-

mouriez's camp, which was covered by a morass, nor towards the column commanded by Stengel, as between them was a deep and marshy valley.

The position was truly grand, had he extended his left along the heights of Gizaucourt; but having permitted this to be occupied by the enemy, it was far too confined. On the other hand, the Prussians would have lost many men had they endeavoured to attack by main force the site of the hill of Valmy in the afternoon, and as the whole of Dumouriez's army might have acted upon their left, they would perhaps have been beaten.

In his instructions to lieutenant-general Leveneur he had unfortunately prescribed to him not to venture too far, in order that he might be always able to resume his position in the camp, should the attack become general. Ignorance renders the bravest men timid, for certainly Leveneur possesses great courage. Having marched straight forward, he fell in with the column of baggage belonging to the Prussians, which happened to be weakly guarded; instead of pushing through it, which he might have easily done without any danger,

ger, he contented himself with some booty, and made haste to fall back, not to the heights where Beurnonville was posted, but as far as the camp; the general could not blame him, as he pleaded his instructions.

Had not the general lost so much time at the attack of the mill of Valmy, he would have seen and followed up the movement on his right, would have pushed his advantage, and at least have taken the Prussian baggage, because he would have put in motion the troops under general Duval, who were assembled at Vienne-le-château, for he would have made them cross the river, and posted them in the enemy's rear.

At the close of day, the cannonade ceased, and Dumouriez's army retired to its camp; that of Kellermann, lying all night under arms on the heights of Valmy, and the Prussians on those of la Lune and Gizaucourt, in such a manner as to block up the great road leading to Châlons. Kellermann once more entreated his colleague to repair to him; it was with a view to ask his advice about falling back to the ground intended for his camp. The baggage having filed off during the can-

nonade, towards St. Menehould; the retreat took place in the course of the night without any difficulty, and Kellermann encamped on the preceding morning.

Such was the action of Valmy, during which each of the two armies fired more than twenty thousand cannon shot, and lost three or four hundred men, to very little purpose. It however produced an excellent effect in behalf of the French, by proving to them that their steadiness and their fire could arrest the progress of so formidable an enemy.

If while extending along this plain, instead of amusing themselves with a cannonade, the Prussians had pushed forward a column towards the heights of Gizaucourt to cut off the retreat by the great road, at the same time ascended with screwed bayonets, to attack Kellermann's army, which was crowded on the heights of Valmy, he would have been beaten, without its being in the power of Dumouriez to have succoured him, and the latter would have been forced to have departed from his plan of temporising, and to have risked a general battle upon disadvantageous terms.

Had

Had Chazot, instead of stopping on the great road, and sending to demand orders from Kellermann, advanced instantly to the heights of Gizaucourt, the cannonade would have been shortened, and the right hand column of the Prussians ruined.

If Leveneur had but had good sense enough to comprehend that it was not contrary to his instructions, to improve a great advantage which did not endanger his own *corps* as long as he had not any troops to make head against him, he would have captured the greater part of the Prussian baggage, had he only detached his cavalry, and his flanking parties, for that purpose.

The duke of Brunswick has been blamed for not continuing the engagement, but he acted like a prudent general. At noon it would have been too late to have made the attack, and if he had done so, he would have run a risk of losing every thing; for beside the army under Kellermann, and the *corps* belonging to Chazot, Dumouriez had still a reserve of twelve battalions, and six squadrons formed in column on the left, ready to extend along the great road, and

sustain Kellermann; while his right at the same time would have attacked the left of the Prussians along the Bionne, where it was embarrassed with a column of baggage, which would have obliged it to fight.

C H A P. X.

Position of the Prussians. Embarrassment of General Dumouriez.

THE general having so successfully effected his different junctions, after having escaped from such a critical position as that in which he found himself between the 13th and 20th, and repelled an attack made by the Prussian army, now found himself in possession of an excellent camp, and was at the head of about fifty thousand men, most of them accustomed to war, of which more than twelve thousand were cavalry. This camp was defended by a numerous artillery. General D'Harville was assembling troops at Rheims, general Sparre was following his example at Châlons, and more were collecting at Paris, Soissons, Epernai, Troyes, and Vitry.

The Prussians found themselves in the centre of all these levies, entangled in a sterile country,

country, and in want of water, forage, and provision. The garrisons of Sedan and Montmedy hampered their convoys, which arrived very slowly, and were obliged to take a large circuit, in order to come from Luxembourg, and the country of Trêves, by Longwy, Verdun, and the pass of Grandprey. The season also was not only too rainy, but too far advanced for them to flatter themselves to be able to cross the Marne and reach Paris. There were but three ways in which they could act: 1. To unite all their troops, and march either by Châlons or Rheims; for if they wished to preserve their communications by leaving behind them, in the country of Verdun, the prince de Hohenlohe, who masked and made daily attacks on the passes of Islettes and La Chalade, being thus deprived of the assistance of twenty or twenty-five thousand men, they would have been too weak to have contended with general Dumouriez and the troops assembled in the interior, who would have followed close at their heels. Their rear guard might have been beaten at the passage of the Marne, and the least check would have produced

duced their total ruin, because in that case, they would neither have been able to have regained the Bishopricks, nor to have crossed the Meuse and the Ardennes, all the strong places being in the possession of the French, and the roads rendered impassable, at least for their heavy artillery.

If, on the other hand, they had united all their forces, Dumouriez would have followed with circumspection, crossed the Marne after them, and at length surrounded them before their arrival at Paris. Had they thought proper to have sent detachments towards Châlons and Rheims, he would have assaulted their camp the moment he perceived them enfeebled. No more than seven or eight thousand men were necessary in order to stop Hohenlohe's army before Islettes. After this there would have still remained with him upwards of fifty thousand men, so that he would have been able to have attacked them with a superiour force.

2. The second mode, the execution of which all the generals, and more especially the emigrants, recommended to the king of Prussia, and which the duke of Brunswick alone

alone had the sagacity to prevent, without regarding the animadversions of the ignorant and presumptuous, was to risk a battle by hazarding a general attack. But Dumouriez occupied an inexpugnable position, the natural advantages of which he was enabled daily to augment. There was every reason to suppose that his camp could not be forced. But even in the case of a victory, however brilliant it might prove, the duke of Brunswick could not prevent his retreat towards Vitry, whither he had already sent his heavy baggage. He would have passed the Marne at that place, and formed a new army by means of the troops assembled there, and at Troyes, and Châlons; the Prussians, weakened by disease, the necessity of leaving large bodies of troops to keep up the communication, and even by their victory, which could not fail to prove extremely bloody, would have been unable to have attempted any thing, and must have melted away in this barren tract of country.

On the other hand, if they lost the battle, a circumstance which might have occurred, a retreat on their part would have been impossible,

possible, and the whole of the army, reduced to the necessity of returning through the defiles which they entered, would have been either massacred or taken prisoners, for the peasants themselves would have been sufficient to have destroyed them, and the war would thus have been at an end.

3. The third mode was an immediate retreat through these passes, before the season had become more advanced, the roads less practicable, and the diseases more numerous. This was the sole reasonable plan. The Prussian army on its return to the Bishopricks, where it would have been in the vicinity of its magazines, by retaining possession of such of the defiles as it had in its power, and continuing to mask the pass of Illettes, might have carried on the siege of Montmedy, which ought to have been attacked before, without experiencing any interruption. Dummeriez in that case would have been obliged to have separated himself from Kellermann, to have left another body of troops to cover Champagne, and to have returned towards Sedan at the head of a small army, with intent to save Montmedy. His troops
were

were not sufficiently well organized for him to entertain hopes of being able to reap any advantage from a war of evolutions, and he might have been beaten in endeavouring to relieve Montmedy.

In short the campaign on the part of the Prussians would still have been very brilliant, winter quarters in Lorraine would have been insured to them, and the succeeding campaign made by the duke of Brunswick with a greater number of forces, might have rendered the counter-revolution triumphant, as the duke of Teschen might have proved successful in his attempts against the northern department, which Dumouriez had been forced to strip of troops, in order to oppose the invasion on the part of the king of Prussia.

But in order to have adopted this, which was the only military scheme, it would have been necessary that the king of Prussia and the French princes of the blood had been absent from the army, that the duke of Brunswick had possessed the entire direction of his own movements, that he had evinced sufficient courage to have extricated himself
out

out of the difficulties in which he was involved, and not been ashamed of making a timely retreat. But the Prussian commanders, deceived by the exaggerated reports of the emigrants, continued to despise the French army, and believed that their resistance proceeded merely from a small number of troops of the line, and their general.

Dumouriez was so well acquainted with his present superiority, and the critical and even desperate situation of the Prussians, that he repeatedly told his army, that the duke of Brunswick in forcing the pass of Croix-aux-bois had only anticipated him by a few days, for after effecting his junction, he himself had resolved voluntarily to throw open this defile to him, in order to inveigle him and his troops into an inhospitable country.

He assured the minister and the national assembly, that they had no manner of occasion to be in the least uneasy; that he would be answerable for the event; that the Prussians would not only be unable to make any further progress, but that within ten days at the furthest, this formidable army, consumed

consumed by hunger and disease, would be obliged to retreat through the same defiles by which it had entered, a circumstance that would not be effected without much difficulty. He assured them also, that he would have time to march to the succour of Lisle, and he demanded by way of recompence, that he should be permitted to take up his winter quarters in Brussels, where he announced that he should be on the 15th of November, if they entertained sufficient confidence in him to allow him to act.

His security and his assertions were considered as so many vain rodomontades, although they were supported by the most probable calculations. All Europe, especially France, beheld the posture of this general through the medium of the blindest ignorance. His rear was surrounded by the prince de Hohenlohe, and in front he had the king of Prussia between him and Paris. His communication with the towns on the Meuse, Rhétel, Rheims, and Châlons, was entirely cut off. The Prussians were only six leagues from Châlons, by way of the Aube; the emigrants at Suippe were still nearer, and the
hulans

hulans made incursions within two leagues of Rheims.

Paris expected daily to behold the arrival of the king of Prussia; between the capital and him nothing was to be seen but feeble collections of federates, more proper to infuse discouragement than hope. General Dumouriez was loudly accused of cowardice, or ignorance, or perfidy. The intelligence in the foreign gazettes, according to which he was sometimes defeated, sometimes put to the sword, and sometimes taken prisoner with his whole army, was perused with uneasiness. The deputies of the princes at Berne, in order to prevail upon the Swiss to depart from their neutrality, had announced this information by means of couriers, and they laid large wagers to the same effect, which they lost on purpose.

In consequence of these multiplied fears, couriers on couriers were dispatched to the commander in chief, with orders to retreat in the best manner he was able. He still resisted, but the generals returned to the charge. Kellermann, staggered by his letters from Paris, threatened to leave him. They

had continual disputes. Dumouriez sometimes conjured him to remain, and sometimes promised to remove his camp in the course of two or three days.

General Valence alone seconded him with Kellermann; and the assistance of one of his *aides-de-camp*, a man of very acute parts, the unfortunate Philip Devaux, ought not to be forgotten. Kellermann was affected, and promised every thing; but he was not to be depended upon. Never did any general either suffer or risk more to save his country. Thouvenot alone participated in all his afflictions, and consoled him by being of the same opinion as himself.

The army, which was very docile, experienced the greatest privations, and exhibited no impatience, but to come to blows with the Prussians. Had it participated the fears of the generals and of Paris, all would have been lost, a retreat would have taken place, disorder would have ensued, the Prussians would have pressed upon the French, and soon established themselves in a fruitful country, where they would have recovered from their fatigues, and Dumouriez would have

have been sacrificed to the injustice of his fellow citizens, and lost his head upon a scaffold like the unfortunate Custine. The firmness of his character extricated him, for he did not alter any part of his plan.

The position of the Prussians had entirely cut off his intercourse with Châlons, where his principal magazines of provision were. He therefore ordered his convoys to ascend from that town to Vitry, along the left bank of the Marne, he caused roads to be cut between the latter and his camp, he posted troops to keep up the communication, and he received his provision and forage by Vitry; but this prolongation of the journey, through difficult and recently constructed roads, amidst lands intersected with woods, springs, and morasses, lamed the horses, and occasioned great delays in the arrival of the convoys.

Sometimes the army was two or three days without bread. On those occasions the general mingled among the soldiers, excited them to patience, and always found means to appease them.

“The famous marshal Saxe,” said he, “has written a book on the art of war, in which he maintains, that the delivery of bread to the troops should be prohibited, at least once a week, in order to render them less sensible of such a privation in cases of necessity. Now you who are here,” added he, “have not half so much reason to complain as these Prussians before you, who are sometimes four days without bread, and are reduced to the necessity of feeding on their dead horses. You have hog’s lard, rice, and flour; make cakes with these, and liberty will give them a relish.”

At one time when there had not been any bread distributed during two days, he was informed that great murmurs prevailed; he expected a convoy, but he had just learned that it had been entangled in the mud within two leagues of the camp, in such a manner that it could not possibly arrive before the next day; on his appearing in the camp he was surrounded, and heard much improper discourse. On this he assumed a severe air, and exclaimed:

“Which

“Which are the bad citizens, who are so cowardly as not to sustain hunger? Let them be stripped of their arms and clothes, and instantly driven away: they are not worthy of participating with us in the honour of saving their country; you cannot have any bread in the course of this day, show yourselves therefore capable of surmounting every thing. No more murmurs. Liberty for ever!”

On this the whole camp began to shout, “Liberty for ever! long live our father!” and they put up with the want of bread with much good humour.

In his army were seven battalions of those very federates who had committed so many crimes at Châlons; they had entered the camp the same day as Beurnonville. They announced that they would not suffer epaulets, crosses of St. Louis, or embroidered clothes, and that they would oblige the generals to listen to reason. The commander in chief rode to the head of their line, accompanied by the whole of his staff officers, and an escort of an hundred hussars. He had caused them to be encamped apart, with

some squadrons behind them, and artillery in their front.

He then addressed them as follows :

“ You others, for I cannot term you citizens, soldiers, or my children, you behold the artillery in your van, and the cavalry in your rear. You are dishonoured by crimes. I will not suffer either assassins, or hangmen in this camp, and I will order you to be cut in pieces on the least mutiny. But if you correct your errors, if you conduct yourselves in the same manner as this brave army into which you have the honour to be admitted, you will find in me a good father. I know that there are ruffians among you, who are instructed to instigate you to the commission of crimes; chase them away from among you, or denounce them to me; I make you responsible for them.”

These battalions, which he afterwards visited daily, behaved extremely well, displayed more patience than the others, and became excellent troops. It was in this manner that he derived his hope and his consolation from the constancy, the good will, and the confidence of his soldiers. He passed the nights at their
fires,

fires, eat and drank with them, explained to them his position, and that of the Prussians, and encouraged their perseverance by announcing to them, that they would soon behold the army fleeing before them, which had produced so much fright while at a distance.

He one day received a letter from the minister Servan, stating that his constancy in remaining in his camp at St. Meneshould was considered as a culpable obstinacy; that the hulans made inroads to the very gates of Rheims, and laid waste all before them; and that it was absolutely necessary for him to act a different part. He replied to the minister as follows:

“ I will not alter my plan on account of a few marauders. There are more than ten thousand men in Rheims, and the hulans who ride up to the very gates of that city are far from being numerous; let them pursue, and slay them.”

The national assembly at this period took upon it to change itself into a convention, to abolish royalty, and to constitute France a republick. The general was afflicted at the

extreme precipitation of such a measure, but he had the enemy in sight, and, whatever might be his own private opinion, it did not belong to him, in so critical a position, to dispute with his nation the right of annihilating a constitution which it had given itself, and of changing the nature of its government.

He thought then, as he does at present, that a monarchical constitution, such as that established by the first assembly, was better calculated for a large country like France, than a republican form of government. But this was not the moment to support an opinion, which would have produced a frightful schism in his army, and put his native country in the power of a foreign king, and French princes of the blood, who, so far from being contented with the constitution, would have re-established despotism on the ruins both of it and the republick. He was at that period the sole support of his country; he would have had to reproach himself with delivering it over to the hands of foreigners, but more especially to his fellow citizens, whom he considered culpable,

on

on account of their taking up arms against it, and he would have committed this crime too, at the very moment when he was certain of being soon able to chase them from the French territory, where they had come on purpose to spread desolation, and establish despotic laws.

He had no manner of doubt, but that even if he had succeeded in bringing over his array to his own way of thinking, he would have been obliged either to have joined the Prussians and the emigrants, or to have fought alone, both against them and the national convention. He knew also, that the royal family would have become the victims of his declaration. All parties would then have had a right to have reproached him with this catastrophe, for being the author of which he could never have pardoned himself; on the other hand, should his efforts be attended with success so decisive as to put a speedy termination to the war, he had reason to hope, that either the triumph of France would soften men's minds, or that the victorious army would invest him with sufficient influence to ensure the
 life

life of the king, and the re-establishment of the constitution.

Indeed, in whatever manner the irresolution naturally produced by a circumstance so delicate, and unexpected, might terminate, he had no time to make any previous preparations, for the decree of the convention arrived during the night of the 23d, and on the 24th, he had three of its commissioners in his camp, Sillery, Carra, and Prieur, who caused the oath to be administered next day to the troops. These commissioners also proved to him beyond contradiction, that this new revolution was congenial to the wishes of all the departments.

Besides this, they were admirably calculated to fix the determination of the army, among which other emissaries whom they had brought along with them were immediately dispersed. Sillery was eloquent, subtle, and seductive. Carra, well known by his newspaper, possessed a rhetoric suited to the populace; ever since 1789 he had been the disorganizer of the armies, and the protection of all the soldiers in a state of insurrection. Posteriour to that period, he had

had run from camp to camp, and made himself beloved by all the troops. Prieur was a violent and fierce Jacobin, and he was a native of Champagne, which had furnished many of the soldiers of this army.

These three men endowed with extraordinary activity, and arriving unexpectedly, would have disconcerted all the measures which he could have taken in so short a period. The French, in consequence of that character so well described by Cæsar, more especially since the revolution, adopt with facility, and without hesitation, every thing violent and extreme; therefore the effect produced by the arrival of the commissioners was instantaneous, and the army passed from the constitutional to the republican form of government, with the rapidity of a torrent.

The commissioners were also charged to prevail upon the general to leave the camp of St. Menehould, and repass the Marne. He represented to them his position and that of the Prussians; he proved how ill-founded the terrors of Paris were, and he assured them, that if within a week the enemy did

did not retreat, he would acquiesce in whatever they might request. Seeing prisoners and deserters brought into the camp daily, they consented to wait, and six days afterwards, they were conscious of the truth of all that the general had announced and promised.

He derived another advantage from their presence ; this was to bridle Kellermann, and to render him more docile. That general has but ordinary talents, although he possesses much artifice. He was surrounded by improper persons, and his staff officers and *aides-du-camp* persuaded him to separate from his colleague, that he might not be under the command of a senior officer. The more the attention paid him by Dumouriez, the less could he prevail upon him to follow the measures they had concerted together. The acute mind of Sillery came very opportunely to the assistance of Dumouriez, without effecting, however, a thorough conversion of Kellermann, who still continued to do much mischief.

C H A P. XI.

Suspension of Arms. Negotiations. The Duke of Brunswick's Manifesto. Cessation of the Suspension.

THE retreat from Grandprey, the junction of Kellermann, the engagement at Valmy, the ineffectual attacks upon the post of Iflettes, and the position of the camp of St. Menehould, made the Prussians imagine that it would be very difficult to finish the present campaign by main force.

On the 22d Kellermann intimated to the commander in chief, that general Haymann had demanded a conference with him in behalf of colonel Manstein, adjutant-general to the king of Prussia. He repaired instantly to Kellermann's head-quarters at Dampierre, where he found this colonel along with Haymann, whom the king of Prussia had made

made major-general in his service, after his flight with Bouillé. The pretext for this conference was the necessity of agreeing to a cartel for an exchange of prisoners between the French and Prussians.

After the first compliments, colonel Manstein told Dumouriez, that they did him ample justice in the Prussian army; that they were well acquainted with the great influence he had over his troops; that it depended upon him to put an end to the present war; and that so far from being cramped in his endeavours, he should be furnished with all the assistance he could desire; if he would but terminate the disorders of France, he promised that he should dictate the terms of peace, and observed, that he would thus render the utmost service not only to his native country, but to all Europe.

The general stated in reply, that France had not declared war against the king of Prussia; that nothing was easier than to procure a peace, as the Prussian army had only to retire to the frontiers, and remain in a state of neutrality, like the other sovereigns of the empire; that the Imperialists being left
to

to themselves, and the king of Sardinia destitute of support, they would in a short time seek for an accommodation; that peace, therefore, depended entirely upon the king of Prussia; that as to what occurred in France, although he disapproved of it in part, it did not belong to him to apply the remedy; and that he could not even labour for that purpose while he was obliged to employ his whole attention in repelling so formidable an enemy. He concluded by saying, that at present he must confine himself to the business relative to the exchange of prisoners.

They afterwards sat down to table, and the conversation became very amicable. Colonel Manstein having taken that opportunity to explain himself with more precision, the general said to him:

“ You have told me, colonel, that I am esteemed in the Prussian army, but I shall not give any credit to this, if you continue to make propositions that would dishonour me. I am anxious to testify to the king of Prussia my respect. I wish to see you again, and to cultivate your friendship; I beg therefore,

fore, that you will not repeat these proposals to me."

It was agreed, during this conference, that colonel Manstein should return next day, and dine with the general at St. Menchould. Messieurs de Manstein and Heymann proposed to discontinue the skirmishing in front of the camp, clearly specifying at the same time, that this agreement should be confined to the front only. Dumouriez allowed that it was of no utility, and from that very night, a suspension of arms took place in the front of the two armies.

As soon as he had returned to his camp, he sent orders to general Dubouquet, who was then in the camp of Notre-dame de l'Epine, near Châlons, to march at the head of sixteen battalions and two squadrons of dragoons, which he had assembled there, and repair to Fresne near Sommièvre. He instructed Kellermann to make general Després-Craffier advance with two thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry to Espense and Noirliu. He dispatched eighteen squadrons of light horse towards Sommièvre, Herpont, and Moyon, under Frecheville, colonel of a regiment

ment of chasseurs, on purpose to harass the right flank of the Prussian army, and he reiterated his orders to lieutenant-general D'Harville to advance to Pont-Favergues, and even as far as St. Hilary.

These movements obliged the *corps* of emigrants to fall back from Suippe towards Croix-en-Champagne.

Colonel Frecheville, thus certain of being supported, and of having his retreat to the camp of Fresnes secured to him, advanced boldly on the rear of the enemy with his cavalry, which seized a great deal of booty. In the mean time he sent general Neuilly from Passavant with the cavalry and light infantry, to take a circuit by the forest of Argonne, and then to advance to Faucaucourt and Autrecourt, in order to annoy the enemy's left flank and rear.

By means of another disposition, he formed an advanced guard for general Beurnonville, consisting of fifteen squadrons and twenty-four battalions, besides the light troops, at the same time giving him the assistance of general Duval; he posted it on the right bank of the Aisne, with orders to advance

as far as Sernon and Condé, on purpose to harass the convoys that passed through Austry and Grandchamp. He at the same time instructed him to make his hussars and light infantry penetrate by Marque across the forest as far as the old camp of Grandprey. As none of these places were in front of the camp, he did not infringe upon the armistice, and the Prussians in the mean time began to feel the ill effects of this species of warfare carried on against their convoys. A squadron of the hussars of Lauzun crossed the forest in a part where horse had never passed before, entered Buzancy, and destroyed a convoy there, which they were unable to carry away; they made forty-seven horsemen, belonging to the escort, prisoners. This employment was exceedingly agreeable to the light troops, who became rich.

Colonel Manstein returned on the 24th to dine with the general; they then treated about the cartel for the exchange of prisoners. The colonel wished to include the emigrants, but it was represented to him, that they were Frenchmen armed against their native country, making war in their own

own name, with denominations of troops entirely French, such as musketeers, *gendarmes*, the king's regiment, &c.; and that Prussia had nothing to do with these. Colonel Manstein having abandoned their cause, an agreement was entered into for an exchange in behalf of the Prussian, Hessian, and Austrian troops.

Dumouriez afterwards commenced a political discussion, the aim of which was to prove that the king of Prussia had engaged in a war in opposition to his own real interests, that the French fought with much reluctance against that monarch, that an alliance between the two nations would be mutually advantageous, and that it would be easy to accomplish it. Colonel Manstein, on the other hand, informed him, that the king of Prussia was not desirous of the continuation of the war against France; that he did not wish to intermeddle in respect to her constitution or government; and that his desires were extremely moderate; at the same time he presented him with some very sage propositions drawn up in six articles; the first of which was, that the king should be liberated from

prison, and that his authority should be restored to him, in the same manner as it existed previously to the 10th of August.

By way of answer, Dumouriez delivered to him the *bulletin* which he had just received officially, containing the decree that changed the National Assembly into a National Convention, and the monarchy into a republic. Colonel Manstein appeared to be much afflicted at this intelligence, and the general himself did not conceal from him, that he was extremely sorry that things were carried to such an extremity, more especially as he did not perceive any remedy. Colonel Manstein then set off for the enemy's camp, and it was agreed, that colonel Thouvenot should repair to the head-quarters at Hans, in order to sign the cartel.

The general having learned that the king of Prussia was in want of coffee and sugar, took the liberty to send him twelve pounds, not being able to find any more, and also some fruit and white bread. The present was received, but it was intimated to him not to repeat it. The utmost cordiality took place between the advanced posts of the two armies,

armies, and the French divided their bread with the Prussians who were dying of hunger. The dysentery made the most horrible ravages among them, and the bad quality of the water and forage occasioned the death of their horses, which they flayed and devoured.

Colonel Thouvenot repaired next day to the king of Prussia's head-quarters, where he was well received. The duke of Brunswick wished to see him, communicated many obliging things for him to repeat to Dumouriez, and reminded him that he had taken him prisoner thirty-two years before, and that he was much wounded upon that occasion. The marquis Lucchesini also conversed for some time with Thouvenot, who conducted himself upon this occasion with much ability. He has since published the particulars of the conference. Colonel Manstein and general Heymann had endeavoured to prevail upon Dumouriez to repair to the Prussian camp, but he neither accepted, nor refused this proposition. He however would have been very cautious how he took such a step; not that he was afraid lest the

laws of nations should be violated in his person, but because a free, being always a suspicious people, the general was obliged to be exceedingly circumspect.

While Thouvenot was in the Prussian camp, Dumouriez drew up a memorial, in which he threw all the blame of the war on the house of Austria, and endeavoured to persuade the king of Prussia, that it was his interest to detach himself from an alliance with it, which was neither natural nor advantageous. He transmitted this paper to colonel Manstein, beseeching him to read it to the king, for the mutual interest of the two nations. Manstein promised to comply, but he assured him at the same time, that this memorial would not produce any effect, and that he himself disapproved of it.

Dumouriez, at that period, was most heartily, not indeed the personal, but the political enemy of the house of Austria; they were at open war, and he did but his duty in endeavouring to detach one of its allies. Perhaps, had he proved successful, the bloody catastrophes that have taken place in France would not have occurred; perhaps peace
would

would have been concluded during that very year; and perhaps the calamities which all Europe experiences, and those still greater ones, with which she is menaced, would have been effaced from the book of fate.

On the morning of the 28th, a Prussian *aide-de-camp* arrived from the duke of Brunswick, and in consequence of orders from him, delivered a manifesto to the general. This paper was so imperative, so harsh, and so ill-timed, that after reading it twice over, he spoke to the *aide-de-camp* as follows:

“ Sir, I have taken the liberty to transmit a memorial to the king of Prussia; I have not addressed myself to the duke of Brunswick; he undoubtedly mistakes me for a burgomaster of Amsterdam; tell him, that the truce ceases from this moment, and that I have given orders to that purpose, in your presence.”

Accordingly he immediately issued an order, which conferred great pleasure on the whole army. He wrote to the same purpose to colonel Manstein, and the negotiation here broke off. The manifesto, drawn up by some emigrant minister, had been composed and

printed two months before, and the communication of it by the duke of Brunswick was the more ill-timed at this epoch, as he struck his camp two days after, on purpose to effect his retreat.

All these conferences, and the appearance of so many Prussian officers in the camp, did not stagger for a single moment the confidence of the army. Dumouriez, in order to found it, one day addressed himself as follows to his soldiers, who always crowded around him when he repaired to the camp.

“What think you, my children, of all these negotiations with the Prussians? do not they give rise to some suspicions against me?”

“General,” replied an officer, in the name of all the rest, “were it any other than you, we should be uneasy, and should sift into his conduct; but with you we shut our eyes; you are our father.”

Alas! if this confidence had lasted, that nation, then so noble, so generous, and so faithful, would not at present be governed by monsters and the guillotine; it would not have

have fallen into the abyfs of barbarity and anarchy.

The general had always told them, that whenever these negotiations were terminated, whatever the result might be, he would inform them of it. He rendered an exact account of every thing to the executive power, and the three commissioners who were along with him, and the moment that he had put an end to the truce, he caused all the papers to be published, that is to say, his correspondence with Manstein, his memorial to the king of Prussia, and the manifesto of the duke of Brunswick: the convention, the army, and all the good citizens, approved of his conduct; but the infamous journals of the jacobins, the Prudhommes, and the Marats, endeavoured to convert these proceedings into so many crimes.

The above is an exact account of all the negotiations that took place between general Dumouriez and the Prussians. Their retreat, which followed immediately after, served as the foundation of a thousand fables. The idea of resisting such a formidable army was so hopeless, that they endeavoured at first to impute

impute his salvation to intrigue or a profound policy. They soon after passed from one extreme to another. After imagining that he had released himself from his embarrassments by deceiving the Prussians, the moment they learned the dismal state of the enemy's army, and yet beheld it saved, they attributed the excellence of its retreat to a collusion between him and the king of Prussia ; and many *profound thinkers* are still persuaded, that the safety of the French, in the first instance, and of the Prussian army afterwards, were the effects of a very refined and a very deep policy.

CHAP. XII.

Retreat of the Prussians.

Two days after the publication of his manifesto, during the night between the 30th of September and the 1st of October, the duke of Brunswick struck his camp at La Lune, and, sending before him his artillery and heavy baggage, marched about a league. This movement was executed with the greatest order.

Dumouriez instantly dispatched general Dampierre with a brigade of infantry, to occupy the camp of La Lune, which he found full of the carcasses of men and horses. The ditches that served as necessaries, were full of blood, many unfortunate wretches had fallen into, and perished in them. Dampierre was immediately obliged to abandon this camp, that his soldiers might not be infected

fected with the terrible epidemic malady that had prevailed there. The general also sent orders to D'Harville to advance immediately from Pont-Favergues to Attigny, whence he was to approach Chêne-populeux with caution, but the same time with sufficient celerity to fall upon the rear guard of the emigrants, who would naturally retreat through this defile. He dispatched an officer as a courier through Rhétel to Sedan, with orders for general Miaczinski to advance with a strong detachment on the side of Tannay, with a view to harass them during their march towards Stenay or Mouzon, on their leaving the pass of Chêne-populeux. He immediately sent off general Chazot with four battalions and three squadrons; he was to proceed through Rhétel by forced marches, to assume the command of Sedan, and instantly to take the field with four or five thousand men, with whom he was to advance through the opening of Carignan, and he was to concert measures with general Ligneville, so as to do the greatest damage in their power to such of the Prussians as took the road leading to Longwy. He at the same time en-
 joined

joined general Dubouquet to repair from Fresnes to Virginy.

He once more reinforced Beurnonville's advanced guard on the right bank of the Aisne with twelve battalions, ordering him constantly to harass the enemy on the side of Coudé. He commanded general Stengel to follow their rear guard as close as possible, without ever losing sight of it, and he reinforced him with all the light horse commanded by Frecheville, who advanced rapidly, by Rapsecourt and Hans, towards Massige.

It was agreed upon with Kellermann, that he should push forward the division under lieutenant-general Després-Craffier, through Croix-en-Champagne and Pertes, towards Manze and Morvaux; and send general Valence with the carabineers, some cavalry, and his battalion of grenadiers and chasseurs to act upon general Stengel's left flank, directing his march through Ville-sur-Tourbe, Challerange, and Bressy.

He commanded general Dillon to endeavour to advance by Islettes, as far as Clermont on one hand, and to Varennes by La Chalade on the other; to reinforce Neuilly
by

by Passavant ; to annoy the enemy in its retreat towards Verdun, and as soon as he had passed the defiles, to do the utmost harm in his power to the *corps* under the prince de Hohenlohe.

The three bodies commanded by Beurnonville, Stengel, and Valence, forming together more than twenty-five thousand men, consisted of the best troops belonging to the whole army, and were conducted by three of its most active generals. It seemed likely, that by displaying a little boldness, and concerting measures properly together, they would have been able at least to have annihilated the Prussian rear guard.

Dumouriez was obliged to remain during the whole of that day in the camp, to make the necessary dispositions for such a great movement ; for although he had expected it for some time, yet the position of the enemy prevented him from completing these preparations. He ordered all the provision destined for the supply of his own army, to be sent back to Rhétel and Sedan, and those for the army under Kellermann, to be conveyed to Bar. He also dispatched a courier

to Metz, with injunctions that the heavy artillery belonging to Lafayette's army, which had been left by him in that city, should be kept in readiness for Kellermann.

Hearing nothing of his advanced guard on the 2d, and perceiving that the Prussians were suffered to retire without molestation, he repaired to the *corps* under Beurnonville, who had only pushed forward a few feeble detachments, while he himself remained at Vienne-le-Château; he had received no intelligence from Stengel, although, according to his instructions, he ought to have kept up a communication with him. Stengel, on his side, had cantoned his troops along the Tourbe, and contented himself with collecting a few stragglers.

He received a letter full of complaints from lieutenant-general Valence, who, evincing a superior degree of ardour and precision in his movements, had proceeded beyond Maffie and engaged the enemy, but hearing nothing from either Stengel or Beurnonville, he had thought proper to retreat. The general spent the whole of that day and the 3d in restoring order and good intelligence in

in this advanced guard, and he made the necessary dispositions for attacking Autry the next day, while a column of light infantry and hussars, filing off by Condé, should penetrate across the woods to his former camp at Grandprey, which was choaked up with sick soldiers and baggage. He reinforced the pass of La Chalade with four battalions, and instructed the commanding officer to pierce as far as Varennes, as soon as he heard a cannonade on the side of Grandprey.

During the night between the 3d and 4th, he received a note from general Valence, enclosing the copy of an order transmitted by general Kellermann commanding him to rejoin him. Valence observed, that he was well aware there must be some mistake, but that he was forced to obey, and would begin his march immediately. Kellermann's order was dated from Suippe: it enjoined Valence to repair to him without delay, directing his course towards Châlons, as Dumouriez having no further occasion for him, he thought proper to separate, and repair to Châlons.

The

The general was filled with indignation at receiving this intelligence, which completely saved the Prussians. He had not concealed any thing from his colleague, he had communicated his movement to him, and at the very moment when their success was about to be completed, he found himself abandoned without any previous intimation. Besides this, Kellermann's march through Suippe and Châlons was absurd, for his baggage being at Vitry, and Lorraine being the place of his destination, his road lay through Vitry, Revigny-aux-Vaches, or Clermont. After such a defection, he saw no reason for remaining any longer on terms with Kellermann.

The general replied to Valence, that Kellermann and himself were both under his orders so long as the armies remained together, that he prohibited him from falling back upon Suippe, but on the contrary, commanded him to resume his position, as the advanced guard to Stengel's left flank, and to follow the operations already intimated to him. He transmitted to Kellermann a copy of the order which he had forwarded to Valence, and he charged Devaux, his aide-de-

camp, with the dispatch. He also sent copies of the whole correspondence to the commissioners of the convention, who were at St. Menchould, beseeching them at the same time to join their orders to his, and complaining bitterly of Kellermann's very extraordinary conduct.

Valence informed the general, that he was exceedingly perplexed how to decide between two orders so contrary to each other, and two authorities which he equally recognized; that the most direct one in respect to him was Kellermann's; that he was well aware his order was improper, but that he could not act in the teeth of it; that he would halt where he then was; and that having transmitted to his general the injunctions he had received, accompanied by his own representations, he entertained hopes that it would be speedily countermanded. Dumouriez could not but approve of Valence's conduct; he himself had saved his country by express disobedience during the whole of his campaign: but it is a very delicate science, to disobey at the proper moment.

Kellermann was reduced to a state of consternation

sternation at the reproaches of Dumouriez, and the serious remonstrances of colonel Devaux; he wept, made protestations, and wrote a letter of excuse. The commissioners, who had just arrived at his army, completed the confusion that prevailed in his poor head; he returned to his former camp, and commanded Valence to resume his position, and to execute every thing enjoined him by Dumouriez. Valence endeavored by means of his activity to repair the evils produced by his retrograde movement; he accordingly pushed forward to Vouziers, where he defeated a small rear guard, and seized on some baggage, and a few stragglers. General Miaczinski, who lay in ambush near Tannay, with eight or nine hundred men, surprized the emigrants, cannonaded, put them to flight, and took some of their baggage; had he used less precipitation, he would have done more damage to them.

The light troops under Beurnonville entered Grandprey, and extended as far as Buzancy; they took a few more prisoners, and pillaged some baggage; but they had the sagacity to permit several waggons filled with sick to

retire unmolested. These unfortunate wretches were dying; many perished also from hunger in the woods; those who surrendered themselves were famished, and enfeebled; their bodies were swelled, and their livid countenances displayed a green or black hue. The French soldiers evinced much humanity towards them.

An epidemick malady raged in the village of Grandprey, where the Prussians had established their hospital; they had interred upwards of three thousand of their troops there. The route of this unfortunate army might be traced by the bodies of men and of horses, which crowded the road. The peasants killed all those who strayed from the army, and avenged themselves of the excesses committed on the part of the Prussians and emigrants, by pillaging their baggage.

The general having thus seen the Prussian army effect its escape, in consequence of a false movement on the part of Kellermann, he reflected on the best means of pursuing them. Dillon had passed the defiles, and was harassing the army under the prince of Hohenlohe, which having suffered less than
that

that of the king of Prussia, although attacked by the same malady, was better able to resist. It was necessary, therefore, to support that general, who, in consequence of pushing the enemy too closely, might be beaten.

He commanded Kellermann to file along by Clermont, and in the instructions transmitted to Dillon, he put him under his orders, while they pursued the Prussians in conjunction. He at the same time desired Valence to pass through la Croix-aux-bois, and rejoin his commander in chief.

He enjoined general d'Harville to be at Chêne-populeux on the 7th, where he was to entrench himself, for his troops consisting of new levies were very irregular, and subject to panic terroure, and mutiny, as well as those under general Dubouquet. He sent this general with four new battalions, to join lieutenant-general Chazot at Sedan, who with the help of these numerous reinforcements formed a small army.

On the 6th, he left his camp at St. Menehould, and advanced towards Vouziers, where he arrived on the 8th. The castle, in which he slept, had served as the head

quarters of the two brothers of Louis XVI. The doors of the apartments where they lodged were still marked with chalk; the princes had kept open table there. The inhabitants told him, that a few days before his arrival, the king of Prussia, whose headquarters were at Termes, had sent for these princes, and severely reproached them, on account of the false hopes they had inspired him with, and that they had returned in the course of the evening, with all the symptoms of the most violent chagrin. He does not vouch for the authenticity of this anecdote.

Two motives obliged the general to carry his army to Vouziers. The first, that he was forced to avoid Grandprey, which had been converted into a cemetery replete with pestilential exhalations. The second, that he was obliged to abandon the pursuit of the Prussians to Kellermann and Dillon, in order to fly to the relief of Lisle.

The different reinforcements received by him had increased his army to eighty thousand men. With Kellermann, in addition to his own army of more than twenty-five thousand, he left the *corps* under Dillon con-

sisting of about twenty five thousand; the troops under Chazot of seven or eight thousand; and those assembled at Châlons, Troyes, and Vitry, which might amount to ten thousand more, newly levied, and of an inferiour kind indeed, but he might have thrown them into the fortified towns, by way of replacing such of the troops of the line as he might have occasion to draught from their garrisons. Thus Kellermann had in fact, nearly fifty thousand men under his command, which he might have increased, in the space of a week, to at least seventy thousand. He had a train of battering artillery to retake Verdun and Longwy, provision in his rear, and every thing he could desire, to complete the total ruin of the Prussians. The commissioners of the convention were also along with him, who would put all the civil authorities at his disposal.

The general, in a series of instructions which he transmitted to him, advised (for after their separation he could no longer order him) to allow general Dillon to act

by himself against the rear guard of the Prussians, and to advance by a rapid march behind Etain and Gondrecourt, towards Longuyon, and after passing the Curne, to leave that river between him and the enemy. Had he followed this advice, the retreat of the Prussians would have been entirely cut off.

He announced to him that the Prussian army, which was reduced to the most deplorable situation, would not retain possession of Verdun and Longwy, but during the time necessary to send off their heavy artillery, their baggage, and their sick; and that being destitute of provision, and having but very little ammunition, they would not endanger the garrisons of these two places, which they would certainly evacuate: that therefore it would be unnecessary to attack these, and highly proper to get the start of them upon the frontiers.

After giving him this advice, which was not followed, he dispatched Beurnonville on the 12th, with the troops belonging to Flanders, which, in consequence of reinforcements,

ments, formed a body of twenty-two thousand men. He sent general d'Harville to take upon him the command of the camp at Maubeuge, and reinforced it with about ten thousand men. Lieutenant-general Lanoue had been falsely accused by the jacobins, and the commissioners of the convention, without any further examination, had ordered this respectable old man to be imprisoned in a dungeon at Douay, choosing rather to deprive the service of his experience, than not to prejudge him guilty.

Beurnonville employed the same celerity in this march as he had displayed during the former. Setting out from Vouziers on the 12th of October, during a most stormy season, he arrived on the 21st at Valenciennes. Dumouriez at the same time went to Paris, which he reached on the 15th.

The retreat of the Prussians from Champagne was made with the utmost order, and with great good fortune. The king of Prussia distinguished himself personally on this occasion, marching constantly along with the rear guard, and displaying as much
courage

courage as he exhibited during the engagement at Valmy, where he presented himself at the head of his columns. This army would have suffered very severely during its passage through the defile of Grandprey, if general Dumouriez' van guard had executed his orders with vigour and precision, and if Kellermann had not suspended the pursuit during a period of thirty-six hours, in consequence of his very culpable movement towards Suippe.

Kellermann would have completed the ruin of this army during its retreat from Verdun, through Luxembourg, and the country of Treves, if, instead of remaining in conjunction with Dillon, on purpose to follow its rear guard coolly and deliberately, he had conformed to the instructions of general Dumouriez, and advanced with rapidity against its right flank. In place of this bold and decisive movement, he allowed himself to be amused with conferences, and deemed himself exceedingly happy in seeing the Prussians evacuate the French territories, and in receiving from them those towns which they were

were unable to garrison. He considered himself as too weak, although at the head of more than fifty thousand men replete with courage, and with health, and he lost his senses to so great a degree, that the commissioners dispatched a courier to the general at Paris, ordering him to return with his army, to defend that part of the country, which the Prussians threatened to reconquer. They at the same time rendered him responsible for events.

He told them in reply, that he would willingly charge himself with the whole responsibility; that before he could possibly rejoin them, they would be no longer embarrassed with the Prussian army; and that as to himself, he was about to set off, on purpose to save Flanders, and conquer the Low Countries.

This lucky retreat on the part of the Prussians, the departure of Dumouriez, the slowness evinced by Kellermann in the pursuit, and the evacuation without a siege of Verdun and Longwy, which every body believed the enemy would be able to preserve, have sanctioned the fables which
were

were spread abroad relative to the negotiations at St. Menchould, fables which he has refuted, as being equally injurious to the Prussian monarch and his generals, as to the French commanders.

CHAP.

C H A P. XIII.

Events in the Northern Department.

WE have already seen that all the French forces destined to defend the northern department, which is the nearest frontier to Paris, consisted, in addition to the feeble garrisons, of forty-five battalions and twenty squadrons, divided among three camps. Duke Albert of Saxe Teschen, after having detached general Clerfait, had but few troops on this frontier, and was incapable of attempting great enterprises. Accordingly the weakness being nearly equal on each side, both the parties remained on the defensive.

The duke of Teschen had however endeavoured to invade the French territories, and had encamped for some time at St. Vaast near Bavai; but he soon after retired to
Mons,

Mons, where he remained in tranquillity. He however reinforced the camp of Trinity near Tournay, and that of Bury, which was opposed to the camp of Maulde.

Lieutenant-general Labourdonnaye commanded in the department of the north, in the absence of general Dumouriez. He had under his orders lieutenant-general Lanoue, who commanded the camp of Maubeuge, general Duval, who commanded at Pont-sur-Sambre, and lieutenant-general Beurnonville, who commanded the camp of Maulde. Lieutenant-general Moreton, at the head of the staff of the northern army, was charged, in company with the commissary-general Malus, to continue the preparations for assembling the army, which the general wished to have ready to enter the Low Countries in the course of that very year, in case he succeeded in driving the Prussians from Champagne, or to march with it, as a last resource, to the succour of Paris, should the Prussians make too much progress.

The rapidity with which Longwy was taken, the consternation which he found prevalent in Champagne, the disorganisation of
Lafayette's

Lafayette's army, its feebleness, its disorder, and the want of every other resource for resisting so formidable an army as that which opposed him, had obliged him to alter all his plans, and to send for general Duval and the troops in the camp of Pont-sur-Sambre, to enfeeble at the same time the camp of Maubeuge, and not to leave with Lanoue any more than the number of troops necessary for a system strictly defensive.

Two days afterwards, being still better acquainted with the enormous superiority of the enemy, expecting that Verdun would make but a very sorry defence, reckoning but little on the assistance of marshal Luckner, whose age and want of inclination engendered doubts, and judging that the safety of France depended on the possession of the defiles of Argonne, he found himself obliged to call in general Beurnonville to his assistance with twelve battalions, three squadrons, and all the light troops belonging to the camp of Maulde.

General Labourdonnaye, who was supposed to possess great talents, and who has since given the lie to this false reputation, had been
sent

sent for to Paris by the minister Servan, to command a central army, and he had been afterwards dispatched to Châlons, where it was to assemble. Accordingly the northern department being entirely stripped of troops, was also left destitute of a commander, and Moreton, who remained at the head quarters at Valenciennes, was entrusted to transmit the orders of the general to the commanding officers of the camps.

During the latter part of the month of August, the Imperialists made several vigorous attacks on the camp of Maulde, but they had been always successfully repulsed by the brave Beurnonville. Dumouriez was ignorant of this circumstance, but he had foreseen, when he sent him orders to join him, that this camp, which was indifferent enough in itself, being enfeebled by the loss of twelve battalions, and still more by that of the general who had hitherto defended it so well, and who alone was acquainted with its strong and weak points, would not be able to hold out with a dozen of battalions under another commander.

This

This camp is only separated by the Scarpe from another, and far better position, that of Bruille. The Scarpe forms a junction with the Scheldt at the bridge of Mortagne. The Scheldt flows from Condé to Mortagne: the Scarpe, from St. Amand to the same place. At their confluence is the end of a bridge which may be very easily defended; behind is Château-l'Abbaye, which is an exceeding good post. In the rear of Château-l'Abbaye is a height, in the centre of which stands the mill of Gourdin; part of it forming the right of the camp, terminates at the village of Bruille, and the left at the village of Nivelle. Neither of these rivers is fordable, the borders too are marshy on both sides, and as the ground rises towards the centre, they can be commanded either by the fixed or moveable batteries of the army encamped at Bruille, or rather at the mill of Gourdin. Behind the right wing of the camp is the village of Condé; in the rear of the centre is the forest of St. Amand, and in the rear of the left flank is the town of the same name.

To abandon the camp of Maulde was a great sacrifice, as it protected the noble plain bounded by Lisle, Douay, St. Amand, and

Orchies. The last of these would then naturally fall into the hands of the enemy. St. Amand, which is a very weak post, although supported by the camp of Bruille, must also be forced to succumb after a few days resistance, but the troops had an opportunity of retreating towards Valenciennes, and the dangers of France were then too imminent to hesitate at the trifling consideration of the devastation of the plains of Flanders, provided the safety of the fortified towns could be ascertained; and in regard to them there was no danger whatever, as the duke of Teschen had not a sufficient number of troops to undertake sieges.

Dumouriez had foreseen all the disadvantages resulting from the weakening of the camp of Maulde; but being forced by imperious necessity, at the time he transmitted orders for Beurnonville's departure, he had authorised Moreton immediately to transfer the camp in question to Bruille, and to confine himself to the defence of the banks of the Scheldt and the Scarpe, between Condé and St. Amand, taking care to fortify the entrance into St. Amand, on purpose to keep up the communication between Valenciennes and Douay, at least by the other side of the

6

canal

canal of Marchiennes, if he were deprived of that of Orchies. He had orders, in fine, should his garrison prove too feeble, to remove even the camp of Bruille, and to reinforce them with the troops belonging to it. However, as the newly levied battalions were assembling at Soissons, and as it was possible, that the army of Flanders might be reinforced in the mean time, he left it at Moreton's option to continue the camp at Bruille, and even not to remove that of Maulde, if he thought he had a sufficient number of troops to defend it.

These orders arrived at Valenciennes on the 1st of September, and on the night before, Beurnonville had experienced and repulsed a sharp attack on the part of the enemy. Moreton, who was very brave, was also very well acquainted with military details; but he had never seen service, and was totally ignorant of the art of war.

He immediately assembled a council of war, consisting of all the general officers; the first question was, whether in the present state of affairs, Beurnonville should be suffered to depart. Several general officers were of opi-

nion that he ought not; they had the example of general Dumouriez himself, to justify them, but the cases were not similar. Beurnonville put an end to the contest, by producing his orders, and swearing that he would execute them. The second proposition was, whether they should preserve the camp of Maulde, or, in compliance with the general's instructions, transfer it to Bruille. The latter was unanimously resolved upon. Beurnonville then returned to his camp, where, in consequence of the orders of the commander in chief, he left Berneron, the head of his staff, and he himself set out next day for Rhétel.

Moreton issued his orders for the removal of the camp. This operation was far from being difficult, for there was not a quarter of a league's march from one position to the other. The Austrians, however, were apprised of the intended movement. On the Scheldt, between Condé and Mortagne, were several large flat-bottomed boats laden with forage. Orders had been issued not to permit these boats to lie along side of each other, because two of them, if thus placed, would

would reach across the river, and serve all the purposes of a bridge. The Austrians taking advantage of the negligence of the French, passed over these boats in the manner already indicated, and one column attacked Château-l'Abbaye while another assaulted the camp of Maulde. The French being taken by surprise at the moment when they were busied in decamping, and not having a single man of abilities to rally them, abandoned their tents, baggage-waggon, and cannon, and falling into disorder, threw themselves into St. Amand, Condé, Valenciennes, and even Bouchain.

The Imperialists, profiting by their success, assailed St. Amand on all sides, during that very day, and carried it. The garrison of Orchies sheltered itself at Douay, and the enemy got possession of the whole flat country. Moreton wished to recall Beurnonville, who told him in reply, that he could not remedy the evil which had occurred; that he had no manner of occasion to be afraid for the fortified places, and that, therefore, he would continue his march. He did right. The people of Valenciennes were

eager to hang Moreton; and the commissioners from the convention were resolved to cashier him; he however produced the orders of the commander in chief, and by that means escaped.

The rout at the camp of Maulde made a great noise in Paris: but the dread of the Prussians occupied the people's minds still more. Dumouriez informed the minister at war, that it would be necessary to send Labourdonnaye to the army of the north, with a commission as commander in chief, and also to transfer to the northern department all the battalions that had been assembled at Soissons, which might be distributed among the fortified towns; that Labourdonnaye could watch the motions of the enemy, draw from such of the places as were least in danger a few troops in order to form a small flying camp, with which he might hover about, and harass the duke of Teschen, if he entered France with an army; and that as to the pillage that might ensue, this was a misfortune for which the nation could indemnify the inhabitants.

The

The duke of Teschen in the course of a fortnight afterwards, by way of making a useful diversion, and perhaps, in consequence of false intelligence, presented himself before Lisle with twenty-five thousand men, and a numerous artillery. He did not pretend to besiege it, for his troops were not sufficiently numerous, but a *coup de main* he thought might possibly succeed, as the garrison was feeble, and anarchy prevalent. Rualt, who commanded in the place, Champmorin at the head of the engineers, and Guiscard, colonel of artillery, were well able to defend it, but they were not obeyed. The duke of Teschen subjected it to a violent bombardment.

This pretended siege of Lisle was carried on with the greatest vigour at the epoch of the retreat of the Prussians; the general therefore was extremely eager to set out in order to relieve that important place. The more considerable the town was, the more did he dread the example of Longwy and Verdun. Had this city, which is the capital of Flanders, been subdued, more than a hundred thousand men must have been employed, and

wards of six months consumed, in order to recapture it.

The ungrateful people, who had forgotten their deliverance from the Prussians, rendered him responsible for events that occurred at eighty leagues distance from him. In fine, it was far more important for France to save Lille, than to pursue the Prussians; and this is what determined Dumouriez to resign this task to Kellermann, while he himself marched into Flanders.

C H A P. XIV.

Reflections.

THIS campaign deserves the attention of all military men. The particulars of it are instructive, and deserve to be studied. Its singularity has been long an historical problem, even to those who served during it; the picture which it presents is truly extraordinary. A French general at the head of a great party, and who had been the idol of his nation, revolts against the legislative power, become the sole representative, in consequence of the captivity of the king; he afterwards flees; his army, consisting of no more than twenty-three thousand men, destitute of leaders and superiour officers, remains in a state of disorganization, and consternation. At the same time a powerful king, at the head of eighty thousand men, enters France, and two fortified towns surrender

render without attempting to make a defence. A general but little known, and who had never before acted as a commander in chief, arrives, and assumes a very strong position ; he is forced from it and surrounded ; he escapes, saves his army, notwithstanding its momentary disorder, occupies a second camp, and is there enveloped by the enemy, which gets between him and Paris. This formidable enemy, although at no more than six leagues distance from Châlons, and ten from Rheims, does not even penetrate to Châlons and Rheims, loses near thirty thousand men, out of which only two thousand at the most fell by the sword, evacuates the two fortified places which it had taken, and retreats into Germany. All these events, which border on the marvellous, occur within less than six weeks, and France is rescued from one of the greatest dangers recorded in her annals.

The details which have been given explain how a series of faults produced a succession of misfortunes. The Prussian army entered France in the persuasion, that it had not any difficulty to encounter. Its first successes completely confirmed it in this error, which
had

had been propagated by the emigrants. They deeming themselves certain in respect to their intelligence, announced too great a degree of confidence, and promised far too much, which occasioned them to receive many disagreeable rubs from this army.

The principal faults committed by the Prussians were :

1st. After the capture of Longwy, not to have attacked Montmedy at the same time as Verdun, if they wished to conquer France foot by foot, commence a regular war, and insure winter quarters and a safe retreat. They had more troops than were necessary for this purpose.

2d. They were acquainted with Lafayette's rebellion, and subsequent desertion with his general officers, and those belonging to his staff. This event was exceedingly important. He had arrived on the 21st, Longwy was taken on the 22d, why did not they instantly push forward a body of thirty thousand men towards Stenai and Mouzon, on purpose to attack this army while destitute of leaders, and at the time when it was in a state of consternation, in order at least,

least, to draw over the troops of the line, as the emigrants had informed them how easily they might have been gained? It is certain, that if between the 22d and 28th, a body of the enemy's troops had presented itself before Mouzon, the French army would have disbanded; perhaps indeed, if a few of the officers belonging to the old government, who were well known to, and esteemed by the soldiers, and there were some of these in the army of the princes, had presented themselves with a simple detachment, they might have seduced part of the troops of the line, and especially the cavalry.

When it is resolved to invade a country torn to pieces in consequence of a revolution, when a great party is supposed to be favourable to their wishes, when they would rescue a king from his fetters, and when a campaign has been commenced at too late a period, the invaders, more especially if provided with a great army, ought to multiply their force by means of their celerity, and dart like a thunderbolt towards the capital, that the people intended to be subjected may not be left time for recollection. It was necessary

cessary to begin by taking Longwy, and attacking Thionville, in order to conceal the point of invasion, and render the defensive system uncertain, and divided. But as soon as Longwy was taken, they ought, on learning the news of Lafayette's flight, to have marched instantly against Mouzon and Sedan, on purpose either to have dissipated, or gained over the French army. This would have been a master stroke, and it was also conformable to the rules of the military art; for this army being once destroyed, there remained no other obstacle, either in the way of a methodical warfare, or the expedition to Paris.

3d. The Prussians attacked Verdun with fifty thousand men, while general Clerfait, with an army of observation, occupied the right hand side of the Meuse. There was no manner of occasion for so large an army to attack Verdun, which could not be succoured from any quarter, for Luckner was kept in check by the body of troops under the prince de Hohenlohe, and Dumouriez by that under Clerfait. After taking Verdun, it was the intention of the duke of Brunswick

wick to lead his army to Paris. During the siege of the former place, he ought to have detached general Kalkreuth, with twenty thousand men, to take possession of the defiles of Argonne.

By this movement the duke of Brunswick would have made himself master of the forage along the banks of the rivers Aire and Aisne, and forced the French to have retired with all possible speed from before Sedan, in order to reach Rheims, by passing through Rhétel : as the siege of Verdun continued no longer than two days, on the third or fourth he could have relieved general Kalkreuth's army in the position of St. Menehould, and that general might then have advanced to Châlons, where he would have found very large magazines. The Prussians, when once masters of the Marne, would have been abundantly supplied with every thing.

4th. The army of observation under general Clerfait, the moment that it perceived general Dumouriez's movement directed towards Stenai, ought to have supported that post, on purpose to have had an opportunity of crossing the Meuse, and of pursuing the French

French general. It was even strong enough to have crossed the Meuse, and marched against him, or at least to have assumed a position across this little plain, covering itself at the same time by means of the wood of Neuville. In this position it would have had the defile of Grandprey behind it, which Dumouriez could not have reached without an attack, and this was not the time to hazard a battle with a feeble and disorganized army, which was however the sole resource of France, more especially when he had no more ammunition than was sufficient for an engagement of four hours.

General Clerfait would have then seen, that Dumouriez wished to gain the defile of Grandprey; he would accordingly have intercepted the passage, and would have forced him to return in order to proceed through Chêne-populeux. General Clerfait might then have advanced to Grandprey, and by taking post at Vouziers, he would have had the Aisne between him and the French general, and have thus cut off his communication with Châlons.

5. All

5th. All these faults were committed, Verdun was taken on the 2d, and Dumouriez did not arrive until the 4th in the camp of Grandprey. Why did the duke of Brunswick lose six precious days at Verdun? and why did not he march instantly to Grandprey, to dislodge the French before they had time to fortify themselves? Why did he not know, that from want of troops, general Dumouriez had been obliged to leave the passage of Chêne-populeux open? Why did not he order general Clerfait to advance thither with rapidity, and thence march to Attigny, to oblige Dumouriez to abandon his position?

6th. He attacked the passes of Grandprey, la Chalade, and Islettes, faintly and to no purpose; a neglect on the part of the French general laid open to him the passage of Croix-aux-bois; general Clerfait surprized the troops there, and made himself master of this defile, after two days engagement. Then was the time to have profited by this victory, in consequence of which general Dumouriez was hemmed in, and to have driven from Vouziers the body of
troops

troops under general Chazot, who had just been defeated. General Clerfait might have afterwards surrounded the heights of Vaux and Autry without any risk, because the river would have been between him and the French, who would have been inevitably ruined.

7th. Not only was the French general suffered to escape and make an incredible retreat, which ought to have been foreseen, as it was the only chance left; but they did not cause him to be pursued unless by a few hussars, and neglected to put themselves in a situation to take advantage of a panick terror that occurred in his army, or of the disorder that followed; and they also permitted him to take quiet possession of the excellent camp of St. Menchould, where he was allowed time to effect his two junctions.

8th. They lost one day more in following him, which gave him time to receive the reinforcements under Beurnonville, for if the king of Prussia had appeared on the morning of the 19th, on the heights of Valmy and Gizaucourt, instead of parading there on

the 20th, Beurnonville would have made a retrograde march to Châlons, and Kellermann to Bar. Dumouriez would then have been actually furrounded a second time, as he could not abandon the position of St. Menchould for fear of opening the passage of Islettes to the prince of Hohenlohe.

9th. Why, after the first ineffectual attempts to force the passage of Islettes, did the duke of Brunswick obstinately persist in allowing the prince de Hohenlohe to remain inactive? and why did he not send him to Bar to prevent Kellermann's march, to open the way into a rich and fruitful country, well calculated for the subsistence of the troops, and to menace Vitry and Troyes, which Dumouriez could not have sufficiently covered without leaving Rheims and Châlons unprotected?

10th. On the 20th in the morning, an error on the part of Kellermann put the duke of Brunswick in a situation to beat that general in the fight of his colleague, as Hannibal formerly defeated Minutius in the presence of Fabius. He very phlegmatically commenced an useless cannonade, which
cost

cost him some men, and lost four inestimable hours, instead of deciding the affair immediately by a sudden attack, the success of which was infallible, and the attempt not dangerous, as his retreat was secured.

11th. But this fault originated in another still more important one. The duke of Brunswick having succeeded in forcing general Dumouriez from his post of Grandprey, he ought to have calculated, that, on assuming that position, he must have established his ovens and magazines at Châlons, and that that place was his place of arms, and the repository of his succours of all kinds. Châlons is a large straggling town, all the houses of which are built with wood, and is incapable of making any resistance. The troops under Beurnonville, which had arrived there after a hard and uninterrupted march of fifteen days, were greatly harassed, and consequently incapable of making any defence. The new levies at Châlons and the camp of l'Epine would have only increased the consternation and disorder. Instead of parading before the camp of St. Menchould, the duke of Brunswick would have exhibited a decisive stroke

of genius, had he advanced with his whole army straight forwards to Châlons, and made a rapid attack on whomever he might have found there. In that case, he would have certainly dispersed the troops, and seized on all the magazines.

Dumouriez would then have had no other resource left, than to have instantly abandoned the camp of St. Menchould and the defile of Islettes, to have escaped by the way of Passavant and Revigny, to have joined Kellermann, and to have crossed the Marne at Vitry, endeavouring by long marches to have gained the banks of the Seine, thus abandoning the whole of Champagne. Prince Hohenlohe would have then proceeded by St. Menchould, and effected his junction, and the Prussian army being abundantly supplied with provision, could have carried the war into the very heart of France. The counter-revolutionary party, which actually existed, would then have declared itself, and a civil war being added to the efforts of a formidable army, it is to be presumed, that a counter-revolution would have been effected.

Dumouriez

Dumouriez had foreseen this danger; he had pitched upon the camp of St. Menehould, on purpose to attract the attention of the duke of Brunswick, and prevent him from making a brisk attack on Châlons, because he had calculated that this general, not choosing to leave an army behind him, would strive to dislodge it, before he marched towards the Marne. But he had come to a determination, in case the duke of Brunswick had advanced directly towards Châlons, to sacrifice Dillon, whom he would have left at Islettes, and to have proceeded to Châlons by a forced march, with a view of anticipating the Prussians at the camp of l'Epine, where he would have found the *corps* under Beurnonville, and gotten Kellermann to join him. He had the advantage of one long march over the Prussians, but his army was little used to manœuvres, and between Aube and Châlons there were six leagues of a plain to be crossed. This, which was the greatest fault committed by the duke of Brunswick, proved decisive. He was too slow, and too methodical.

12th. In fine, having neglected to prevent the junctions; perceiving the French general posted at the head of sixty thousand men in an impregnable camp; seeing considerable bodies of troops assembling at Châlons and Rheims; having forgotten to seize on the first of these two towns, at the moment when this step would have been practicable and decisive; being no longer able to make such an attempt, either with his whole army, or by means of detachments, without exposing himself to be followed, attacked, and perhaps defeated; finding his troops enfeebled in consequence of a terrible dysentery; his horses destitute of corn and forage; the march of his convoys long and difficult, and famine ravaging his camp; the duke of Brunswick must then have been convinced of the necessity of retreating; and it was a great error to have delayed that event. Every day lost in consequence of his irresolution augmented the sufferings, the dangers, and the ruin of this unfortunate army, for it was evident, that it must always end in a retreat at last.

Had

Had the duke of Brunswick returned through the defiles on the 20th or 21st, leaving general Clerfait to defend the course of the Aisne, and general Hohenlohe to guard the Aire, he might even then have taken Sedan, and perhaps Montmedy, before his troops retired into winter quarters. The campaign would in that case have still proved of great utility, for as Sedan protected the two flanks of the forest of Argonne, its defiles would have been then bereaved of all their importance. He would thus also have taken some steps highly favourable to the success of the ensuing campaign, and, what was of great importance, Dumouriez would have been still forced to neglect the protection of the northern department, and even to have stripped it of more troops on purpose to defend Champagne.

These are the most essential faults with which the Prussians can be reproached; there were a few others of less consequence, from which the French general would have reaped more profit, if he had been at the head of an army composed of troops of the line, such

as this was four years before, and commanded by experienced officers, and well informed generals.

In consequence of such serious errors, Dumouriez was not under the necessity of having recourse to negotiations, in order to save his country. The first conference took place on the 22d, and he had then collected together sixty thousand men within a formidable camp. He was indeed a little straitened in respect to his convoys, but he was not in actual want of any thing. He well knew the scarcity that prevailed among the Prussians, and he had taken all the necessary measures to increase it; every day augmented the superiority of his position over theirs, and he was certain of disconcerting the objects of their campaign by temporising; he therefore could not regard the overtures made by them in any other light than as a proof of their embarrassment.

The French have three faults to reproach themselves with. The first is to be attributed solely to general Dumouriez; it consisted in his confiding too readily to the report of a subaltern; in having withdrawn the troops from
the

the defile of Croix-aux-bois, and allowing it to be surprised by general Clerfait. This error was afterwards repaired, as the enemy did not know how to take advantage of it; but it might have ruined all.

The second was committed by Kellermann on the 20th of September, in consequence of his mistaking his field of battle for his camp, which occasioned the cannonade at Valmy, because the duke of Brunswick, by being too slow in getting possession of the height of Gizancourt, which Kellermann had committed a second fault by neglecting to occupy, and making a sudden attack on the mill of Valmy, lost the opportunity of defeating that general.

The third, which is to be partly ascribed to the generals commanding the advanced guard, and still more to Kellermann, is the slowness evinced in pursuing the Prussians during their retreat, and the allowing them to return through the pass of Grandprey with impunity.

As Dumouriez is not at all interested in respect to what concerns the remainder of the retreat from Verdun and Longwy,

having set out for Paris on the 12th of October, and as Kellermann and Dillon have not published any official account of it, he does not know any thing concerning it, but what he read in the newspapers of the day, and is therefore utterly ignorant as to all the particulars. But he does not believe that the Prussian army was saved by negotiations, as its retreat was never likely to be cut off, which would however have occurred, had Kellermann, instead of remaining coupled to Dillon, advanced behind the Curne to Longuyon, as was expressly recommended to him.

As to the evacuation of the fortified places, Dumouriez had already calculated on, and predicted that event in consequence of disease, and the scarcity of provision. So far from dreaming of supplying these two towns with provision, the Prussian army had long since consumed the twelve thousand sacks of grain which they found in Verdun. That place is but weak, and the garrison left there would have been captured. Perhaps the duke of Brunswick might have endeavoured to preserve Longwy, which

which being on the extreme frontier, could have been revictualled, and succoured in case of a siege, or he might have consigned that place into the hands of the Imperialists or emigrants.

But he knows, that at this epoch the duchy of Luxembourg, and the country of Treves, were exhausted, that the important fortress of Luxembourg itself was destitute of provision, and encumbered with the sick belonging to this unfortunate army, and that general Clerfait was obliged to make long marches in order to defend the Low Countries, while the Prussian army was under the necessity of setting out to retake Francfort, to arrest the progress of general Custine, and save Coblentz, and the country of Treves.

It is to the conjunction of all these circumstances that he attributes the evacuation of Longwy.

It is wrong to run in quest of mysterious causes, for events which naturally explain themselves by the most simple rules of the military art, and good sense; but mankind is fond of the marvellous. Another motive
gave

gave birth to all these fables. The jacobins had made a sudden transition from the greatest consternation to the greatest insolence. They at first expected to behold the king of Prussia enter Paris as a conqueror. When affairs began to change, they had no manner of doubt but that they should see him dragged thither, loaded with fetters. Those ruffians believed that an army might be taken with as much facility as they themselves could assassinate an *aristocrat* or a *moderate* in the streets of Paris.

The Prudhommes and Marats have invented the most atrocious and the most stupid calumnies, both against the king of Prussia and the French generals. This exempted them from gratitude to the latter; and by inspiring the nation with suspicions against them, diminished their credit, which might some day have been opposed to their disorganizing, and anarchical plans.

Dumouriez had assuredly saved his country, and from that moment they sought his destruction. When services are too great they become crimes. France in her cradle displays the vices of Rome in her decrepitude,
and

and never pardons a victorious general. Custine, Houchard, Biron, Brunet, have been the victims of this pernicious ingratitude, which will ruin that republick, notwithstanding its momentary successes.

C H A P. I.

DUMENIL'S ARRIVAL.

General Dumenil arrived at Paris on the 10th of October. He had received during his whole journey the most affecting marks of the gratitude of the people, more especially in Champagne, the inhabitants of which were indebted to him for their liberation. The inhabitants of Paris who attended him a very kind reception, but the convention fearing to enhance his consideration too much, by conferring public marks of national distinction, and far from imitating the ancient republics by bestowing triumphs, festivals, and plaudits, merely expressed the promotions which their necessity or

CHAP.

B O O K VI.

CHAP. I.

Dumouriez at Paris.

GENERAL Dumouriez arrived at Paris on the 16th of October. He had received during his whole journey the most affecting marks of the gratitude of the people, more especially in Champagne, the inhabitants of which were indebted to him for their salvation. The inhabitants of Paris also afforded him a very kind reception, but the convention fearing to enhance his consideration too much, by conferring publick marks of national satisfaction, and far from imitating the ancient republicks by bestowing triumphs, festivals, and plaudits, scarcely approved of the promotions which either necessity, or
a spirit

a spirit of justice, had induced the general to make.

He presented himself before it on the day after his arrival, and pronounced a very laconick speech at the bar, in which he announced that he only meant to remain at Paris during four days, for a part of his army being on its march to succour Lisle, he had deemed it necessary to pass through the capital, in order to treat with the ministers relative to his future proceedings; he added that he should be at Valenciennes between the 20th and 25th, and would then instantly take the field.

He was obliged to offer this kind of excuse for his appearance, because he was informed, that by way of finding something to blame in his conduct, he had been censured for leaving his army without permission. He did not quit his army, since it was upon its march; it was of the utmost consequence to have an interview with the ministers, in order to agree upon a general plan, and also on the particular operations relative to his entrance into the Low Countries. Instead of taking the same route as his army, he
passed

passed through Paris; and nothing but hatred, baseness, and jealousy, could blame a journey indispensable in its nature, of which he had informed the executive power beforehand. The president however replied to him in a very genteel manner, and granted him the honours of the sitting, but the assembly adjourned in a very short time afterwards, because the Impartialists and Girondists overwhelmed him with embraces and caresses, although it had been agreed to maintain the dignity of the convention by a gravity which they were unable to sustain.

The ministers, who were Servan, Roland, Clavières, Danton, Lebrun, and Monge, appeared to him to live together in the utmost cordiality. They carried him to two public entertainments, where he was greatly applauded, and a celebrated female of Paris invited him to a charming festival given on the occasion, at which all the performers belonging to the different theatres complimented him. Many members of the convention, and several of the ministers assisted at this festival, which experienced a momentary interruption,

interruption, in consequence of a very ridiculous occurrence.

On the retreat of the Prussians, he had sent general Chazot with four battalions and three squadrons, to reinforce the garrison of Sedan, and in conjunction with lieutenant general Ligneville to harass the enemy's rear guard. Among these battalions were two of the federates of Paris, the one called the *republican*, the other belonged to the section of *Mauconseil*. Chazot repaired with these to Rhetel. Four deserters from the emigrants arrived in that place, in order to surrender themselves; they were simple soldiers. The federates surrounded, and wished to kill them. Chazot was informed of this circumstance. The municipality and the inhabitants implored him to exert his authority over these cannibals. He endeavoured to make them release these unfortunate men; on this they overwhelmed him with injuries, nay, they wished to kill him, and these four unhappy creatures were actually massacred. The municipality on this drew up an account of their proceedings, which general Chazot transmitted to the command-

er in chief, accompanied by a formal complaint on his own part.

He received this intelligence at Vouziers, and all the army heard of the crime with horror. He ordered Beurnonville, who passed close to Sedan in his way to Flanders, to surround and disarm these two battalions, to send back their colours to their respective sections, and to order the men to be conducted by the *marechaussee* to Paris, there to be punished by the sections themselves. He, however, left it to Beurnonville's discretion to pardon them, in case they pointed out, and delivered up such as were guilty.

Beurnonville executed this sentence with equal address and firmness. He himself, unaccompanied by any one, appeared before the battalions, read the general's orders, and commanded them to ground their arms, and deposit their colours. These unfortunate men fell at his feet, burst into tears, acknowledged the enormity of their crime, and delivered up forty-two culprits. Beurnonville pardoned them, restored their arms and their colours, made the battalion of Mauconseil enter into Sedan, and carried along with himself

himself the battalion called the republican, which was a very fine one, and since that period has become the general's confidential battalion, that on which he could depend most, and the model of the whole army. It was impossible for such an atrocious adventure to terminate in a happier way. Their repentance was sincere, the crime was punished in an exemplary manner, at least the guilty were surrendered and arrested, and two good battalions were regained; the convention and the sections of Paris were therefore very well satisfied.

But the principal culprit had escaped, and returned instantly into Paris. This was an artist of the name of Palloy*, one of the conquerors of the Bastille, a furious jacobin, and a very sanguinary man. He was lieutenant-colonel of the republican battalion.

He carried his complaints to his friend Marat, one of whose agents he in all likelihood was. Immediately after this, the *hall* of the jacobins resounded with complaints against the cruel despotism of general Du-

* Palloy was formerly a sculptor.—*Transf.*

mouriez, who was said to have sacrificed excellent citizens, on account of having done a very patriotick act, by massacring a few infamous emigrants. Chazot, the district, and the municipality of Rhetel, were loudly blamed in the course of these violent accusations. The public papers were also filled with them, but all this could not prevail either upon the sections or the convention to act conformably to these declamations.

The jacobins, however, did not abandon this business, for their committee nominated three commissioners on purpose to interrogate the general relative to it. These commissioners consisted of the monster Marat, Bentabole, and Montault, all three members of the convention, and furious ruffians. At the moment when no one dreamed of any thing else than the amusement afforded by the festival, they entered and insisted on speaking to the general; he was informed that the spokesman was Marat, who looking at him with eyes denoting fury, summoned him in the most brutal manner, to tell him, how he could have had the audacity to com-
mit

mit a violent, and tyrannical act, against estimable citizens.

The general surveying him with scorn, replied : " What ! is it you who are called Marat ? I have nothing to say to you," and instantly turned his back upon him. Then, not knowing the other two commissioners, he addressed himself to them, and made them, or at least thought he made them, listen to reason. They afterwards retired, and the entertainment was continued.

By way of concluding the history of this affassination, the general will here remark, that he has learned since he left France, that Marat, become a tyrant before Elizabeth Corday elevated him to the rank of a god, caused a new trial to take place relative to Palloy, and these forty-two villains ; that they have been declared innocent, and restored to their battalions, as men who had deserved well of their country ; that the account drawn up by the municipality of Rhetel has been declared false and calumnious ; and that general Chazot has been arrested, and put in a state of accusation. He however does not know whether the brave re-

publican battalion condescended to receive its unworthy lieutenant-colonel and these assassins.

This adventure did not prevent general Dumouriez from experiencing a gracious reception at the society of the jacobins, where he was obliged to present himself once. In truth, the minister Danton presided on that occasion. Collot d'Herbois, formerly a very bad comedian, and since become the exterminating angel of the unhappy city of Lyons, made the members laugh by saying to the general, "You are going to conquer Brussels, and you will find my wife there, whom you must embrace." Three weeks afterwards Dumouriez took Brussels, but he did not see Collot's wife, and he forgot the commission he was charged with by that orator.

Every thing he saw during the four days which he spent in Paris occasioned much disgust and chagrin on his part. The assembly, which was in existence at his departure to the army in the month of June preceding, was indeed filled with factious men and intriguers, but genius, talents, and decency, were

were still to be found there. That which had succeeded to it was wholly composed of the most gross and clownish villains. The Girondists were still the masters, but their power, continually attacked by the violence of Marat and the jacobins, began to decline, and they only supported themselves by means of a feeble *machiavelism*, which in the end ruined them.

One man only could have supported them, and saved the king and country; but they completely alienated him, although Dumouriez had counselled them to keep fair with, and connect themselves with him. This man was Danton. To a hideous figure, a heart harsh and violent, much ignorance and coarseness, he united great natural sense, and a very energetic character. He alone, amidst the greatest danger which they were threatened with on the part of the Prussians, neither losing his courage, nor participating in the public consternation, opposed the removal of the convention and the king to the other side of the Loire, and forced the assembly and the minister to call forth all the national resources. He had rendered as important ser-

vices in Paris, as Dumouriez had done in Champagne, and if the Girondists had possessed good sense enough to have coalesced with him, he would have humbled the atrocious faction of Marat, either tamed or annihilated the jacobins, and perhaps Louis XVI would have been indebted to him for his life; but they provoked him, and he sacrificed every thing to his vengeance.

The general wished at that time to resign the command of the army; he mentioned this to some friends; every body dissuaded him from it, and he himself yielded to other considerations, to which are to be added the illusions of self-love. He had engaged to conquer the Low Countries. He wished to demonstrate the excellence of that plan of operation, which the generals who preceded him had failed in executing. Behold what his pride, brought into play by so many contradictions, had imprinted in his heart; but his imagination veiled to his own eyes those motives of personal interest, under more patriotic reasons.

He had been eager for war, in the hope that it would extinguish all the domestic factions,

tions, by uniting them against a foreign enemy, and that it would clear the capital of all the turbulent spirits who besieged the legislators, and the executive power; he perceived however, that so far from producing this effect, it had involved Paris in a still greater agitation; he then thought that other means must be resorted to, in order to make this cease.

He had saved his country from the Prussians, and he entertained the hope, that by giving a great blow to the house of Austria, these two powers would be glad to sue for peace. France had experienced the scourge of war, within its own bosom; he judged that it was time to carry it beyond her frontiers, and not wishing to violate the neutrality of the empire, he could render no other place but the Low Countries the theatre of it; he also reckoned on the friendly disposition constantly evinced by the inhabitants.

His success would furnish France with an useful ally in the people of Belgium, afford the means of making a peace, of returning into France with her victorious armies, and
employing

employing their influence to restore the constitution, and consequently to restore the king: for in the course of this journey, he did not perceive any thing that could inspire him with the least apprehension for the life of that unfortunate prince, whether it were that they were then wholly employed in rejoicing at the retreat of the Prussians, or that the two factions were not as yet so violently at variance, as to consider the unfortunate Louis as their first victim. Marat was at that time universally hated; and had not then acquired that frightful ascendancy, which has since precipitated the nation into all manner of crimes.

Had he been able to have dived into futurity, he would not have hesitated to have fled from his country; not indeed to have joined the other emigrants, and carry fire and sword thither, but to groan at the excesses of a great people, which in the space of three months had entirely changed its character.

He regrets, that he did not then cross over to England, and thence to America, as he once proposed; but the love of his country
and

and the hope of saving it internally, as he had before done externally, a chimera, with which he but too much amused himself, retained him ; and notwithstanding his disgust, he occupied his mind entirely with this object,

C H A P. II.

Plan of the general Campaign.

FRANCE had been just delivered from a great danger, which had aroused her patriotism. Success had inspired energy, armies were formed, and at this epoch, in addition to more than sixty thousand men, who were in pursuit of the Prussians under the orders of Kellermann, Dillon, and Chazot, twenty-two thousand under Beurnonville, then on their march to the succour of Lisle, and eighteen thousand assembled at the camp of Maubeuge, under lieutenant-general D'Harville, Labourdonnaye commanded nearly thirty thousand more, including the garrisons of Valenciennes, Lisle, and Dunkirk. Custine with twenty-two thousand additional troops was at Francfort ; there remained from fifteen to eighteen thousand under Biron, divided in two camps,
under

under the walls of Strasbourg and Huningen, besides the garrisons, and the small *corps* posted at Porentruy. Montesquiou was assembling from twenty to twenty-five thousand men on the side of Lyons and Dauphiny. There were only garrisons towards the Pyrenees.

About two hundred thousand men might accordingly be reckoned upon, and these could be brought to act along the frontiers, from Dunkirk to Antibes. It was necessary to give them special directions, combined according to the first plan traced by general Dumouriez during his administration, and for this purpose, it was requisite to form a general scheme, so as to carry on the war externally, in order to prevent an invasion of the French territories in future.

The legislature did not intermeddle in this business: the conduct of the war was confided to the generals, under the direction of the executive power. Servan was minister at war; his health had not been able to resist the excessive fatigue, the uneasiness, and the fear with which he had been tormented during the stay of the Prussians in Champagne. He had opposed

as much as lay in his power the general's defensive system, not out of hatred, or a desire of vengeance, but because he entertained no greater confidence in it than the rest. He had not however ventured to transmit him absolute orders, but he had thrown upon him the whole responsibility of all the disasters which he dreaded and announced.

This minister had served in the regiment of Dauphin infantry until he had attained the rank of lieutenant-colonel previously to the revolution. He had also written a very good book, entitled the *Soldier-Citizen*. He was the only military man in the council. His opinion was supported by those of a colonel of artillery, called Laclos, a man celebrated as the author of a horrible romance called the *Danger of Connexions*, and for having acted during the revolution, as the *Mentor* of the duke of Orleans; of Meusnier, an academician, and an officer of engineers; and of Vieusseaux, who belonged to the staff, and was the son-in-law of Clavières: none of these counselors had seen actual service any more than the minister, and they did not understand any thing about it. Servan was naturally
 6 of

of a gloomy, harsh, and yet a very weak character. His mind always suspicious, uncertain, and atrabilarious, had rendered his temperament morose. He lost his senses on the occurrence of the most trifling inconvenience, his head became dizzy, he fell into despair, and wished to resign his office; he was much esteemed by the Gironde faction, and was entirely under the direction of madame Roland, of whom he appeared greatly enamoured.

Dumouriez on his arrival at Paris, was exceedingly astonished to find Servan sad and dejected: he thought he had delivered him from all his fears, but it appeared, on the contrary, as if they were augmented. He had announced, that being incapable of continuing his official labours, he had only waited for the retreat of the Prussians, in order to give in his resignation. He affirmed, that he was very ill, and yet, by a singular contradiction, he had just appropriated to himself the direction of the army of the Pyrenees, as commander in chief: it is to be observed, however, that this army was not then formed. Dumouriez imagined, that it could nei-
ther

ther be jealousy nor hatred alone, that produced this profound chagrin, and the project of retiring on the part of Servan, at the moment too when he had been relieved from the thorns of his administration, and when there no longer remained any thing but flowers under his feet.

The general had not sufficient time, during the space of four days, to reflect much on, and to investigate this fantastical circumstance. It was not till after what he was told by Danton, and what he has since learned, that he was able to discover that his successes had entirely disconcerted the projects of the Gironde, which being unable to overcome the faction of the jacobins at Paris, and dreading perhaps, lest they should be some day obliged to succumb, had formed the project of profiting by the consternation, in order to transfer the king and the convention to the other side of the Loire, where they could have given the law. Thus the Girondists, at the very time they were caressing the general, were afflicted at his success; and as a proof that they did not pardon this, they never admitted him into their confidence.

confidence. They were particularly hostile to Danton, who, being more powerful than they in the capital, had prevented the removal alluded to, by depicting it as an act of cowardice.

Dumouriez did not belong to any faction; he had publicly extolled the courage of Danton, without imagining that every eulogium on him was a thrust with a poniard to the Gironde faction, whose distrust, and perhaps aversion, he thus unknowingly augmented. They however carested him, because a fortunate general might prove useful, and because they wished to make the jacobins believe that they were connected with him, on purpose to render him more odious to them. All this petty, and unworthy *machivellism* brought upon them the greatest calamities.

If Genfonné or Vergniaud, the only two men belonging to this faction whom he really esteemed, had declared himself frankly to him, and in order to this it would have been necessary for one of them to have procured a commission for the express purpose of repairing to him in Champagne, he would

Vol. III.

T

have

have assuredly joined them in effecting this translation, extricating the national convention from slavery, and the royal family out of the hands of the jacobins; without altering his military conduct, he would have transmitted threatening letters, and it would certainly have been easy for him to have augmented the consternation so prevalent at that period.

He could then have worked upon Danton, by means of his agent Westermann, so as to procure his consent to the removal of the convention; or on Danton's opinion being no longer supported by encouraging dispatches on the part of the general, he himself would have yielded to the torrent. The wretched policy of the girondists ruined them. It unfortunately happened, that Dumouriez, while in Champagne, remained ignorant of what was then passing in Paris; as he did not keep up any confidential correspondence with any of the factions, he could neither prevent nor foresee the misfortunes that followed. Such were the real motives of the profound melancholy on the part of Servan, who, being less cunning than the rest
of

of the girondists, did not know, like them, how to veil the impressions of his mind under a smiling countenance.

While in this state of despondency, and on the eve of quitting the administration, he was incapable of exerting the application necessary for the examination and details of a general plan, at least he had not strength enough to put any obstacle in the way, and accordingly allowed general Dumouriez to act, who was obliged to form the grand project of the campaign without any assistance, and to dictate all the instructions for the generals entrusted with the command of the different armies.

1. It was decided that Montefquiou should instantly attack Savoy and the county of Nice, and after the conquest of these, he was to stop at the natural boundaries of the Alps, the defence of which was to be entrusted to him. He was to pay the utmost respect to the neutrality of the Swiss, to have always a small body of reserve in the neighbourhood of Lyons, in order to observe their motions, and not to intermeddle in the troubles of Geneva, but with the utmost cir-

cumspexion, and on purpose to preserve the tranquillity of that commercial city. Much reliance was placed on the sagacity and talents of Montesquiou, and orders were expedited to hasten the preparation of every thing of which he might stand in need.

This part of the war was in excellent hands, The general after surmounting all difficulties, made so rapid, and well combined an attack, that nothing could withstand him, and conducted himself in respect to the cantons and Geneva, with a degree of prudence and wisdom, that only served to ruin him a little sooner, than would otherwise have been the case, because his proceedings were in direct opposition to the horrid plots of Clavière against his country.

Clavière, at that time minister of the public contributions, was extremely jealous of the great talents that Montesquiou had discovered for finance during the first legislature. Jealousy, and hatred, were never separate in the violent mind of Clavière, He was assisted by the atrocious Dubois de Crancé,

Crancé, whom this general had unfortunately admitted upon his staff; and they succeeded in ruining him, precisely on account of the great services he had rendered his country, by subjugating two provinces, by preserving a precious neutrality, and by preventing an important city from falling a prey to its own fury.

2. It was resolved, that no more troops should be left in Porentruy, but such as were absolutely necessary to prevent a counter-revolution; that Biron should have his army augmented to twenty-five thousand men, still divided into two camps; that of Huningue, to prevent the imperialists from attempting to penetrate through the territory of Basle, and that of Strasbourg, to watch fort Kehl; and that Lebrun, minister of foreign affairs, should make use of all possible means to preserve the neutrality of Switzerland, and that of the circles of Suabia and Franconia. Biron's instructions were drawn up accordingly.

3. Custine had just been nominated commander in chief, to recompense him for his rash, and dangerous conquests. He had

crossed the Rhine, and was then at Frankfurt, whence he advanced to Marbourg, and Gießen; it was not known how far he intended to go. He had only twenty-two thousand men, and yet he seemed desirous of conquering all Germany. This part of the plan was extremely delicate, because the nation, being dazzled with his easy and brilliant successes, and Cambon intoxicated with the contributions which he announced, and which dwindled into a shameful, and little lucrative pillage, supported this general in his imprudent schemes. Dumouriez foresaw, that Custine would soon have to contend with the Prussian and Hessian troops, that he was about to put an end, in consequence of an unjust and rash aggression, to the neutrality of the circles, hitherto of such eminent service, and that he would be embarrassed in respect to his retreat.

He was at a great distance from Alsace. Landau was then uncovered, and unable to sustain a siege. The court of Vienna was assembling troops in the Brisgaw. The elector of Bavaria had a strong garrison in Mannheim, and he as well as the circles might

might be forced by the excesses and injustice of Custine to declare himself. In that case, an army composed of Imperialists, Palatines, and the troops of the other princes of Suabia and Franconia, might assemble with the utmost celerity at Mannheim. The elector, either by consent, or force, might be prevailed upon to allow a passage through that city, and thus Custine, cut off from all communication with Alsace on one side, and Lorraine on the other, would find himself enclosed between the Prussians, and the army of Mannheim, because he had preferred making Francfort the point of attack, instead of the more sage and useful idea of seizing on Coblentz and Treves.

It was therefore resolved, that a body of twelve thousand men should be instantly assembled under the orders of general Meunier, consisting as well of the troops in Alsace, as those in the interior, on purpose not only to mask Mannheim, and keep up the communication with Custine, but also to cover Landau, and secure a retreat thither.

Custine was too independent for Dumouriez to take upon him to send him precise

orders through the medium of the minister. Notice was therefore sent to him of the dispositions that had been made on his right and left flanks, and it was added, that after having acted in such a manner as circumstances should direct, whenever he deemed it necessary he might either fall back on Landau, as he had the intermediate *corps* commanded by general Meusnier under his orders, or support himself along the borders of the Rhine, because general Kellermann was about to advance on his left between the Rhine and the Moselle, and would be instructed to guard that river all the way from Bingen to Coblenz.

4. Orders were given to general Kellermann, as soon as the Prussians should have entirely evacuated the French territories, which took place a few days afterwards, to assemble twenty-five thousand men with the utmost haste under the walls of Thionville, making use of the Moselle for transporting his magazines, to enter the duchy of Luxembourg by Remich, apparently as if he wished to attack the fortress of Luxembourg, on purpose to detain the Prussians there, but he

he was to turn short by Grevenmaker, to cross the river at Confarbruck, and to advance with rapidity to Coblentz, on purpose to anticipate the Prussians; without stopping at Treves, which would fall of course; he was afterwards to take up his winter quarters between Bingen, Coblentz, and Treves, in the triangle formed by the two rivers.

Custine's fault would be repaired by means of this movement. His winter quarters would be along the banks of the Rhine; a body of horse was on the borders of the Moselle, on purpose to menace Luxembourg; and between Landau and Treves, sixty thousand men were assembling under the orders of Custine and Kellermann, who being reinforced, and provided with every thing, might have opened the ensuing campaign, either with the siege of Luxembourg, or by making a powerful irruption into Germany, if a peace should not be concluded.

Kellermann, who had so much difficulty in resolving to obey general Dumouriez, was still less disposed to put himself under the orders of general Custine, who was more lofty and impetuous. He marred this part
of

of the plan of the campaign by committing the unpardonable crime, not only of neglecting to execute the orders he had received, but in entirely abandoning the frontier, and placing his troops in winter quarters, sending back his cavalry and artillery behind Metz, Toul, and Verdun.

He excused himself by saying that his army was harassed. But the troops that had proceeded by forced marches from Flanders to Champagne, after having made the same campaign as his army, were then returning again into Flanders, and that too during a season, and along roads truly horrible, and were about to enter upon a winter campaign. His excuse therefore was a bad one. Custine on this, transmitted the most just and bitter complaints against him, and Kellermann was dismissed.

Beurnonville was appointed to succeed him, and he was commanded, in conformity to the advice of Custine, to resume the execution of the orders given to Kellermann. The season was then become too rigorous, and the opportunity had elapsed. The Prussians occupied Treves and Coblenz, and

and the prince de Hohenlohe was at Luxembourg with a respectable body of troops. Beurnonville, at the same time that he animadverted on the danger of the expedition, obeyed, assembled his army on the Sarre, presented himself before Treves after having surmounted an infinite number of difficulties, fought several brilliant and useless engagements, and retired with the loss of one third of his army, the remains of which were reduced to a state of inaction by the terrible sufferings they had experienced to no manner of purpose.

5. In order to strengthen, by means of a diversion, that part of the general plan confided to Kellermann, and to make it appear still more likely that this movement had the fortress of Luxembourg for its object, general Chazot was ordered to assemble a body of ten or twelve thousand men, which was to be dispatched under general Ligneville to Virton in the duchy of Luxembourg. Ligneville was, on one hand, to lay waste the duchy, on purpose to revenge the ravages committed in Champagne, and on the other, to attract
the

the notice of the enemy, without however endangering himself, having his retreat always secured between Sedan, Montmedy, and Longwy. If a formidable force were not opposed to him, he was to advance towards Arlon, on purpose to cut off the direct communication between Luxembourg and Namur; and his small army was to be increased to double its then number, by means of reinforcements, in the spring. The retreat of Kellermann necessarily rendered this diversion slow and useless.

6. At this period Dillon was dismissed; he was succeeded in the command of that part of his army, which general Dumouriez had left under the orders of general Kellermann, by lieutenant general Valence, who had well deserved this post. But Valence did not, until long after, receive the appointment of general in chief, notwithstanding general Dumouriez' pressing solicitations. This body of troops was called the army of the Ardennes, and was charged to co-operate with the northern army in the enterprise against Belgium. It was ordered to assemble
at

at Givet, on purpose to act by the way of Namur and Liege, according to the instructions of general Dumouriez.

7. The latter undertook, with the army which he was bringing back from Champagne, and that under Labourdonnaye, to enter the Low Countries.

Such was the general plan of the campaign, the particulars of which were detailed by him in the course of four days, and transmitted in that short space of time to all the generals. The different parts were distributed in such a manner as to afford each other a mutual support, and yet they were so independent that the default of execution in any one point, would not prevent success in the others. This actually occurred.

The Imperialists and Prussians were at that time left destitute of all means of defence. The hundred and ten, or hundred and twenty thousand men, with which they had commenced the campaign in Champagne and Flanders, were reduced to sixty or eighty thousand, still overwhelmed with diseases, and they had not time to receive
the

the assistance of fresh troops. The French, on the contrary, had two hundred thousand men emboldened by unexpected success. The latter end of autumn promised to be as charming as the months of September and October had been disagreeable. They fought on the frontiers, their armies too might even have been doubled, and besides the provision which they would find in the Low Countries, and in the fertile provinces bordering on the Rhine, they could easily receive more from France, by means of the navigable rivers, and charming roads. Thus they had the almost certain hope of being able, in the month of January, to take up their winter quarters along the Rhine, from Landau to the Wesel, and this would have happened, had it not been for general Kellermann's very culpable retreat.

In this position, a very advantageous peace might have been negotiated. The Empire and the Helvetic body assuredly would not have violated that neutrality, which the latter has preserved until this very moment, and neither Holland nor England would have declared themselves. Eu-
 6 rope

rope would have now been at peace, and the French nation would not have crowned all its crimes by the murder of the royal family, the destruction of religion and the laws, and a barbarous anarchy.

Plan of the Campaign in the Low Countries.

DURUTEX, in the interval from his other important labours, did not neglect the plan of that part of the campaign entrusted to himself. He found means to get a troop put to the transfer of the great quantity of artillery, ammunition, and troops which had been collected at Paris, in order to restore them to the northern department, which had been left entirely destitute. The only general he knew proved very useful on this occasion; he had all the supplies in his own power, and he had not consented to relinquish them, the troops were thus remained unopposed. It took him some time that Westerman was his friend, and that you could do any thing with him; that accordingly

CHAP.

C H A P. III.

Plan of the Campaign in the Low Countries.

DUMOURIEZ, in the interval from his other important labours, did not neglect the plan of that part of the campaign entrusted to himself. He found means to get a stop put to the transfer of the great quantity of artillery, ammunition, and troops, which had been collecting at Paris, in order to restore them to the northern department, which had been left entirely defenceless. The base general Santerre proved very useful on this occasion; he had all the supplies in his own power, and if he had not consented to relinquish them, the troops must have remained unemployed. It luckily happened, that Westermann was his friend, and Danton could do any thing with him; they accordingly

accordingly displayed much zeal on this occasion.

The general demanded shoes and great coats for the soldiers, who were entirely naked. He required, that by the 25th of October, six millions* in *money* should be transmitted him, to ensure a fortnight's pay; and he announced at the same time, that he hoped afterwards, far from exhausting the national treasury of its cash, which was then very scarce, he would make large sums flow into it from the Low Countries, and establish the circulation of assignats. It was in occupations such as these that he spent the four days he remained in Paris, which he was very happy to leave, and this is a proof of the truth of that sentence in Plutarch: "Glory, like the light, is more useful to such as feel its effects, than those who are clad with its beams."

The jacobins proclaimed every where, that he had come to the capital merely to flatter his vanity, and to concert dangerous plots with the faction of the Gironde. The

* Of *livres*.—*Transf.*

latter attacked him more insidiously, at the very time they were careſſing him. They whiſpered, that he was deſirous to make haſte to terminate the war, in order to acquire an influence at the head of a victorious army, and raiſe himſelf to the dictatorship. Their newspapers, without naming him, forewarned the people to diſtruſt Cæſar, and to dread Monk. As to Marat, he announced boldly, that this general was about to conquer the Low Countries on purpoſe to make himſelf duke of Brabant.

Roland, whoſe wife was the central point of the party of the Gironde, had written, and repeated before his face, that they could not but diſtruſt him, when they beheld him continually inſiſting on the neceſſity of following his plans, and complying with his opinions; that all the generals ought to be independent; that the more talents he poſſeſſed, the more he was dangerous; that it was not to be forgotten, that on his quitting the adminiſtration, he had diſplayed great attachment to the king, and that he had maniſteſted unequivocal ſigns of ſorrow relative to his lot. Dumouriez had ſhown
this

this letter to Genfonné, Brissot, and the other ministers; all of them acknowledged it was ill-timed: but as Roland was merely their organ, he had reason to suppose, that these expressions conveyed the sentiments of the secret meetings at which this celebrated, and too much punished woman assisted.

This faction, but more especially Roland, Pache, and Brissot, affected an excess of stoical rigour, which they deemed proper to conciliate the entire confidence of the people, and which in the end ruined all the girondists. One might also apply to them that other remark of Plutarch, in the life of Cato of Utica, to whom Roland was at the time compared: "In the extremes of virtue, it is often caprice that prevails, and insinuates itself under virtue's mask." Hypocrisy was too feeble an engine against ruffians so determined as the leaders of the jacobins.

The general set out with joy from Paris on the 20th of October, on purpose to spend a couple of days in the country near Peronne, both to meditate on his own plan, and to repose himself after the fatigues and intrigues of the capital. He repaired to Valenciennes,

on the morning of the 20th; the troops under Beurnonville arrived there on the 21st and 22d. At his approach, the Imperialists hastened to raise the siege of Lille, to leave the French territory, and to return to their own frontiers.

On his arrival at Valenciennes, he learned that Servan had resigned, and that he was succeeded by Pache. He was very well contented. He knew that he was the intimate, and confidential friend of Roland, whose probity he esteemed, and that he was put into office by means of him and the faction of the Gironde. Pache was a man of talents and application; the faction to which he was attached did not indicate the least presumption, that he would become a furious jacobin. But the desire of rendering himself independent, and of supplanting Roland, induced him to throw himself immediately into the arms of the *Mountain*. He began by dismissing all the old clerks in his office, and delivered himself up entirely to the direction of Meusnier and Hassenfratz: the first had been long the enemy of his benefactor, general Dumouriez; the second was an adventurer

turer from Mentz, of the name of Lelièvre, who after being a bankrupt had become a furious jacobin. To these two men are to be attributed the disorganisation of the army, and all the misfortunes that resulted from it; they also made us lose the fruits of a superb campaign, that ought to have given peace to France. The consequences that might have been expected from it were the safety of the king, the re-establishment of the constitution, the return of the laws, the abolition of anarchy, and a general amnesty.

It ought here to be remarked, that one of the just reproaches lavished upon the monarchical government was the instability of official situations, which did injury to public affairs, at the same time that it perpetuated factions, hatred, vengeance, and the misfortunes of the people. Never was this instability more notorious than since the revolution. Never has the spirit of party more influenced the expulsion, and the nomination of ministers, or afforded greater scope to roguery and ignorance.

Indeed it is the same at present. A committee consisting of a dozen of bold villains

reigns, and will continue so to do, until it shall be supplanted by some other fantastical form of government, which the guillotine will elevate, and cut off in its turn. And this is the liberty of the French ! this is the object of their frenzy ! this is that for which they have sacrificed their character, their laws, their religion ! This is the happiness in which they wish to make all Europe participate, by the force of sabres and of bayonets !

The first obstacle Dumouriez experienced in the execution of his plan proceeded from a man, who he imagined would have seconded him with great promptitude. He had caused Labourdonnaye to be invested with the title of general in chief, and he commanded under him the army of the north, as Valence did the army of the Ardennes. He knew that Labourdonnaye possessed but little capacity, and few talents, He was rich, descended from a respectable family in Brittany, had been a major general previous to the revolution, and employed in the education of the children of the count d'Artois. This man had from the first been
friendly

friendly to the revolution, like many others, with a view to save his wealth, and act a brilliant part. He had frequented the clubs, acquired popularity, and by little and little, had procured a reputation, and an interest among the jacobins. The moment he beheld himself general in chief, he aspired at independence, and even at being entrusted with the expedition into the Low Countries.

He began by writing fanatical, haughty, and ill-timed letters to the general. He sent him word one day, that he was well acquainted with his own mediocrity, that he neither aspired to be Cæsar, nor duke of Brabant, but that he was an excellent republican, and would render the good cause triumphant. The general showed these letters to the three commissioners of the convention, Delmas, Bellegarde, and Bois du Bais, whom he had found at Valenciennes, with a view to nip this quarrel in the bud; they besought him to accompany them to Lisle, where they received the complaints of all the general officers, to whom Labourdonnaye was insupportable. He spent whole days in reading the *Moniteur*, and the ja-

cobin newspapers, and in keeping up a mysterious correspondence with the most famous jacobins. The general entered into a very severe explanation with him, announced that if he put any more obstacles in the way of his plans, he would bereave him of his army, leave him without troops in the northern department, and even cause him to be removed immediately, if this punishment did not prove sufficient. Labourdonnaye wept, and promised every thing; and the general being appeased, returned to his army.

He then drew up his plan of the campaign, and sent a paper of instructions to each of the generals, who were to act on his right and left flanks, that there might be a constant uniformity in their movements. The forces destined to seize on the Low Countries were very considerable, and it was impossible for the duke of Teschen, even after the junction of Clerfai, to resist them.

He determined above all things, not to commit the same fault as the Prussians on their entering Champagne, they having lost all the advantages resulting from their enormous superiority, by keeping their forces in
a body,

a body, and not extending them, which would have obliged general Dumouriez to have divided his line of defence, and this would have been every where feeble. He accordingly took measures for dividing the whole of his army into four bodies, which were to act separately, but yet in such a manner as that two or three of them could reunite according to circumstances, and the orders he might send them, as soon as he had discovered the mode of defence intended to be adopted by the enemy.

This plan of the campaign consisted of two grand movements. 1. By the 1st, general Valence, with the army of the Ardennes, composed of sixteen thousand men, was to march by Givet towards Namur, to cut off general Clerfait, who was pushing forward with great rapidity from Luxembourg, and prevent his junction with the duke of Teschen. He reckoned that Valence would file off by Givet, about the 5th of October; but obstacles, which this brave general, who has served with great ability, was unable to control, retarded this event to the 13th, and general Clerfait had therefore time to leave a
strong

strong garrison in the citadel of Namur, and to effect a junction with the duke of Teschen.

2. Lieutenant-general D'Harville was to leave Maubeuge, to advance to Charleroi with twelve thousand men, to rejoin general Valence, on purpose to cover the siege of Namur, to remain afterwards in the county of Namur, to check the supplies which might be sent from Luxembourg, while Valence continuing to descend the Meuse by Huy, should march towards Liege, and prevent the duke of Teschen's retreat, if, after having passed the frontier, he chose, as was reported, to encamp behind the canal of Vilvorden, to defend the Scheldt. This prince would then have been forced to retire by Campine and Ruremonde.

3. Dumouriez with an army of forty thousand men was to march to Mons, and thence straight on to Brussels, driving the duke of Teschen before him, with an intention, at the same time, to give him battle, should he wait for that purpose.

Labourdonnaye with eighteen thousand men was to encamp at Cisoing, to approach
Tournay

Tournay with a view to force the duke of Teschen to divide his means of defence, and to seize on it, if the Imperialists should leave but a small body to defend it. A *corps* of four hundred men was also to march to Courtray and Deinse, on purpose to force all the little detachments on the frontiers of West Flanders, to fall back to Antwerp.

If the duke of Teschen assembled all his forces at Tournay, Labourdonnaye was to retire to Lille, and Dumouriez, become master of Mons, and on his march to Brussels, would have shut up the duke of Teschen between the Lys and Scheldt, ordered the two bodies of his troops on his right to rejoin him, and captured him and his whole army. But this event could not occur. The duke of Teschen, after assembling all his forces, could not collect more than forty-five thousand men, and the French consisted of double that number, besides a large *corps* of artillery.

This first movement, on the part of four grand divisions of the army, must necessarily oblige the duke of Teschen to fall back as far as Brussels, and that too, without fighting ;

ing; for he would be afraid lest Valence having joined D'Harville should march by Sombref towards Bruffels, or by Judoigne to Louvain, to take him in flank, while Dumouriez continued at the same time to drive him before him, which would have actually occurred. He would thus have been obliged to have abandoned the position of Bruffels, and to have retired towards the Certemberge, or the iron mountain, either on this side of, or beyond Louvain.

By the second movement the two armies of the right were to unite under the orders of Valence at Namur, if the duke of Teschen should immediately advance to Liege; Valence, in that case, was to take Namur, and Dumouriez to pursue the Imperialists as far as the Meuse. Labourdonnaye was to make a rapid march to Ghent, thence to Mecklin, where with his right he would have threatened to have turned the right flank of the enemy, and with his left to have besieged the citadel of Antwerp. His division, consisting of four thousand men, was to escort six twenty-four pounders, which were to be embarked on the Scheldt. Six more of the same

same calibre followed the great army, and twelve others remained at Valenciennes. This second movement was intended to effect the complete evacuation of the Low Countries, and Dumouriez neither expected to find resistance, nor to fight a battle. While the troops were thus pushing forwards, two thousand men belonging to the garrisons of Dunkirk, Gravelines, Bergues, and St. Omer, were to seize on Bruges and Ostend, where they would not meet with any resistance. Dumouriez was to pass the Meuse, whenever the castles of Antwerp and Namur, or at least one of them, should be taken.

This plan experienced a multitude of obstacles, delays, and changes. Labourdonnaye forgot all his oaths, and wanted to equivocate relative to his instructions, on purpose to substitute another movement in the place of that he was ordered to make; for he also had drawn up a plan of the campaign. He wished Dumouriez to march to Mons, along with D'Harville, to allow Valence to act by himself on the Meuse, and he was desirous that he himself should lay siege first to Ostend,

tend, with the army under his command, and afterwards to the citadel of Antwerp.

Involving himself thus with twenty-two thousand men between the sea and the canals, a very small body of troops was only necessary to oppose his march, by disputing with him the passage of the canals, and cutting down the bridges; he would have thus lost all the advantages resulting from his superiority, and as he commanded an army of recruits, and he himself was not a man of capacity, he might have been beaten, being too far distant to receive timely support, more especially, as according to his project, his attack had neither any connection nor communication with the other armies.

The general on this transmitted the strictest orders to him to execute his instructions without any deviation whatever, warning him, that if he neglected this, he would deprive him of his command, and bestow it on general Duval, whom, at the intreaty of all the other generals, he sent to direct him. He had made Miranda and Duval lieutenant-generals, on purpose to recompense them for
the

the meritorious activity they had displayed during the campaign against the Prussians. He also placed his very able *aide-de-camp* Philip Deveaux, who had managed Kellermann so well, about the person of Labourdonnaye. But he did not succeed with this general, who was shallow, proud, and obstreperous; and seeing himself treated as a spy, he retired at the end of four days, and assured him, that nothing could be done with this silly and ambitious man, who transmitted loud complaints to the ministers and the jacobins against his general, stating that out of mere jealousy, he had rejected an excellent and easy plan, on purpose to make him miscarry before Tournay, a very strong place, defended by an army, and to sacrifice him to his ambition. The general received letters on this subject, but he replied, that he would not alter his plan, that Labourdonnaye must either execute his instructions, or remain in Flanders, and that he had better generals to occupy his place.

The delay proceeded from the minister at war, who did not send great coats, shoes, camp materials, ammunition, artillery, and money.

money. The whole of these ought to have arrived on the 25th of October; and Dumouriez, after having allowed four days rest, in good cantonments, to the troops that had arrived from Champagne, had issued orders for assembling them on the 28th in a camp on the extremity of the frontiers, between Quarouble and Quiesvrain. He did not find tents, and other camp furniture, prepared for more than half of the forty thousand men who composed this army; and burned with ardour to take the field. The same cause produced the same embarrassments relative to the troops assembled at Maubeuge and Lisle, although every thing had been foreseen and arranged during the general's stay at Paris. He attributed these delays to the change in the ministry, and the removal of the clerks in the war-office.

He had a most excellent commissary-general of the name of Malus, who was already hated by the clerks of the war department; they accused him of aristocracy, and dissolved all the contracts he entered into, without substituting new ones in their place. The minister at war was at this time busied in
destroying

destroying the administration for supplying the army with provisions, which in France had been brought to a high degree of perfection by sixty years experience, and which, during all the former wars, had constantly insured the subsistence of the armies, and the operations of the generals. Merely because it was an old institution, it was accused of aristocracy: even had this been true, there would not have been any great danger, all that was necessary being to watch the superintendents.

They had rendered the most essential services in Champagne, where, in consequence of the rapidity of unforeseen movements, it would have been easy to have created a scarcity of provision, if they had been actuated by incivic intentions, as they were accused, without subjecting them to suspicion. The general had given his testimony in their favour, and made an eulogium on them in his speech to the convention. This was therefore considered as a body which he protected for his own advantage: it was therefore necessary to cashier it, on purpose to deprive the ambition of the new Cæsar of

its assistance. Thus reasoned the jacobins, and those belonging to the public offices, who, on a change of system, would find some gleanings for themselves.

Pache, by way of making his court to the people, was eager to decry the administration of his predecessors, especially Servan, and to dissolve all his contracts, promising at the same time to establish the strictest economy; and it was in the course of a very brisk campaign, that by this dissolution of all the contracts relative to the army, he palsied every branch of the service. It was thus that, by driving from the service of the armies all the experienced clerks, on purpose to substitute ignorant and starving jacobins in their stead, he had raised the expences of the war alone, to two hundred millions of *livres* a month, reduced the armies to the most frightful misery, and made the best combined and most certain plans miscarry.

These delays were still more notorious in respect to that part of the army that assembled under general Valence at Givet. He did not find any thing prepared, and was obliged to wait for his artillery, his ammunition, and draught

draught horses, until the 19th of November. Being thus unable to take the field, he could not intercept the march of general Clerfait, who effected his junction without any obstacle. General Dumouriez perceiving that the season was far advanced, and wishing to take advantage of the month of November, which was charming, deemed it better to act without the assistance of Valence's army, than to delay the campaign; and resolving to commence his operations early in the beginning of that month, he made an alteration in the first movement of his plan.

He ordered Valence, as soon as he should be ready, and without waiting for his artillery, to advance rapidly by Charleroi towards Nivelles, to turn the enemy's left flank, if it meant to remain in its position at Brussels; and as he calculated, that this first movement made by Valence would coincide with the second movement of the other troops belonging to his army, he directed lieutenant-general D'Harville's first movement from Maugebeuge towards Binch, so as to turn the left of the enemy in its position at Mons, if it persevered in retaining it.

He left Valenciennes on the 28th to join the army. He had drawn up a proclamation, in which he announced to the Belgians, that the French would enter their country as brothers and friends; that their design was merely to assist them in the recovery of their liberty; that they would neither intermeddle with their government nor their laws; that they would leave it to themselves to form any constitution they might be inclined to adopt; and that they would not levy any contribution, nor exercise any act of sovereignty, or of conquest. He transmitted this paper to Paris, and it was approved of by the convention, which at that time respected itself. It was found consonant to the declaration of the rights of man and the French constitution, as well as sound policy.

This proclamation was accordingly adopted, and the general was allowed to publish it. He caused it to be printed in the two languages*, and sent copies of it to the generals under him, with correspondent instructions, in which he enjoined them, as

* French and Flemish—*Transf.*

soon as they entered the towns of Belgium, to assemble the people, to publish this proclamation, and to exhort them instantly to change their magistrates and administrators, without however making any alteration in respect to the form of the imposts and the government, that right residing in the whole nation, which ought not to decide on its constitution, except in a national assembly, which should be summoned as soon as Belgium was entirely delivered from the Imperial troops.

It was at this epoch he wrote to the convention that on the 15th of November he should be at Brussels; he entered that city on the 14th: and on the 30th at Liege; he arrived there on the 28th. His campaign was calculated like a game at chess, in consequence of his great superiority; and had it not been for the insurmountable obstacles he experienced on the part of the minister at war, he would have been at Liege on the 20th, and on the 30th at Cologne.

His plan at that time was to drive the Imperialists before him, to oblige them to cross the Rhine, to take up his winter-quarters

between Cleves and Bonn, and to send Valence to Andernach, to keep up the communication with Kellermann, through Coblentz; thus occupying the course of the Rhine, blocking Luxembourg by means of the army under D'Harville on one side, and by that commanded by Ligneville on the other.

That fortress, which was still incumbered with sick and heavy baggage, and exhausted of provision in consequence of the long stay of the Prussian army, being unable to draw any more supplies out of the adjacent country, which is naturally sterile, or to receive any convoy from Germany, would have been forced to have surrendered, perhaps even during the winter, after having experienced the ravages of famine and disease, or would have easily fallen at the opening of the next campaign. The perfidious retreat of Kellermann, which had left the Prussians masters of Coblentz and Trêves, and prince Hohenlohe of Luxembourg, added to the culpable arts of a jacobin minister, rendered this plan, which would have terminated the war, abortive.

CHAP. IV.

*First Movement of the Armies. Actions at
Thulin and Bouffu.*

THE duke of Teschen occupied the villages beyond the rivulet of Quiesvrain, his left flank was supported by the wood of Sars, his right by the river of Haifne, and the marsh in front of St. Ghislain. This was a very good position, and could have been long maintained, more especially if he had thrown up entrenchments in the wood of Sars, which might then have been considered as impenetrable. On his right he had a small body of troops in the wood of Hermitage, which masked Condé, and kept up an intercourse with four or five thousand men stationed at Bury. This camp communicated with that of Trinity, consisting of seven or eight thousand men, commanded by

general Latour, who also occupied Tournay. Small detached bodies, occupying Lannoy, Roubaix, and Turcoing, harassed Lille. Another small *corps* was stationed in Varneton, at the junction of the Lys and Marque. This system of defence was well planned, but it presented too considerable a front for twenty-eight or thirty thousand men, which constituted the whole of his strength, before the junction of general Clerfait, who brought him an accession of about fifteen or eighteen thousand men.

This defensive position on the part of the duke of Teschen may be compared with that of the cantonments of general Wurmser and the duke of Brunswick in Alsace, towards the latter end of the year 1793, with this exception, that the retreat of the duke of Teschen was more certain, that his position was not fixed like that of the combined army, and that he had not a great river in his rear. The cantonments of the combined army possessed too extensive a front not to be liable to be pierced through the centre.

The

The blockade of Landau was rendered abortive as soon as the duke of Brunswick had failed in the attack of Bitsch. It would have been at least necessary, that general Wurmsier, abandoning the lines of Mautter, had contented himself with guarding those of Lauter, charging himself, by means of his left, with the defence of these lines from Lauterburg as far as Wissembourg, and re-joining with his front the Prussian line of defence by Bergzabern to Anweiler, whence the Prussians would have guarded the right by Kaiserslautern. It would even have been still better for the duke of Brunswick to have abandoned Kaiserslautern, and to have straitened his line of cantonments by Spanenberg, to Neustadt, covering his right flank by means of Speierbach.

This connected system of defence would have possessed uniformity. Indeed, it would have been abandoning fort St. Louis to itself, but it was in a state to sustain a siege; and if the French had been so rash as to have undertaken it, they would have been still near enough to have succoured it, either by the right or left bank of the Rhine. This
siege

siege would have occupied their attention for some time, and it would not have fulfilled their object, as this ought to have been to relieve Landau, which place would have been forced to have surrendered, or at least the attempt for its relief would have obliged the French to have fought a battle, and to have attacked the two armies in a position compact enough to be defended with success.

In that case, instead of attempting so dangerous an attack, perhaps the French army of the Moselle would have advanced against Trêves, Coblenz, and Mentz, with a view to induce the combined army to forsake its position. It would have then been necessary to have thrown the troops of the circles into these places, to have protected them from a sudden attack, and to have kept the original object in view. If the army of the Moselle ventured too far, they could in that case have attacked the army of Alsace, and either beaten or forced it to fall back, which would have greatly precipitated the surrender of Landau, an essential object, to which every thing else ought to have been sacrificed.

The plan of defence adopted by the duke
of

of Teschen being once known, the general arranged his first movement in such a manner as to drive him from all his posts at the same time, or to oblige him to fight to a disadvantage, a measure which he did not suppose he would risk.

As early as the 28th, he had dispatched through Condé a body of eight thousand men under the orders of general Berneron, whom he had created a major-general, with orders to clear the wood of Berniffart, and then to take post there. Lieutenant general Omoran, who commanded in Condé, unfortunately was not in a state to serve during the campaign, on account of the breaking out of a wound which he had received at the attack of Savannah in America; he however could superintend this first evolution. This division menaced Ath and Leuze, being able to march along two excellent roads, leading from these two towns to Blatton.

By way of keeping up the communication of this detached body with his army, he enjoined Beurnonville, who commanded his advanced guard, to take post at Quiesvrain, and occupy Montreuil, and Pommereuil.

The Imperialists stationed at Raucourt and Bury harassed the division under Berneron, and, during some days, he had a variety of severe skirmishes between Perwels and Blatton. This is what general Dumouriez was desirous of, on purpose to attract the principal attention of the general entrusted with the defence of Tournay to this side, and to oblige him to withdraw, lest he should be placed between two fires.

He ordered general Labourdonnaye to encamp on the heights of Sanguin, with the bridge of Bouvines in his front, and to detach lieutenant general Duval with one third of his army to Pont-a-Tressin. This movement necessarily obliged the Imperialists to withdraw towards Tournay all the detachments which they had at Roubaix, Turcoing, and Lannoy, which laid waste the rich district of Lisle, without Labourdonnaye, although far superiour in point of force, having the good sense to drive them away. He had great difficulty in getting this movement executed by Labourdonnaye, who wrote to him, that he could not risk himself so far in advance, unless the general would
come

come with the whole of his army to Maulde, on purpose to support him; that Tournay was well fortified and replenished with a numerous artillery; that the enemy had constructed entrenchments on the outside of the town, along the heights of Hertain, Lamain, and Marquain; and that he was already in too great danger at the camp of Sanguin, because the enemy could cut him off from Lisle.

The general discovered in Labourdonnaye's letter, either a great degree of cowardice, or a decided disinclination to the service. He accordingly sent to him his *aide-de-camp* Devaux, with positive orders to quit Lisle, where he then was, to repair to, and place himself at the head of his army, and to assemble his general officers, not to decide in a council of war if he should execute, but how it was necessary to execute an attack on the heights of Hertain, Lamain, and Marquain, and afterwards of Tournay.

He intimated, that the intelligence he had received relative to the defence of Tournay was fallacious. He informed him of the position of general Berneron, which was too disagreeable

disagreeable to the enemy, for it to think of defending Tournay. He also announced, that he himself should attack the duke of Teschen on the 3d or 4th of November, and that general d'Harville was charged to turn the left of the Imperialists, in the same manner as he was to turn their right. Colonel Devaux presented to general Duval a copy of these instructions, with orders to communicate them to the other generals, and to assume the command himself, should Labourdonnaye persist in his disobedience. On this he came to a determination, and repaired to the camp of Sanguin, with a resolution to make use of as many obstacles and delays in the execution of these orders as possible.

After having ensured the movements of his left wing, the general, learning that the duke of Teschen was inclined to defend the position of Mons as long as possible, thought that he ought to draw near to general d'Harville, whose march to Binch had carried him to too great a distance, because there was no longer any idea of preventing general Clerfait's junction. In consequence
of

of the detachment which he had made of the division of eight thousand men under the command of general Berneron, there remained no more than thirty-two thousand with himself. By the reunion of general Clerfait, he estimated that the duke of Teschen must have at least twenty-five thousand men, and not wishing to leave any thing to chance, he reinforced himself with the twelve thousand men under general d'Harville, on purpose to preserve his superiority. He therefore ordered him to come and encamp on the 1st of November at Hon, at the end of the wood of Sars.

On the 3d, the Belgick infantry, without cannon, but supported by the hussars of Chamborant, finding themselves too much straitened at Montreuil, attacked the Austrian advanced posts, in the village of Thulin, and drove them thence with the utmost ease; but they were so imprudent as to pursue them, and engage in the plain towards the mill of Bouffu. The Imperial hussars on this fell upon, surrounded, and either put to the sword, or took prisoners, four companies. The regiment of Chamborant march-
ed

ed to their assistance with the utmost intrepidity, disengaged them, and suffered considerably, the Imperialists being infinitely superiour. Beurnonville, vexed at this little check which his Belgick infantry had brought upon themselves, by fighting without orders, transmitted an account of the particulars, and stated that he was about to withdraw his advanced posts, and only retain Quesnvain. He had at that time his four brigades of infantry, and his artillery, still encamped near the abbey of Crespen, with Honneau in front, and he actually evacuated Thulin, where the Imperialists once more took post.

The general had not then received shoes, great coats, camp equipage, or money, but he had come to a decision to open the campaign. On the very day that the check was experienced at Thulin, he had rode to his right, on purpose to order colonel Frecheville, who commanded a body of flankers belonging to the right wing, to advance, and extend from Angres to Fayt. The wood of Sars is very thick, and very easy to be defended, more especially with Austrian and Tyrolese chaf-seurs. There is an opening and a road in the

the wood between Fayt, and the castle of Sars. The general wished to establish a communication, by means of this opening, with the division under general d'Harville, which, having arrived on the 1st at Hon, had orders to file along the right of the wood by Blargnies and Sars, that he might be constantly ready to assist in the attack which general Dumouriez was about to make by the left of that wood, between the wood and the river Haisne.

The wood of Sars is almost in form of a very long isosceles triangle, the acute angle of which presents itself before Hon and Taisnières. It is nearly three leagues in length. Its base is terminated by the villages of Framery and Paturage. Between these villages and Mons, which lies a little towards the right, on leaving Hon, is an elevated plain of about two thousand fathoms in length. In front of Mons is the suburb or village of Cuesmes, whence is a passage to the town along a broad causeway that leads to Bavay.

To the right, and by the side of the town, is a height called Berthaumont, behind which

is a still greater eminence called mount Palizel, and in the rear of this mount is the height of Nimy, which flanks the great road leading to Bruffels. The Haisne furrounds all these high grounds. On the left of the causeway of Cuesmes, between this causeway and that of Valenciennes, is the village of Gemappe, which extends along a spot of ground abounding in wood, and elevated in the manner of an amphitheatre, which renders it a good position, but which has the disadvantage of being bounded behind by the river of Haisne, and having too little depth for drawing up an army in order of battle.

This village commands the whole plain as far as the wood of Sars. Below, and to the left of Gemappe, are the two villages of Quareignon, and The latter is on the banks of the Haisne. The ground to the left of the wood of Sars, as far as the Haisne, reaches, still descending however, from Mons to Quiesvrain, St. Ghislain, and Condé. Very near to the end of the wood, within a league and a half of Gemappe, is a little eminence on which stands the windmill of Bouffu. Bouffu is a large market town on the borders
of

of the river, and is consequently commanded from the mill. Such is the ground on which they fought from the 3d to the 6th.

On the 3d at night, the general, on returning from his right to his head quarters at Honnaing, received the account transmitted to him by Beurnonville of the check at Thulin, and of the resolution he had taken to withdraw the advanced posts belonging to his vanguard. He considered this adventure in a far different point of view. He possessed far too much superiority over the Imperialists to think of commencing with a retreat, which could only whet their courage, and make a bad impression on his own troops. He ordered him, therefore, to march the whole of his advanced guard, which was to pass the bridges of Crespin and Quiesvrain, once more to attack the villages of Montreuil and Thulin, on the next day, which was the fourth. He reinforced this vanguard with three brigades, or nine battalions, commanded by the duke de Chartres. He commanded the army to hold itself in readiness to march, and he himself proceeded to his own advanced guard.

The Imperialists did not defend these villages, but retired to the mill of Bouffu, where they had posted a few pieces of cannon. He perceived with great pleasure, that the contest was only with light troops, and that the Imperial army neither supported in force the wood of Sars, nor the excellent position of the mill of Bouffu.

He threw three battalions of chasseurs into the wood in question, he sent to enjoin colonel Frecheville to penetrate on his side along the centre, and he transmitted orders to general d'Harville to march, taking care to file along the right of the wood, always keeping up with the former, a circumstance which he would be able to judge of by the firing of the musketry. He ordered six twelve pounders to advance to cannonade the mill, and he marched in three columns to take possession of it. The charge was so brisk, that the enemy made haste to withdraw their cannon. The free battalion of O'Donnel, which endeavoured to throw itself into the wood, lost four or five hundred men, who were massacred by our chasseurs.

He

He did not think that he ought to stop at the mill of Bouffu. It was of great importance for him to reach the plain fronting the end of the wood ;

1st. That the enemy might not be able to send troops back, to recommence the attack, cut off his communication with D'Harville, and resume the advantage of superior ground :

2d. To support himself by means of this same wood, that he and D'Harville might mutually succour each other in consequence of a second attack on the part of the enemy :

3. In fine, to participate in the advantage resulting from the height, and by extending his line along the plain of Paturage, to force the enemy to retreat. He accordingly advanced beyond the wood, and extended his infantry from the mill of Bouffu as far as Frameries. The corps under general D'Harville remained drawn up in column, at Genly, Engy, and Noirchin. The moment he had gotten possession of the hill of Bouffu, he sent orders to the army and the park of artillery, to

march and occupy the position between Esflouges and Hefnin, as a second line, and it spent the night under arms, in that station.

He was greatly astonished, that the Imperialists had not supported their detachments in the wood of Sars, and the mill of Bouffu, more especially as he found entrenchments at the top of the village of Bouffu, which indicated a design to maintain this line. He supposed, that the march of D'Harville towards the right of the wood had made them afraid of being turned by Frameries, and induced them to narrow their defence at Gemappe: this is indeed what would have happened, but the French would have lost many men in this attack, which would have been long and dangerous, and the Imperialists, being in possession of the high ground, would have always been able to have returned to their entrenchments at Gemappe.

On the 5th, the general caused Quareignon to be attacked by the Belgians, supported by three free battalions, which formed the body of flankers belonging to the left.

He

He caused the vanguard under Beurnonville to advance in front of Frameries, facing the great road leading to Cuesmes; he ranged his army in column along the wood, but in such a manner as to be able to place it in order of battle by facing to the left, parallel to the village of Gemappe, and with the wood in the rear.

He posted twelve battalions on his left to support the attack on Quareignon, and to take the village of Gemappe in the rear, by turning it along its right flank. He divided his cavalry into three bodies, to support the three divisions of his infantry, posted in the plain, which were to attack the village. He caused his artillery to file along his whole front, and placed it so as to produce a cross fire on the enemy's fixed batteries.

He ordered general D'Harville to march and take post on the heights in front of Siply, whence he could extend along the heights of Berthaumont, and menace mount Pallizel. While he made this disposition, he caused the attack of Quareignon to be continued, on purpose to amuse and detain

the enemy, for he was afraid lest they should take advantage of the night to abandon their entrenchments at Gemappe, pass through that town, and proceed to Berthoumont, Pallizel and Nimy, which might have been effected. This indeed is the reason that induced the general to keep the troops all night under arms, so very near to the enemy.

He has since been told, that general Beaulieu had advised to attack him during the night. This advice was certainly the best, provided that of retiring was not followed, which was still better. General Beaulieu recollected what had occurred to himself nearly in the same position, during the month of April preceding, against general Biron. But the troops were no longer the same. This attack would perhaps have produced a momentary disorder, but as soon as it had been discovered, the Imperialists would have been overwhelmed on every side, and Dumouriez then turning them, either with his right or left, would have surrounded them before they could have regained their entrenchments.

This

This opinion, however, is that of an enterprising warrior, and was better than they adopted, of allowing themselves to be attacked on the morning of the succeeding day, in the entrenchments of Gemappe, *by Frenchmen.*

CHAP. V.

The Battle of Gemappe.

ON the 6th, at break of day, the commander in chief sent orders to general D'Harville, to be very particular in observing what passed on his left, at Beurnonville's van-guard, to advance always in a line with him, out-flanking at the same time the left of the Imperialists posted on Berthoumont, to direct the fire of his artillery against it, and to take advantage of the moment of its retreat to advance rapidly to the top of mount Pallizel, whence he could gain the high ground of Nimy, thus turning Mons, and cutting off the retreat of the enemy along the great road leading to Brussels. This general could not contribute to the success of the battle, because the town of Mons was between him and the position attacked; but he might complete the victory in case of success, by attacking

attacking the enemy with fresh troops during its retreat.

General Beurnonville had in front of him the enemy's left wing, stationed on a height that covers Cuesmes, provided with five large redoubts. This height bordered on the straggling houses of Gemappe. Several other redoubts extended all along the front, and as far as the right flank of the village below Quareignon. Twenty pieces of heavy artillery, and several howitzers, independent of the battalion guns, were distributed in these redoubts, and presented three rows of fire; trees, hollow ways, and houses, constituted formidable entrenchments.

In the centre of this front, which corresponded with the centre of the French army commanded by lieutenant-general de Chartres, was an opening with a road that led to Gemappe. The Imperialists posted a few squadrons of horse there, which, in case of disorder during our attack, were to fall on the centre of our infantry.

The left wing of the French army was conducted by three major-generals, Ferrand, Blotefières, and Rozières, in the absence of
 7 lieutenant-

lieutenant-general Miranda, who was still at Paris. General Ferrand, as the senior officer, commanded this wing, which being drawn up in the form of a square, was to attack the village by the right extremity of its front and its right flank.

This terrible position was defended, according to the confession of the Imperialists, by nineteen thousand men; but according to the statement found at Mons, among the papers of colonel Fischer, one of the principal officers of the staff, the duke of Teschen's army amounted to twenty-eight thousand. The contradiction is only apparent. He might not have had any more than nineteen thousand men in the entrenchments of Gemappe, for the rest might have been placed in Mons, and on Berthaumont, opposite to general D'Harville.

Dumouriez ordered Beurnonville to begin the attack, directing his march at the same time towards Cuesmes. He had stationed along his front ten sixteen and sixteen twelve pounders. Labayette, an able colonel of artillery, planted these cannons in such a manner, that every redoubt was attacked in flank by
two

two batteries of two pieces each, and a brisk fire commenced all along the front at eight o'clock in the morning.

The general, after having been employed in riding along his front, from the break of day, went to find general Ferrand on his left. He perceived, that the attack of the village of Quareignon was carried on very faintly. He therefore made general Rozières advance with two twelve pounders and four battalions, to support and push forward the Belgick and French infantry; the village was carried in his presence. He then gave orders to general Rozières to continue his march along the great road, to draw up his cavalry, consisting of eight squadrons, in order of battle, and to attack the right flank of the village with a body of infantry. He commanded general Ferrand to attack the angle, and the right extremity of the front of the village, and as soon as he perceived general Rozières ascending along the left flank, he was no longer to amuse himself with a cannonade, but to march forward to the charge with bent heads, and fixed bayonets.

He

He recommended to him to make the attack by battalion in column, to preserve this order in the village, and not to extend his front, until his right should rejoin the left of the centre division. He left with him some officers belonging to the staff, whom he was to send back with information relative to the progress he made in the attack; and he told him, that he would wait in expectation of hearing intelligence from him, at the division of the centre, which he would put in motion as soon as he learned that his attack had commenced.

He repaired quickly to the centre, where he ineffectually waited until eleven o'clock in expectation of news from Beurnonville and Ferrand. Beurnonville's attack was slow, but he was detained by the very brisk fire of five redoubts, which he could not silence by that of his own artillery, although the general had reinforced him with four sixteen pounders. As to Ferrand, his delay was inexcusable.

At eleven o'clock, he begged colonel Thouvenot to proceed to the left, to cause the attack to be commenced, to direct it afterwards,

wards, and not to rejoin him until he should be master of that part of the village fronting the left. Thouvenot, on his arrival, found that old general Ferrand, who had lost his senses, continued an useless cannonade, and had not come to any resolution; that general Rozières remained concealed behind the houses of Quareignon, and did not extend his line; and that the troops, who were replete with ardour, murmured, and became impatient. On this he took upon himself the command, conformably to the orders of the general in chief, put the columns in motion, advanced rapidly against the right flank and the front of the village, and carried the redoubts with that French impetuosity, so difficult to be resisted, and this sudden attack decided the affair on the left.

The general, who only waited for this movement, drew up in column, by battalion, the infantry of the centre, and made it advance with equal impetuosity against the centre of the village. He caused the opening to be masked, by means of seven squadrons of dragoons and hussars. The centre crossed the plain with such rapidity, that but
few

few men were lost. But a brigade that marched towards the opening, perceiving the enemy's cavalry advance, threw itself behind a house on the right, and left a vacant space, through which this cavalry might have been able to have pierced the centre.

At this very moment, young Baptiste Renard, the general's *valet de chambre*, inspired by an heroick movement and his attachment to his master, set off at full gallop, found general Drouet, who commanded this brigade, made him ashamed of his retreat, brought back the brigade, masked the opening anew, went for the seven squadrons which this timid movement on the part of the infantry had stopped, conducted them also to the opening, and returned to his master, after having renewed the engagement.

At the time general Drouet had given way, the brigade on his left made a halt; it did not flee, but the three columns of the battalions which composed it were thrown into confusion, and lost many men, by remaining exposed to a fire of grape within half musket shot of the batteries. The duke de Chartres proceeded thither with precipitation

tation, rallied, formed the soldiers into a large mixed column, which he gaily termed the *column of Gemappe*, renewed the combat, penetrated into the village, and carried the three stories of redoubts and entrenchments.

Some squadrons of hussars, chasseurs, and dragoons advanced with as much rapidity as the infantry; they fought with uncommon rage. Thouvenot, who had advanced along the right of the village, placed the Imperialists between two fires; more than four hundred were drowned in the Haisne, and the battle was gained in the centre, and to the right of the village.

While the duke de Chartres rallied the centre with so much vigour, Dumouriez experienced a new cause of uneasiness. As Beurnonville did not make any progress in his attack, he proceeded thither in great haste, with two very opposite intentions; the one to force the redoubts belonging to the enemy's left, in order to support the duke de Chartres' attack, the other, to abandon this attack, and to return with the troops belonging to the vanguard, into the

plain of *Paturage*, there to rally the troops of the centre, and protect the retreat of the army, if the duke of Chartres should prove unsuccessful, which was to be presumed, in consequence of the first disorder occasioned by general Drouet.

Never did any general arrive more opportunely. He found on the height of Cuesmes two brigades of infantry, one of which was composed of three battalions belonging to Paris, which had formerly served under him at the camp of Maulde. These were turning the left of five redoubts filled with Hungarian grenadiers. In front was a large body of Imperial cavalry, that appeared ready to attack them, and at five hundred paces distance before their left, a column of infantry, which only waited for the movement of the horse, in order to complete their destruction. One hundred paces behind these two brigades, were ten squadrons of hussars, dragoons, and chasseurs, exposed to the cannon mounted on the redoubts which swept them diagonally, and to those belonging to general d'Harville, who, in consequence of an inconceivable blunder,

blunder, mistaking them for the enemy, mowed them down from behind.

These troops had not any general at their head, for the famous Dampierre, who ought to have commanded them, was not to be found, although on the evening before he had uttered an indecent jest against his general, on his having delayed the attack until the morning.

Beurnonville in the mean time proceeded along the rear, at the head of two other brigades and the remainder of his cavalry. The general had only time to pass along the front of the two brigades, and to tell them, that having their father at their head, they had not any thing to fear. The cry of *Long live Dumouriez!* assured him of the good disposition of this body, which displayed an heroick countenance. He then rode to the head of the cavalry; it was time, for it began to break, and was ready to flee. He dispatched an *aide-de-camp* to Beurnonville to hasten his march. At the same moment the Imperial dragoons advanced at a gallop, in order to make an opening into the two

brigades, which, by means of a general discharge with the muzzles of their muskets close to the enemy, formed a rampart before them, of the bodies of more than an hundred horses and troopers. A squadron of the enemy, that had come along the great road, endeavoured to surround this body of infantry; on this, the general, who had rallied his cavalry, detached the hussars of Berchiny, who plunged into the midst of, and dispersed these dragoons. The whole of this body of Imperial cavalry, on this, fled as far as Mons, and the column of infantry also began to retire.

Dumouriez caused the field of battle to be occupied by Beurnonville, who had just arrived, made the two brave brigades which had decided the fate of the action, the horse commanded by Frecheville seniour and Fournier, the hussars of Chamborant, commanded by Frecheville juniour, and those of Berchiny, commanded by Nordmann, move to the left; he chaunted the *Marseillois* hymn, placed himself at their head, and they proceeded with great gaiety, and a degree of courage

courage impossible to be described, to attack the redoubts by the gorge. A great massacre of the Hungarian grenadiers ensued.

However, being still uneasy about his centre, when he saw that this attack had proved decisive, he withdrew the elder Frecheville with six squadrons of chasseurs, and setting out at their head, at a smart trot, he proceeded along the village to the succour of his centre. He had not gone five hundred paces, when he beheld Montpensier, the younger brother of the duke de Chartres, arrive at full gallop, on purpose to announce to him that the centre was victorious, and that his brother had gotten possession of the village after a bloody engagement. Thouvenot arrived at the same instant, having passed through the village, and along the rear of the redoubts, and told him that the enemy had fled. The engagement had commenced at noon, and it was now only two o'clock.

The general dispatched repeated messages to d'Harville, to make him hasten to occupy mount Pallizel, without being able to prevail upon him. That officer still saw some troops

on Berthautmont, and he imagined that mount Pallizel and the heights of Nimy were well provided with entrenchments; and in truth, the Imperialists had established some redoubts there. It was in vain he received reiterated advice, that the battle was gained, and the enemy in flight; he would not advance, and it was with some difficulty that they could induce him to cease firing on the height of Cuesmes, which was occupied by Beurnonville.

In the mean time the army was horribly fatigued. It had lain under arms, and fought, during the last four days. It was absolutely necessary to allow it two hours repose, and to make a distribution of bread and brandy. The troops had not as yet eaten any thing, and it was not then the custom to intoxicate the soldiers, in order to lead them on to battle.

During this pause, the general became impatient at perceiving the Austrians retire without being pursued, because, in consequence of their retreat, the town of Mons was between him and them, and d'Harville alone was in a situation to have turned that place, had he but followed his instructions,

He

He himself would have proceeded thither, but he had not a single horse capable of sustaining this fatigue, and he had many orders to issue, especially respecting his provision and his wounded.

He remained therefore with his vanguard at the end of the village of Cuesmes. At four o'clock he gave orders for forming the ranks, and announced that he was about to advance. These brave soldiers, forgetting their fatigues, testified their joy by loud exclamations. It was necessary to occupy the suburbs of Mons by means of the light troops, and he sent to summons the town. A fantastical event once more opposes his wishes. Those two brigades, which had just exhibited an heroick courage, which had attacked a frightful position, braved a triple stage of musquetry, and forced redoubts lined with a numerous infantry, in the midst of a frightful fire of artillery loaded with grape shot, were seized with a panick terrour. They imagined, that the Imperialists had undermined the mountain. In consequence of a supposition impossible in its nature, five battalions abandoned this position, notwithstanding all the repre-

sentations of general Stettenhofen, who commanded them; one battalion only remained with him, the rest threw themselves, in the utmost disorder, into the village of Cuesmes.

The general, on being informed of this very unexpected event, dispatched other troops to take possession of Berthaumont. At length general d'Harville arrived. He posted himself on mount Pallizel: on his reaching it, he occupied the hill of Nimy, with only light posts, instead of marching thither with his main body. In the midst of all these delays, the enemy effected its retreat, and the night set in.

The general had immediately detached the body of flankers belonging to the left towards Gelin and the chapel of Notre-dame, on the other side of Mons and the river, to harass the left of the great road leading to Brussels, while d'Harville, posted at Nimy, hung upon the enemy's right. The flankers being too weak, were obliged to allow the Imperial army to pass, because d'Harville did not support them. The general, greatly to his regret, was obliged to defer until next day
the

the capture of Mons, and the pursuit of the enemy. He had not made any preparations to force Mons, the commanding officer of which mingled much address and great haughtiness with his answers. He was forced to content himself with the success of the day, and he spent the night in getting batteries ready to attack this sorry place, which was evacuated before the morning.

Such are the particulars of the battle of Gemappe. It decided the fate of the Low Countries, but its success would have been far more complete,

1. If Ferrand and Beurnonville had commenced the attack at eight o'clock in the morning, because this would have gained three hours;

2. If d'Harville had studied better the movement made by Beurnonville, which would have prevented him from firing upon his troops, and advanced rapidly to the heights of Pallizel and Nimy, for then the retreat of the Imperialists would have been entirely cut off. Between two o'clock in the afternoon, and six at night, there would have been time, with this body of fresh troops which

which had not as yet been in action, to have completed their defeat, and pursued them.

The success of this battle was principally owing :

1. To colonel Thouvenot, who determined, and conducted the attack on the left ;

2. To the *valet-de-chambre* Baptiste Renard, who rallied the infantry and cavalry of the centre ;

3. To the duke de Chartres, who rallied the left of the centre, and forced the centre of the village ;

And 4. To the impetuous attack made on the redoubts to the right, by the commander in chief.

General Ferrand was so completely bereaved of his senses, that he has since asserted, he did not see colonel Thouvenot, although it was he who directed the movement. The officers belonging to the staff, and the general's *aides-de-camp*, displayed the utmost bravery and knowledge. Several of them were wounded. General Moreton exhibited extraordinary courage, and

lieutenant-colonel Bourdois, his *aide-de-camp*, performed the greatest services. General Drouet repaired his fault in the most brilliant manner; he has since died of his wounds at Quesnoi.

There was not a single *corps* in the whole French army, that did not engage, and attack the enemy hand to hand, either with their sabres, or screwed bayonets. The greatest loss fell upon the battalions belonging to the centre, which halted to fire. Those who marched straight forward with bended heads, lost but very few. This battle did not actually cost more than two thousand men, six or seven hundred of whom were killed outright; but many matrosses, and artillery horses were destroyed, because that *corps*, in order to produce more effect, advanced with its usual intrepidity, within musket shot of the entrenchments. The Imperialists lost about four thousand men, and thirteen pieces of cannon, seven of which, of a large calibre, were left in the redoubts. But from this moment, desertion and dismay took place in their army.

C H A P. VI.

Berneron at Ath. Capture of Tournay, and Ostend.

ON his setting out on the 4th, on purpose to attack the Imperialists, the general had given orders to Berneron, to advance that same day to Blatton, whence he was to march without delay to Ath, if, as he then believed would be the case, the duke of Teschen should abandon the position of Mons without exposing himself to receive a check. He intended by means of the movement effected with this division, to cut off the communication of the Imperial body of troops charged with the defence of Tournay, and prevent it from rejoining the duke of Teschen. Berneron was retarded, in consequence of his being in want of every thing; he was destitute of camp equipage, provision, horses
for

for drawing his artillery, and money. He had also the little camp of Bury on his left flank; and as there were many new levied battalions in his division, he was afraid of exposing them to some accident.

He accordingly could not arrive at Ath until the 8th, after general Latour had already passed through, and fallen back upon Brussels. He found in Ath great quantities of ammunition, provision, and baggage, as well as at Lessines, Grammont, and Ninove, whither he sent detachments. But this movement was too slow to produce all the effect which the general expected from it; he could not however accuse general Berneron of disinclination to the service, as he, on the contrary, displayed much courage and zeal.

It was not the same with general Labourdonnaye; he had dispatched an *aide-de-camp* on the 3d, to announce to him, that he intended to march in order to dislodge the duke of Teschen; he conjured him to make haste to get possession of the heights of Hertain, Lamain, and Marquain, and to bring his heavy cannon and mortars before Tournay,

may, assuring him that he would not meet with any resistance, because general Latour had nothing else left but to rejoin the duke of Teschen, whether the duke intended to abandon the position at Mons, or to put himself in the way of being driven from it. Labourdonnaye, notwithstanding the pressing solicitations of general Duval, colonel Devaux, his staff officers, generals, and the murmurs of his army, did not begin his march until the 6th, in order to reach Hertain. He was much surprised and vexed on his arrival, neither to find enemies nor entrenchments, as he had intimated; he had carried his heavy artillery along with him, but it was in vain that they conjured him to advance to Tournay.

He remained the whole of the 7th in his position, although during the night between the 6th and 7th he had received intelligence of the victory of Gemappe, and notwithstanding many inhabitants in the course of the 7th had repaired to his camp, on purpose to inform him, that the enemy had begun to evacuate the place during the preceding night, and that general Latour had

had commenced his retreat. On the morning of the 8th, colonel Devaux, indignant at the conduct of this general, put himself at the head of four hussars, entered Tournay, sent to tell him that he was expected by the townsmen, and then proceeded straight to Mons, to inform his general of this instance of cowardice or treason, for it was impossible to say what name ought to be given to such conduct.

Labourdonnaye accordingly entered on the morning of the 8th into Tournay; he transmitted a pompous account of this conquest to the convention, whose eulogiums and thanks he received in return. As soon as he had established himself there, he caused a proclamation to be published, in direct opposition to that issued by the commander in chief; he also seized on the public money, and ordered contributions to be collected. This system of spoliation, which was supported by the commissioners whom he had brought along with him from Lille, shocked the inhabitants of that place, and also of Courtrai, Menin, and Bruges, who sent deputies

puties to the commander in chief, to the ministers, and the convention.

Labourdonnaye's conduct had many partizans; it was similar to that practised by Custine at Francfort. But the situation of France in respect to the Germans was far different; upon them might be exercised the rights of war and of conquest. The same rights did not exist in respect to the Belgians, whom they had not conquered, but who had thrown themselves into the arms of France, and to whom, with the consent of the convention, general Dumouriez had given assurances, that he had come to deliver them from the Imperialists, and that none of the rights of sovereignty or of conquest should be exercised against them.

The general was exceedingly irritated at this enterprise on the part of Labourdonnaye. He ordered copies of his own proclamation to be posted up in all the towns, annulled all the ordinances of this general, caused all the publick money to be restored to the administrators of the country, prohibited them from obeying any order issued by this general, which might violate their liberty, and wrote

to

to him not to intermeddle in respect to any other than military operations, until he should be replaced by a successor, announcing to him at the same time, that he should transmit complaints against him, and demand his dismissal.

Accordingly, in a letter addressed to the executive power, he detailed the particulars of Labourdonnaye's misconduct, stated that it was impossible for the campaign to have a happy conclusion while he had such a second, and that it was necessary to come to an immediate determination. If they approved the conduct of Labourdonnaye, he would willingly resign to him the command of the army; if they blamed it, it would be necessary to send him back to the northern department, and bestow his army on a general who would not thwart the military and political plans of the commander in chief. The minister at war, after some tergiversation, sent back Labourdonnaye to Lisle, and left the choice of his successor to general Dumouriez.

Dumouriez replaced him by lieutenant-general Miranda, on the refusal of lieutenant-

general Duval, who had the modesty to decline the command of an army. A degree of modesty, very rare indeed ! Duval served with the same zeal until the end of the campaign, under Miranda. He had an ill state of health, but he was one of the best general officers belonging to the whole army.

The particulars respecting general Labourdonnaye are detailed in this place, to prevent any further mention of him. He was at that time one of the most ardent of Dumouriez's concealed enemies, he therefore could not have reaped any advantage, either in behalf of the state or of himself, by sparing him any longer.

This bad general was greatly humbled by what occurred in consequence of the battle of Gemappe. He had announced, that Dumouriez's plan was incomplete, and that he ought to have preferred an attack on the maritime places, entrusting this operation to him, at the head of the northern army. The general had asserted, on the contrary, that the garrison of Dunkirk was sufficient to take the maritime places, and he had sent orders

orders to the *commandant* for that purpose. Accordingly, as soon as the intelligence of the battle of Gemappe arrived, this officer took the field with eighteen hundred infantry, and two hundred cavalry. Nieuport and Ostend opened their gates to him. Bruges received him with joy, and all Flanders was subdued without firing a single musket.

C H A P. VII.

*Capture of Mons. Engagement at Anderlecht.
Entry into Brussels.*

ON the morning of the 7th, the general entered Mons, where he was received with the utmost joy by the inhabitants.

His situation was far more embarrassing than before his victory. The commissaries at war, and the administrators of provision belonging to his army, had remained behind at Valenciennes. He was destitute of provision, money, and means to enable him to advance. D'Espagnac, a man of great talents, and fertile in resources, found him in this situation. He had undertaken the convoys for the army. He lent him fifty thousand crowns, and in consequence of orders from the general, entered into a variety of contracts with the commissary general Malus,

lus, for shoes and great coats, of which the soldiers stood in much need during so rigorous a season. Certain opulent Belgians agreed to supply the army with provision and forage for two months. The general at the same time issued an ordinance requiring from the clergy a forced loan of one year of their revenues, with a promise to cause this loan to be guaranteed by the Belgick nation, with which the French nation was to settle on balancing accounts at the conclusion of the war.

This loan on the part of the clergy was assurance for them of the preservation of their property, and was calculated to bring into circulation the money buried in the convents. As to the bargains relative to provision and forage, in addition to their ensuring the subsistence of the army, and the consideration that the first deliveries would prevent the march of the general from being any longer delayed, as they were to commence in a week, and continue without interruption, there resulted another advantage, which was, that the contractors being paid in *assignats*, they had an equal interest with France herself,

self, to make them enter into circulation. These details occupied his attention until the 11th, and prevented him from following up his recent advantages with vigour, which he would have done, had he not been destitute of every thing. D'Espagnac, with whom the general also entered into another contract for arming and equipping the Belgians who offered their services, and by whose means he wished to form a national army, set out for Paris to get all these agreements ratified; not doubting, any more than the commander in chief, and the commissary general Malus, that they would be approved, and that the convention and minister at war would consider it as extremely advantageous, to have no occasion to send any thing to this army, which would be entirely fed, clothed, and equipped by mutual consent, at the expence of the Belgians; to learn that the *assignats* were to be circulated at the same rate as in Paris; and not to account until the end of the war, and then too, according to a calculation, which in consequence of the compensation to be made for the disbursements of France,

to

to insure the liberty of Belgium, would be reduced at the most to a very trifling debt. It will be seen how much the general was deceived in his opinion.

He sent one of his *aides-de-camp* to Paris, with an account of the particulars of the battle of Gemappe, and he caused him to be accompanied by the brave Baptiste, who received from the president of the convention a sword, a complete uniform, the *brevet* rank of *aide-de-camp* and captain, the fraternal embrace, and the honours of the sitting. This recompense did honour to the nation itself, for true equality consists in the eligibility of every citizen of a state to rank and dignity, when he shall have merited them. No other equality can exist but amidst savage hordes who are unacquainted with property, arts, and the distinctions of society. It afforded him pleasure to see general Miranda, who had returned from Paris, arrive at Mons, and also the major-generals Stengel and Eustace, who had remained sick at Valenciennes. The first was nominated second in command of the vanguard; and Eustace, who was an American, was appointed

to head the body of flankers belonging to the left wing.

But the person whose arrival afforded him the greatest pleasure was the brave and respectable Lanoue. The commissioners of the convention residing at Valenciennes had caused him to be shut up in a dungeon at Douai, along with malefactors; he had languished there for the space of three weeks, without being able to obtain the nomination of judges; when the general, on his arrival from Paris at the end of October, thought proper to exercise in his favour the sage English law of *habeas corpus*, by offering himself as his bail. He brought him to Valenciennes, and appointed him an *aide-de-camp*, taking care to render an account to the minister of what he had done, and the motives by which he was instigated.

He was certain of the prisoner's innocence, and he deemed it useful to employ his talents, more especially as he had but few general officers. This had been depicted at Paris as an act of despotism on the part of the general; the most furious were anxious to have him arrested. The brave Lanoue,

perceiving that the generosity of his commander was likely to involve him in difficulties, sacrificed himself, returned to his dungeon, and wrote to the convention to demand that judges might be appointed to try him. This act of resignation made his accusers blush, judges were nominated, he was acquitted, and came to make an offer of his zeal, his talents, and his life, to his friend.

The general communicated his success to Valence, and desired him to be on the 13th or 14th at Nivelles, because, being obliged, in spite of his own inclinations, to allow the duke of Teschen time to prepare himself, he hoped that he would wait for him behind the canal of Vilvorden; and, in this case, Valence would be employed to turn the forest of Soignies, on purpose to harass him on passing the Dyle. He ordered Berneron to approach nearer his left, and to come and encamp at Herines on the 11th. He marched on that very day from Mons towards Enghien with his army, and general D'Harville proceeded at the same time from Mons to Braine-le-comte.

He was so badly supplied by his convoys, that he was unable to perform this march
in

in less than two days; his army accordingly did not reach Enghien until the 12th. His vanguard was then at Hall, and Beurnonville had just left it, to take upon him the chief command of the army of the Moselle in the room of Kellermann. Stengel was then commander in chief. Dampierre, who could not serve along with him, went to take the command of Berneron's division, who re-entered the line two days afterwards.

The general ordered Labourdonnaye to advance from Tournay to Ghent, to push on his vanguard to Dendermonde, and to be opposite that place on the 13th without fail. He fully explained to him, that he had no enemy to encounter, therefore that nothing ought either to prevent or retard his march, and that there were two or three thousand Imperialists at Ghent, who would retire at his approach. Labourdonnaye found means however to lag behind for two or three days longer; but then his disinclination was not attended with any danger, because the operations of the armies had become independent of each other.

On the evening of the 12th, the general repaired to Hall, where his vanguard under colonel Thouvenot was. On the morning of the 13th he entrusted a detachment of two hundred foot and fifty horse chasseurs to his own aide-de-camp colonel Devaux, in order to receive some intelligence respecting the enemy. He received notice in two hours afterwards from Devaux, that he was engaged with the rear guard of the Imperialists, which he found at St. Petersewe; that he then kept them in play, but that if he received a reinforcement he would drive them before him; that the peasants had told him, the Imperial army was on the other side of Brussels, and that a rear guard, consisting of two or three thousand men, was left on the heights of Anderlecht.

The general on this took three thousand men belonging to his advanced guard, with two companies of horse artillery, and advanced to St. Petersewe, having sent orders previously to general Miranda to march with the army to Hall; he issued similar orders to general D'Harville, not wishing to bring him from the other side of the Senne, that he
might

might not be entangled in the forest of Soignies. He desired him to send him his vanguard, which was to join the body of flankers belonging to the right, and the remainder of his own vanguard, in order to support him.

Having reached St. Petersewe, he easily drove the Imperial light troops before him ; but when he arrived before Anderlecht, he perceived his left to be out-flanked by a more numerous body than his own, having five or six thousand men in front of him. This was not a proper opportunity to engage at the head of a slender vanguard ; but he was still less disposed to retreat. He drew up his troops so as to form a very extensive front, and he commenced a sharp cannonade, at the end of the great road. The enemy believing him to be stronger than itself, did not wish to engage. At length, at three o'clock in the afternoon, the remainder of his van arrived ; he then made a vigorous attack upon the village, which was carried. The dragoons of Latour, and a corps of hulans, were cut up by his cavalry. A major of the Imperialists, of the name of Mahmi, distinguished himself during this retreat, which

which cost the enemy five or six hundred men.

Both Miranda and D'Harville marched in the direction of Hall; on their arrival there they learned that the general was engaged with superior forces, and demanded assistance. The troops heard a loud firing on the side of Brussels, and the wounded were conducted from that quarter. The army on this becoming uneasy, wished to proceed to the assistance of its general, its *father*, threw away its soup, and resumed its march, advancing hastily towards Anderlecht. This is one of the features in the character of these soldiers, that most affected the sensibility of Dumouriez. He dispatched word to them, that the enemy had been beaten, and was then retreating, the army on this returned, and encamped at Hall, murmuring at the same time at its general, who had exposed himself in the vanguard. Next morning, before day-light, it was again on its march, and the general enjoyed the pleasure of being well scolded by the soldiers. It is impossible not to love such men! How much regret does it not occasion him, to behold so noble a character disfigured
by

by crimes ! Oh ! Frenchmen, how you have changed since 1792 ! But this terrible epoch of your history will be effaced, your virtues will return, and you yourselves will punish the monsters who now mislead and dishonour you.

Immediately after rendering himself master of Anderlecht, the general dispatched colonel Westermann with a trumpet to Brussels, to summon the commanding officers. Marshal Bender received the summons. He was entrusted with a second for the magistrates. The latter entreated colonel Westermann to beg, that the general would not permit his troops to enter the city at the approach of night, for fear lest they should disperse themselves, and the Imperialists, who were still drawn up in order of battle near the park, and the gate of Bellevue, return to attack them, which would produce an engagement within the walls. The general had an additional motive for prohibiting his troops from entering Brussels at night : he dreaded plunder and licentiousness. He caused it to be intimated to the magistrates, to secure their gates,

gates, and not permit one French soldier to enter, and he sent out strong patrols of cavalry to guard all the avenues.

On the morning of the 14th, after having traced the camp for his army at Anderlecht, he entered Brussels amidst the acclamations of the people. The streets were lined on each side with a double row of Austrian deserters: they amounted to more than four thousand. His soldiers conducted themselves with great propriety; neither the smallest violence nor excess took place. He immediately provided a garrison of six battalions and a regiment of dragoons, and he took advantage of this opportunity to get rid of Moreton, the head of his staff, who was incapable of filling so important a situation. He nominated him *commandant* of Brussels and Brabant, where he conducted himself very badly. He recompensed the great talents and distinguished services of colonel Thouvenot, by appointing him a major-general, and placing him at the head of his staff. It was thus, that within the space of two months, general Thouvenot elevated himself

himself to the second place in the army, by his own personal merit; and it is thus, that men of superiour talents ought to be promoted rapidly, on purpose to render them still more useful.

C H A P. VIII.

Siege of Antwerp. Engagement at Tirlemont.

THE more the general advanced, the more did his embarrassments increase. On entering Brussels, Malus announced to him, that there were no more than fourteen thousand *livres* in the military chest, and it was necessary to provide money for fifty thousand men whose pay was due. He was therefore obliged to borrow eighty thousand florins from the treasury of that capital, promising at the same time a speedy reimbursement, and three hundred thousand *livres* without interest from a banker, in whose favour he caused a bill of exchange to be drawn on the national treasury. It was D'Espagnac who pointed out this resource; he had just arrived from Paris, and had brought very bad news with him. The minister Pache did

not choose to give his assent to any of the contracts.

Cambon, who was the absolute master of the finances, said, that it was useless to agree with Belgick contractors in order to bring the assignats into circulation ; that they would force the nation to take them, not at the value affixed to them in Paris, but at the same rate as money ; that if the articles of subsistence, and necessaries for the army, cost more in consequence of sending them from Paris, than by procuring them on the spot, that mode would afford a livelihood to a number of French artizans, and more especially those of Paris, who, but for this, would become disorderly from the want of bread ; that the administration of provision and forage was a den of aristocrats, who augmented, by means of their monopolies, the price of the necessary articles of life ; that all the other contractors were rogues, who charged extravagantly high for bad commodities ; that, to obviate all these inconveniencies, the convention had authorised the ministers of the home, the marine, and the war departments, to dissolve all the companies of
old

old contractors, and to entrust the interests of the nation to five or six persons charged with making purchases of every kind, who were to account in the same manner as a clerk with his employer ; that the company known by the name of the committee of purchases should be charged with making all the bargains, without the liberty of being contractors themselves ; that by these means an uniformity of price would take place relative to all kinds of supplies, and they would no longer depend on the industry of the forestallers.

D'Espagnac possessed too much ability and knowledge not to be easily able to refute these specious sophisms. The formation of a committee of purchases would throw all the articles of the first necessity into the hands of six persons, who were to compose it. This would be reviving the practice of the monopoly of grain, in the same manner as it had prevailed under the old government, which had been one of the first causes of the revolution. The committee of purchases could not establish an uniformity of price for each article that might be wanted, through-

out a country so extensive, and varying so much in respect to its productions as France, but by adopting the highest price : as to the foreign territories where the armies were, the committee of purchases being obliged to draw the provision from the spot, could only have it at second hand, and would be under the necessity of recurring to the contractors of the country : that these would either be satisfied with the price already agreed upon, or would increase it : that, in the first instance, there would be the additional charge of two *per cent.* allowed to the members of this committee, while, in the second, they would besides this pay the enhanced price occasioned by the inexperience of the committee, or its connivance with foreign contractors.

As to the circulation of assignats, this could only be brought about by confidence, and at the rate usual in commerce : that this circulation could not be equitably established at *par* in Belgium, while a discount of more than fifty *per cent.* took place at Paris : and that if this were attempted by means of violence, it would be a robbery which would

dishonour the nation, render the Belgians disaffected, and might be attended by the most disagreeable consequences.

This committee of purchases was actually established. It was composed of a Swiss banker called Bidermann, the partner of Clavières, a Fleming belonging to Ostend, and three Jews from Strasbourg, of the name of Cers-Beer, the sons of a man who had rendered himself famous by his roguery during the seven years war. These are the five *worthy men* to whom were entrusted the fate and the interests of France.

It was the minister Clavières who had brought this machine into play, with the faction of the Gironde, the greater part of whom possessed large capitals, and became *riders* to those contractors disguised under the name of administrators. Poor Roland, and perhaps Cambon himself, might have been seduced by the sophisms which they had made use of, while the minister Pache and Monge were drawn into the scheme by the clerks, who found their account in promoting it. The general would not have intermeddled in this affair, but allowed the na-

tion to be plundered without uttering any complaints, since he could not have prevented it, if the disorganisation of his army, which followed close after, had not entirely ruined his whole plan of the campaign.

The circulation of *assignats* embarrassed him exceedingly. His army was paid in money, but the stock-jobbers, who wished to introduce the circulation of *assignats* at *par*, in order to gain the difference, furnished them to the soldiers, who in their turn carried them to the petty shopkeepers. For an article that did not cost more than three or four *sols*, the soldier required change for an *assignat* of one hundred, whence violent quarrels ensued, the tradesman was wronged, and the soldier accustomed to rob.

The army wished to engage the general to order that the *assignats* should be received by the shopkeeper, who, on the other hand, was disposed rather to give away his merchandize, than in addition to it, to pay money for paper which would necessarily produce a loss of upwards of fifty *per cent*. Such an order would have been unjust, because the army was paid in money, and had no pre-

text

text whatever to refuse making its own disbursements in cash.

The magistrates of the towns solicited him, on the contrary, to direct that the tradesmen should not be obliged to receive *assignats*. This demand was strictly just, but the compliance with it would have completely depreciated them, and done an injury to his country. He advised the cities to issue confidential notes in proportion to the consumption, as was done in France; they refused, he could not blame them, and this state of warfare continued between the retail traders and the soldiers: it is to be observed however, that when the soldiers came to complain, their officers obliged them either to leave the merchandize, or to pay for it in money.

An administrative body was formed at Brussels, which at first, being selected from all the different states, was well composed; but as a club was formed at the same time, at which the general was obliged to assist once, as soon as he had left Brussels, great changes were made in this administrative body, and Moreton, a violent jacobin, became the enemy

of the administration, which however supported itself courageously to the very last moment, and resisted with much force and energy a legion of *sans culottes*, that harassed it, and also the tyrannical injustice exercised by the commissioners of the convention and the executive power. The prudence and resolution of this body, supported, amidst a variety of dangers, in 1793, by several acts of authority on the part of general Dumouriez in opposition to all these tyrants, saved the capital of Brabant from an entire subversion.

In Mons, Brussels, and all the towns of Belgium, were found much property appertaining to the emigrants, which was confiscated in behalf of France. But as there were too few commissaries of war in the army, to spare any for this service, much pillage and disorder ensued, relative to the seizure and sale of these effects, because Lacroix and Danton, the commissioners of the convention, on their arrival at Brussels, had entrusted a band of famished jacobins from Paris, who committed great disorders, with the superintendence of these operations. But little advantage was reaped by the nation, and thus
another

another resource for the maintenance of the army was exhausted. The carriages, the horses, and the arms, were distributed among the general officers, and those belonging to the staff.

The general found himself detained in Brussels, in consequence of all these embarrassments, until the 19th. He had sent orders to Labourdonnaye to lay siege to Antwerp; and to Valence, who had advanced as far as Nivelles, to return towards Namur, to block up that citadel, and to wait there for his heavy artillery, which had set out from Givet on the 19th to join him. He invited the different provinces of Belgium to form military committees, which were to send deputies to a central committee at Brussels, to agree on an uniform manner of levying national troops. But too little cordiality prevailed among the provinces, to attain this degree of unanimity; each formed independent military committees, and charged itself with the levy of national battalions, which succeeded very badly. All of them evinced confidence in general Dumouriez; but as he had then too many other occupations, to en-
gage

gage in the political affairs of Belgium, he reserved that task until winter. The vexations he experienced on the part even of France prevented him, in the end, from executing the plans he had formed for the advantage of Belgium and his native country.

The intelligence of the appointment of the committee of purchases annulled all the bargains into which the general had entered, to ensure the subsistence of his army. Nevertheless, if he did not mean to retire to the frontiers for want of provision, it was necessary to maintain the execution of these agreements, at least until the committee should be able to station its agents, and commence its deliveries. The contracts with the Belgians were for two months, which would afford time for the establishment of the new board. Thus, the general being constrained by the necessity he was under of putting himself in a condition to pursue the Imperialists, did not perceive any inconvenience in following this indispensable line of conduct; but in order to shelter the commissary-generals Malus and Petitjean, the latter of whom was with Labourdonnaye's army, and all the principal agents

agents under them, he took it upon himself to issue a written order to them.

He left Brussels on the 19th, and encamped at Cortenbergue. Stengel, with the vanguard, had taken Mechlin, where he found more than eighteen hundred thousand weight of gunpowder, a large quantity of arms, and a most excellent foundery. He desired the minister of the marine to send him lieutenant-colonel Thouvenot, younger brother to the officer of the same name at the head of his own staff, who superintended the foundery of Hendrêt near Nantes, to direct the establishment at Mechlin. He was in want of a great number of four pounders for his volunteer battalions, and would soon stand in need of more for the Belgic infantry, which he was about to form.

There was a large quantity of materials in Mechlin, and the adjoining country; he wished also to establish manufactories there for small arms, as part of his cavalry was destitute of pistols, and in want of carabines. All the dragoons had been obliged to give their fusils to the infantry, who had not a sufficient number. In short, one half of his

his victorious army was disarmed. Lieutenant-colonel Thouvenot possessed sufficient skill to enable him to reap great advantages from the establishment at Mechlin. He arrived soon after, and the general, to give him more weight among the Belgians, who had a colonel of artillery of the name of Melius, made him colonel and adjutant-general.

On the 20th, the army passed through Louvain, and encamped on the Pellenberg. The body under D'Harville, who marched on the right, crossed the Dyle at Corbeck, and took a position along the wood of Merendael; the head-quarters were at Louvain, and the advanced guards at Boutersem, and along the Welpe. The enemy in the mean time occupied the heights of Cumplich in front of Tirlemont, with a strong vanguard. His army was between the two Gettes, behind Tirlemont.

On the 21st the general marched the main body close to his vanguard, which he advanced to Boutersem. D'Harville also made a movement on his right, and, in consequence of the attack intended to take place next day,

day, marched through Meldert, towards Hougaerde, in order to turn the enemy's left, in case it should maintain its position, which it was not expected to do, because it was not a good one, unless by facing Tirlemont with the Gette before it; instead of which, having their front towards Louvain, the Imperialists had the Gette in their rear. A division of the army marched by Gladbeck, towards Oplinter.

On the morning of the 22d, the general, being astonished at beholding the Imperialists still in the same position, attacked them with his vanguard. The combat was long and obstinate. The column under D'Harville encountered many obstacles in its march; that on the left did not arrive at Oplinter and Neerlinter until after the action, which continued until three o'clock in the afternoon. The Imperialists lost three or four hundred men and many deserters upon this occasion. The general caused his army to encamp on the heights of Cumptich, posted the advanced guard at Orsmael, and established his head-quarters at Tirlemont. He ordered general D'Harville to go and encamp at Ju-doigne,

doigne, and to proceed thence, in two marches, to Namur, to cover the siege of the citadel, which general Valence was about to undertake, a circumstance that might attract prince Hohenlohe, with the troops belonging to Luxembourg, towards that quarter.

The duke of Teschen's army was at this time reduced to fifteen or sixteen thousand men at the utmost, and although he was slow and displayed much boldness in his retreat, Dumouriez was of opinion, that his own army alone would be sufficient to oblige him to evacuate the whole of Belgium, although the garrisons of Mons, Brussels, and Louvain, the sick, the wounded, and still more than any of these, licentiousness, had reduced this army to about twenty-five thousand men.

None of the battalions of volunteers were complete. The officers afforded a bad example by either remaining in the towns, or returning to France. Indeed, the troops were entirely naked, and in want of provision; and the season, although very fine, was yet very severe. When any complaints were made to the minister about the misery of
the

the army, he said, that he had transmitted every thing necessary, and then exhibited the statements. In truth, he had given his orders; there were at Valenciennes provision, great coats, shoes, and money, but none of these arrived at the army. A project was formed to disorganise it entirely, and to disconcert all the plans of a general, whose career was found to be too rapid, and whose success was too brilliant.

CHAP. IX.

*Engagement at Varoux. Entry into Liège.
Capture of the Castle of Namur.*

ON the 23d all the general's suppositions relative to the disorganising projects of his enemies were confirmed by the decree of the convention, and the order transmitted by Garat, the minister of justice, enjoining him instantly to cause Malus, Petitjean, and d'Espagnac, to be arrested, and conducted to the bar. This order was immediately executed. It left the army destitute of the persons who presided over its supplies. Those who furnished provision and forage at the same time received orders not to make any further purchases in behalf of the troops, and all their money was seized, which disabled them from paying those employed by them.

A new

A new commissary general presented himself; his name was Ronfin. He was a jacobin poet, known by means of two or three incendiary dramas, one of which was called *The League of Tyrants*. He had never been employed before in any branch of administration, or in any of the public offices. This important place was bestowed upon him, by way of recompence for a pamphlet entitled *A Relation of the Battle of Gemappe*.

This man, who was not invested with any employment in the army, had viewed that battle either out of curiosity, or as a spy from the jacobins. He asserted in the publication just mentioned, that the wounded French did not receive any assistance, because the commissary general Malus remained behind at Valenciennes with the ambulatory hospital. This was a gross untruth, for previous to the battle, the general himself had placed part of this hospital in the village of Wasmes, the other part was in Bouffu, where Malus was present; and if Ronfin had seen any of the wounded carried to Valenciennes, they were those who had received a first dressing, and

were sent thither to prevent too great a crowd. It was thus that an informer destitute of talents got at the head of the administration of three armies, by way of rewarding him for an infamous calumny.

The general was filled with indignation, and astonishment: this decree demonstrated to him the power of his enemies, and he in it beheld the total ruin of all his plans and successes. He very justly supposed the plot was directed against himself, as these administrators had not done any thing but in conformity to his orders. In a letter to Pache, he informed him of his opinion of his conduct, and he told him, that in future he should transmit a copy of all his correspondence with him, to the convention; he summoned him at the same time, to lay all his preceding dispatches before it.

He himself immediately wrote to the convention, from whom he did not conceal, that he considered the decree against the administrators, who had merely executed his orders, as personal; he added, that he was about to drive the enemy to the other side of the Meuse, provided he was not prevented by being left destitute

destitute of supplies of all kinds; he demanded to be afterwards discharged from the command, and to appear at its bar, to defend his two commissary generals, and share their lot should they be found guilty; and that in the latter case, he was more culpable than them, and ought not to be spared. This letter, just in itself, was considered as being too haughty, and excited his enemies still more against him. The convention did not make any reply, but Condorcet, Pethion, and the minister Lebrun, were employed to soften him by means of insidious letters.

- In the mean time those who furnished provision and forage refused to continue their services on account of the impossibility of paying those employed by them; the few commissaries along with the army were filled with indignation at the treatment experienced by their principals, the one respectable on account of his probity, both from their talents, and they refused to serve under Ronfin. The Belgick contractors put a stop to the delivery of the provision, and the army was in want of every thing. The general did not conceal his indignation from this new admi-

nistrator; he communicated to him the letters that he had written against him; he reproached him with the atrocious calumny he had propagated against Malus, and his audacity in coming to assume his place, notwithstanding his incapacity. In spite of all his impudence, Ronfin was affrighted. He perceived that the army was destitute of supplies of all kinds, and that he did not possess the means of relieving it from its embarrassments; he dreaded becoming a victim to the fury of the soldiers, and he himself, loudly blaming the conduct of the ministers, besought the general to grant him his assistance.

However irritated the latter might be, he would not sacrifice either the interests of his country, or the safety of his army, to his revenge. The enemy, and the emigrants in particular, triumphed at these intestine quarrels, with all the particulars of which they were perfectly acquainted. The marshal de Castries at that period communicated a very just observation in a letter written by him from Spa; he said, "Dumouriez, in a short time, will experience the same fate as Lafayette,"

fayette," and what is very striking in point of correspondence, Marat said at the same time, "Dumouriez will desert like Lafayette."

Actuated by these important motives, the general made use of all his interest, and employed supplications with the administrators, the commissaries at war, and the Belgian contractors. He prevailed upon each of them to resume his former situation, and also that the agreements should continue to be executed, until the committee of purchases should have sent their superintendents, and were in a situation to procure subsistence for the army.

There must have been either stupidity or treason in Pache's conduct. According to the conditions entered into by the committee of purchases, they were to begin supplying the armies on the 1st of January; none of the persons appointed by them for that purpose had hitherto presented themselves, and yet ever since the 15th of November, this minister had put a stop to the service of the administrators, seized on their funds, annulled the bargains of the Belgian commissaries, and procured a decree against, and arrested the

two commissary generals. Thus there was an interval of six weeks between the actual cessation of the old supplies, and the commencement of the new administration, during which it must necessarily occur, that the army would be in want of every thing. This circumstance could not possibly have escaped the observation of Cambon and Pache. They undoubtedly hoped, that absolute necessity would force the general to treat Belgium as Custine treated the countries in Germany; that this conduct would irritate the Belgians, produce some act of violence that would enable the convention to consider them as enemies, to unite them as a conquered country to France, and to exercise there that system of spoliation, which they afterwards introduced under another form equally atrocious. So far from endeavouring to form magazines for the subsistence of the three armies, the committee of purchases was busy at this moment in carrying grain out of Belgium into France. There were however eighty thousand men to be fed in the Low Countries. They knew that the Dutch would not furnish the French with any thing, as they reserved all their provision

vision for the Imperialists and Prussians; but they wished first to carry the grain from Belgium to France, and afterwards to convey the flour from France into Belgium, which would double the expence, and the profit of the committee and its *riders*. Pache wrote a very flattering letter to the general; he informed him, that this committee having purchased three hundred thousand sacks of grain in Austrian Flanders, had chosen to embark it at Ostend, in order to transport it to Nantes, but that the administrators at Ostend had laid an embargo on the cargoes, and would not permit them to depart; he therefore begged him to employ the great credit which he possessed, and *was so justly entitled to*, among the Belgians, to make them take off the embargo.

But a few days before this the convention, on the solicitations of Pache and Cambon, had passed a decree to prohibit the generals from intermeddling in any thing that respected the civil government. The general accordingly observed in reply to the minister, that what he had demanded was contrary to an express decree, and that even if he could

take this step, he should be very cautious of acting in that manner at a time when the army was reduced to the extremity of want; that it was a very lucky circumstance that he had so large a quantity of grain at his disposal, which however would not prove sufficient for the support until the next harvest, of an army that ought to be augmented in the spring to one hundred and fifty thousand men.

The general learned at Tirlemont, that the national treasury had refused to pay the three hundred thousand livres which he had been forced to borrow from a banker of Brussels for the pay of his troops. He transmitted energetick complaints to the convention against this instance of bad faith, and the banker was reimbursed. It was in consequence of affronts of this kind, that they endeavoured to bring the general into discredit and to ruin him, by forcing him into some act of desperation, which, by producing wrongs on his part, might efface the lustre of his successes.

After having been detained four days by these frightful obstacles, he marched from
Tirlemont

Tirlemont on the 26th, and encamped at St. Tron. The Imperialists abandoned the country foot by foot, and made a very fine retreat. On the 27th, he found them before Liege, in the position of Raucoux and Varoux. They had some heavy cannon mounted on well constructed redoubts, near to the latter village. General Staray commanded this rear guard; the main body of the army was posted on the other side of the Meuse, on the heights of Chartreuse. The engagement continued during the whole day between the French van and the enemy's rear. These two bodies consisted of seven or eight thousand each.

The general, who had his army immediately behind him, could have made a still greater effort, but he wished to avoid sacrificing his troops unnecessarily at the end of a campaign. He had sent the flankers attached to the left wing to Hertall, and those belonging to the right to Flemal, to hem in this rear guard, and force it to re-enter Liege, the inhabitants of which of themselves would be sufficient to keep it in check. He wished to wait for that moment,
to

to make an impetuous charge upon it. He spent the whole of this day, in bringing them to a central point. The delay on the part of the two bodies of flankers rendered the engagement indecisive, and, according to the judgment of general Dumouriez, the honour wholly appertains to general Staray, who received a severe wound on the occasion. In the course of the evening the Imperialists re-passed the river.

The general encamped on this side, upon the heights that overlook Liege, to prevent any licentiousness on the part of his troops, who, through want and nakedness, had become greatly relaxed in discipline, and much addicted to pillage. He did not enter Liege until the morning of the 28th. The Imperialists in the mean time retired to Herve, and Dumouriez, in order to harass their left flank, reinforced with a brigade of infantry and a regiment of chasseurs the body of flankers belonging to the right, commanded by colonel Frecheville, whom he dispatched to Spa, Stablo, and Malmedy. He posted general Stengel in front of Liege, on the heights of Robertmont. General Miaczinski,

Miaczinski, having arrived from Sedan a few days before, got the command of the flankers belonging to the left, in which post he superseded general Eustace, and advanced to Dalem.

On setting out from Louvain, he had dispatched general Miranda to assume the command of the northern army in the room of Labourdonnaye, who conducted the siege of the citadel of Antwerp in such a dilatory manner, that he would not have taken it in a month. Miranda altered the whole system of attack, and this place surrendered on the 26th. In consequence of the instructions he had received, he instantly advanced to Ruremonde. On the 2d of December, the castle of Namur surrendered to general Valence. Thus, exactly one month after the opening of the campaign, general Dumouriez found himself completely master of all the Low Countries, and the territory belonging to Liege, excepting the dutchy of Luxembourg, and the little town of Herve.

CHAP. X.

Political embarrassments. Miranda at Ruremonde.

THE people of Liege adopted, with a degree of fury, all the excesses of the French revolution. Fabry the mayor, who had aided the first revolution at Liege, and been the martyr of it, lost all his credit as soon as he spoke in favour of a reasonable constitution. A club was formed in the city; it was exceedingly ardent and unruly: the missionaries whom the jacobins sent from Paris formed another; which blamed all the operations of the former, and accused it of aristocracy: the quarrel between them was carried so far, that a civil war was likely to ensue. The French troops took part with the one or the other, according to their private inclinations. The general became mediator between the two parties

parties without being able to make them agree. Those belonging to the other side of the Meuse were, according to the French expression, perfectly at *the height of the revolution*, for they would not listen to any thing else than absolute equality and pillage. Those who inhabited the town, on the other hand, wished for a constitution; but in consequence of metaphysical subtleties, they did not well know what they wished for. An attempt was made to prevail upon them to form a national convention. The country was divided into districts with a considerable portion of ingenuity. Commissioners selected from the two clubs were sent into all these districts. Fabry, the mayor, and the provisional administration, were in the mean time continued, and at the end of a month, when the general set out for Paris, no progress whatever had been made, and men's minds were deranged anew by the jacobins, and the commissioners of the assembly.

The secret intention at Paris was not that the people of Liege, and still less those of Belgium, should unite as a national body, to give themselves a constitution and laws;
they

they were afraid lest, when once assembled, these two countries should know their own strength, and found an independent republic.

This however would have been consonant to the real interest of France, which by means of a sage conduct would have procured a good ally, and not have acquired the odious character of a conqueror and a spoiler. But the desires of invading the gold of Belgium, and laying hands on the property of a rich clergy, presented another political system to the *managers* of the convention. They wished, by overwhelming that unhappy country with tumult and disorder, to force it either to throw itself into the arms of France, or to commit some excesses which would afford a pretext for treating the inhabitants as enemies.

The country of Liege was poor and ruined; the people are proud, hasty, warlike, impatient of subjection, and very ready to run into excesses. It was the policy of the jacobins of Paris to excite this nation to anarchy, in order to press the Belgians between the two chaps of a vice, and force it

it to follow the same course: The people of Liege, divided among themselves, supposed they should agree together in consequence of an union with France; they have however only completed the measure of their former evils, and deprived themselves of the means of defending their liberty.

What determined the most moderate to join the *sans-culottes* of the other side of the Meuse, in favour of this union, was, the consideration of theirs being too small a country to form an independent state; they also distrusted the Belgians, who would not sacrifice their religion and their clergy, and considering themselves in an advanced position, destitute of fortified places, and their territory easily invaded, they imagined that on their becoming French, the republick would defend their liberty.

This was a false mode of reasoning, for their reunion to France would not change the nature, or diminish the grandeur of their danger, their topographical weakness constantly remaining the same; they had still between them and France that Belgium which they distrusted, and they ought always to be afraid
either

either of being abandoned, or feebly supported, if, as all appearances prognosticated, the French army should be obliged to retire.

Their union with France also rendered their reconciliation with their prince more difficult, if they should chance to be abandoned; it was resigning their country to that anarchy which desolated France; and it prevented them from acquiring a national strength and consideration, which, even amidst the greatest evils, may be useful to nations, as well as to individuals.

Danton and Lacroix, the two commissioners, laboured heartily to effect an union by augmenting anarchy and disorder. They pushed on the inhabitants of the other side of the Meuse to every species of excess. These commissioners were heard to reproach them because they had not cut off heads, at the same time observing that their revolution was too mild.

Much violence was committed, the vengeance of individuals fatiated, and some assassinations perpetrated; but the French commissioners were not able to make them cut off heads.

The reunion of the country of Liège was resolved upon almost unanimously, and accepted of by the convention, which, by means of this imprudent step, discovered to the eyes of Europe an ambition, that tended to arm all the different powers of Europe against it; and took upon it the charge of a ruined people, and the task either of defending a distant and open country, or dishonouring itself by abandoning it after the adoption.

As to the people of Liège, they had only the choice of two things; to form themselves into an independent nation, levy troops, and form an alliance with the French and Belgians, who would have certainly been determined by their example; (this first plan was dangerous; but the schism between the people and their bishop was accompanied with circumstances that did not admit of any medium;) or to temporise, and remain passive in expectation of events: but the ardent character of this people would not permit them to exercise this stoical prudence.

General Dumouriez had many motives for
 Vol. III. D d trying

trying to prevail upon the people of Liege to form an independent state :

1. He stood in need of a national representation on their part, as will be seen hereafter, for the execution of his military plans ;

2. This warlike people could furnish him, within the space of a fortnight, with ten thousand excellent infantry, besides a national militia of more than twenty thousand men ;

3. Its example would have been followed by Belgium, and given him the entire disposal of all the military forces, and all the pecuniary resources, as well as all the articles of subsistence belonging to that rich country ;

4. These two republicks would have opposed a barrier to French anarchy, and above all, afforded a support to the *monarchico-constitutional* party, which, although concealed and oppressed, was still very considerable in France ;

5. This plan would have disconcerted the projects of the general's enemies, procured
 6 him

him the means of perfecting his successes by forcing the Imperialists to cross the Rhine, rendered him independent in respect to the subsistence of his army, of the minister Pache, and the committee of purchases; completed the confidence of his troops, enabled him to save the king, annihilated the jacobins, restored to the national representation its liberty and dignity, by making it relinquish the name of *convention*, in order to reassume that of *assembly*, and found its authority on the re-establishment of the constitution.

Unfortunately, he had not anybody at Paris to assist him with the convention. None of the generals could be admitted into his confidence; he had adopted perhaps too scrupulous a degree of delicacy in not causing their private sentiments to be sounded. This however has not availed them, as even those who betrayed him have been ruined, for the memory of Dampierre has been branded, Lamarlière and several others have perished on a scaffold, and Custine, Biron, and Hou-chard, with whom he never corresponded, have been sacrificed to the caprice of the populace.

At this epoch the jacobins no longer concealed their odious projects against him. They publicly demanded his head. Marat accused him of having sacrificed ten thousand Parisians, in order to conquer at the battle of Gemappe, and having afterwards sold to the duke of Teschen permission to retreat. They also recurred to the retreat from Champagne, which they likewise attributed to treason.

Besides this, they accused him of having committed robberies. "His *aides-de-camp*," said Marat, "wallow in gold and silver, and light their pipes with assignats of fifty *livres*." The more gross the calumnies were, the greater was the effect they produced on the people. The soldiers, who read all these papers with scorn, pitied their general; but the dissipation, and debauchery of a city so licentious as Liege, and the relaxation of discipline, which proceeded from extreme misery, rendered their sensibility slight and frivolous.

In the midst of these frightful obstacles, the general was still detained by political embarrassments, which of themselves would
have

have been sufficient to have prevented him from advancing. France and the empire were not at war. Before him was the imperial town of Aix-la-Chapelle, and beyond that, the archbishoprick of Cologne. On that side the difficulty was not insurmountable.

But in front of his left wing, was the country of Juliers; he could not pursue the Austrians without crossing it, and he could not render his winter quarters safe, without placing a garrison in the capital. However, the position of Custine in Mentz required that the neutrality of the elector-palatine should be managed with much delicacy. If he were rendered discontented in consequence of occupying one of his strong places, he might afford a passage through Manheim to the Imperialists, and the retreat of Custine would be thus cut off. They would not have failed in Paris, to have thrown the blame of all the disgraces, which might have befallen Custine, upon Dumouriez.

He was still more embarrassed in respect to Holland. Maestricht is on this side the key of the Low Countries. That strong and im-

portant place renders the power in whose possession it is master of the Meuse. The neutrality was still preserved between France and the United Provinces; but the Dutch government did not give itself the trouble of even dissembling its predilection for the Imperialists and the Prussians, and its aversion to the French revolution. In this the Stadtholder ardently followed the impulse of his own personal interest. More than two thousand emigrants had taken refuge in Maastricht; they recruited publicly for them there, as well as in Holland. A prohibition, under pain of death, had also been just published, forbidding any provision to be delivered to the French army, while they established, with the consent of government, immense magazines on the lower Rhine, for the emperor and the king of Prussia.

The general was desirous to be made acquainted with the resolutions of the minister of foreign affairs, and to receive direct orders from the executive power relative to his conduct. In several dispatches which he transmitted on this project to the minister Lebrun, he demanded a positive decision in respect

respect to Juliers and Maestricht. As to the first of these two towns, he informed him that he could do without it ; although he ought to take up his winter quarters in the duchy of Juliers along the borders of the Roer, if, as he foresaw, he were not furnished with the means of advancing as far as the Rhine ; and that he would endeavour to arrange matters during the residence of the troops there, in such a manner as not to afford any occasion for violating the neutrality, by a strict attention to the good conduct of his soldiers, and by paying for every thing furnished, according to agreement, with ready money.

In respect to Maestricht, he assured him that it was impossible to advance, or even to defend the Meuse, without being in possession of it. He suggested two modes of obtaining it ; one by reviving the claim of the prince of Liege, on the quarter of the city called Wyck, situated on the right hand side of the Meuse, pushing forward a small *corps* of *Liegeois*, and afterwards advancing thither as an auxiliary : it was on this account he was anxious that the people of Liege should

form themselves into a national body, and had uselessly flattered them with the idea of this acquisition.

Miranda had advanced to Ruremonde in the beginning of December, and dispatched general Lamarlière, who commanded his van guard, to levy contributions in the country of Cleves. This general of the advanced guard did not fulfil his mission with sufficient precision. The Prussians having at that period but very few troops in Wesel and Cleves, their small detachments had either fallen back, or been beaten. Lamarlière might have fortified himself on the heights of Suchtelen, instead of retiring, as he did, with too much precipitation, towards Ruremonde. In this formidable position, he could have waited the receipt of contributions, and carried away seven or eight millions from this territory ; whereas he did not bring back one quarter of that sum.

General Dumouriez, convinced of the necessity of taking Maëstricht, and not wishing that the least delay should intervene between the orders he expected from Paris, and the investment of the place, commanded

Miranda

Miranda to send forward his heavy artillery as soon as possible to Tongres, to extend his cantonments along the left bank of the Meuse from Ruremonde to that place, and to establish his head-quarters there. He announced to him that he daily expected orders to take that place, that he would entrust him with the conduct of the siege, and that he was to arrange every thing beforehand relative to the march of his troops, that he might invest it as soon as he should receive authority for that purpose. The garrison of Maestricht was weak and incomplete. The artillery, ammunition, and provision, were all in a bad state; it even was destitute of a pallisade, and could not have held out a single week.

The still better to ensure this operation, he ordered general Valence to leave at Namur the body of troops under D'Harville, which would be sufficient to guard the Meuse from Givet as far as Huy, to send his vanguard, consisting of seven thousand men, to Stablo, Spa, Malmedy, and Limbourg, and to come with the nine thousand men that remained, in order to post himself on his right between Huy and Flamael. He had
thus

thus formed a body of near sixty thousand men, half of which was to lay siege to Maestricht, while he himself marched with the other moiety to drive the Imperialists from Aix-la-Chapelle, and chase them across the Rhine.

The Dutch had not made any preparations for war. Their government being taken by surprise, and distrusting the patriotic party, would have endeavoured to have gained time; on the other hand, that party, emboldened by the capture of Maestricht, would have resumed courage; a coalition would naturally have been formed between the Dutch, Liege, and Belgian patriots, of which the general would have profited in order to surround that part of France with a girdle of free nations.

It is impossible to calculate the advantages resulting from such an aggression at this epoch. His motives were very legitimate, and indeed it was only by occupying Maestricht and Venlo, that the preservation of the Low Countries could be ensured.

Lebrun at first transmitted insidious answers, but being forced by the reiterated and positive demands of the general to declare himself,

himself, he commanded him to observe a strict neutrality. It was necessary to obey, and this neutrality was maintained with the utmost precision, which completed the ruin of the French affairs,

CHAP. XI.

Capture of Aix-la-Chapelle. Winter-Quarters.

THE army still remained encamped behind Liege. The season was extremely severe. The soldiers had neither straw nor wood. They burnt the fruit trees, and the doors and windows of the houses they demolished. Whole battalions were destitute of shoes; but few great coats arrived, and the soldiers were without clothes. The Meuse runs through a country where leather may be had in abundance; and shoes might have been made there for four *livres*, or four *livres* ten *sols* a pair. Instead of this, they bought up all the hides at Liege, and elsewhere, and sent them to Paris, whence we received, in small quantities, shoes that cost from nine to ten *livres*. It was the same in respect to the boots, woollen stockings, arms, and clothing,

clothing, which could have been procured at a very cheap rate. In addition to this no money arrived.

The general was obliged to borrow one hundred and fourteen thousand *livres* from the seven collegiate churches of Liege. This was a very inadequate resource. The Belgick contractors were still employed, but, notwithstanding the general's reiterated orders, and those of the commissioners of the convention, Ronfin only furnished the army with provision from day to day, and would not establish magazines; he wished to gain time, and wait the arrival of the first of January, when the committee of purchases was to begin to supply the troops. By this too he obtained another end, which was to prevent the general from advancing. In the mean time the troops suffered greatly. Whole regiments were infected with the itch. The hospitals were filled; and indeed they could not have been established, had it not been by exciting the charity of the people of Liege, who relinquished their beds and bedclothes for the use of the sick.

The strength of the battalions diminished considerably.

considerably. The soldiers deserted in bands, on purpose either to return to France, or to amuse themselves in the great towns of Belgium. It was the national guards and the officers, in particular, that abandoned their colours. The artillery and cavalry suffered still more, forage was not to be had, and the generals themselves found it difficult to procure any for their horses. Ronfin sent requisitions, supported by armed men, into all the villages. At first the peasants, from the hope of being paid, furnished it readily ; and from that time Ronfin put a stop to the services of the contractors. The peasants afterwards refusing, he sent detachments of horse into the villages. These troopers, under pretence of searching for forage, pillaged, and committed excesses. The peasants, driven to despair, massacred the soldiers, when they did not keep in a body. In short, during the months of December and January, six thousand artillery horses died for want of forage. The commissioners of the convention beheld all, and remedied nothing.

They complained at Paris that the general stopped at Liege, and did not advance to
Cologne.

Cologne. He never had either bread or forage for two days, and was not once in a condition to make any other than a retrograde movement. Had he proceeded, he would have found the provision devoured by the enemy, and the country naturally bad. Besides, having failed in the execution of the general plan, and having, in consequence of Kellermann's fault, permitted the enemy to establish itself between the armies of the north and Alsace, it was neither possible, nor prudent, to occupy the winter quarters proposed in that plan. Even had the general been able to have advanced as far as the Rhine, he would still have been forced to return and winter behind the Meuse, otherwise his right flank would have been too far prolonged, and might have been attacked in the rear.

The winter quarters on the Meuse were already very bad, more especially as the city of Liege being insusceptible of defence, it would have been necessary to have extended the cantonments too far in front to establish the advanced quarters in that part.

In

In the mean time, he would not permit the enemy to remain so near him. The Austrians were posted in divisions communicating with each other at Aix-la-Chapelle, Herve, and Henry-Chapelle. On the 7th of December the general executed the project he had conceived of driving them from these posts. He caused colonel Frecheville to set out from Vouziers, to turn their left flank, and colonel de Hack attacked them on the same flank by the Great and Little Richeu, while general Stengel pushed them in front. An engagement ensued, that proved highly honourable to colonel de Hack, and the three battalions of grenadiers commanded by him.

The Imperialists, after having maintained their ground with great vigour, and lost three hundred men, retired towards Aix-la-Chapelle, and our troops entered there on the 8th. General Clerfait withdrew to a very excellent post behind the Herfte. There was no more than a march of ten leagues in order to force him; but bread and forage were absolutely wanting, and there was much difficulty in finding subsistence, even after separating the
troops

troops in such a manner as to produce too great an extension.

General Dampierre, with twelve battalions, which all together did not amount to three thousand five hundred men, was stationed in Aix-la-Chapelle. General Stengel occupied the borders of the Roer as far as Aldenhoven, and general Miaczinski, with the flankers belonging to the left, as far as the little river of Foron, and the country of Dalem. Colonel Frecheville, with the flankers of the right wing, occupied Eupen and Cornelis-Munster. The vanguard of Valence's army was stationed at Verviers, Limbourg, Stablo, Spa, and Malmedy ; his main body was posted in two lines extending from Huy to Liege and St. Tron. The army of the centre occupied Liege, Robermont, Herve, and the intermediate villages. The army of the north, under Miranda, was stationed between Tongres and Ruremonde.

The central point for assembling was at Aix-la-Chapelle, should the enemy choose to attack our quarters, which they could not do until the spring, being too feeble, and suffering nearly as much from the scarcity of

provision as the French. The passage of the Roer could be easily defended during the winter, and at the epoch when it was forced, the enterprize would not have proved successful had it not been for the negligence of the generals, who ought to have begun by assembling the troops in quarters, at Aix-la-Chapelle, in order to have disputed the passage of the Roer either at Aldenhoven, or elsewhere, because it was the aim of the Imperialists to march to the assistance of Maestricht, and that of the army of observation to prevent them, which could not be done by leaving the troops dispersed in winter quarters.

It was on the 12th of December that the general sent the army into winter quarters, and the commissioners consented to it, convinced by the deplorable situation of the troops, that every day's delay hastened their ruin. At this very epoch Pache the minister at war transmitted him a resolution on the part of the executive power, which it was impossible to carry into execution. Custine, blinded by his too easy successes, was still persuaded that he was destined to be the conqueror

queror of Germany. He accordingly wished to draw the war towards that quarter, in order that he might act the principal part.

He had complained, and with reason, of Kellermann's bad conduct; and received satisfaction on this point, as that culpable general was deprived of the command of the army of the Moselle. Beurnonville, his successor, found it very difficult to assemble his army on the Sarre, and execute a movement against Treves, the opportunity for which was lost. Custine, a very fickle, harsh, and bad colleague, already accused Beurnonville of slowness, who, while he disapproved of the plan confided to him, fulfilled it to the best of his ability.

Custine took it into his head that the army of Miranda only ought to be left in the Low Countries, that the army of the Moselle, under Beurnonville, should be united to his, in order to march again into Franconia at the head of forty thousand men, and that the army of the Moselle ought to be replaced by that of the Ardennes, commanded by Valence, who was to attack Treves and Coblenz, in passing by Andernach, while

general Dumouriez, with his army, was to march and besiege Luxembourg.

It is necessary to be remarked, that each of these separate armies amounted to fifteen or twenty thousand men. It ought to be observed also, that the Prussian army occupied Coblenz, Treves, and Francfort ; Custine having evacuated the last of these places in a shameful manner ; and that the prince de Hohenlohe, with at least fifteen thousand men, was in the province of Luxembourg. It should finally be noted, that the changes in the administration had introduced the same disorganisation throughout all the armies, and that they were destitute of arms, clothes, shoes, and magazines.

Dumouriez could never have supposed, that so absurd a plan would have issued from the brain of the unfortunate Custine, if that general had not proposed the execution of it in several of his letters. It was already the middle of December, and general Dumouriez had been obliged to place his army in winter quarters, because it was incapable of serving. He was not even able to march ten leagues, in order to advance to the banks
of

of the Rhine. The duchy of Luxembourg is a poor and sterile country, whence he could not have drawn the necessary subsistence. It was impossible at this season of the year to have transported heavy artillery thither, the greater part of his draught horses being dead. Even after forming a junction with the body of troops under d'Harville, he would not have been able to have mustered more than thirty thousand men; in order to have marched during the severest part of the winter, to attack the strongest place in Europe, defended by an army, and having the Prussian army stationed behind it at Treves and Coblentz. In addition to all this, he had not a single magazine at hand, and no supplies could be drawn either from Champagne or the Ardennes, as they had been the theatre of war during the whole summer.

He could have executed one half of the directions of the council, that is to say, he might have detached general Valence with his sixteen thousand men; but he could neither have sent him into Luxembourg, where he would have died of hunger, nor have made him march towards Andernach,

where prince Hohenlohe, who was at least as strong as he, and might have been reinforced by the Prussians, would have attacked him. It would have been necessary therefore, that he should have sent him back along the same road by which he had come through Givet, and the Ardennes, in order to advance to Sedan, where he would have arrived at the end of January, with at most the moiety of his army.

The general having caused the minister's letter to be transcribed in one column, placed his refutation of it on the opposite one, article by article, and demanded absolute and definitive orders, protesting that he would see them executed, but that he would not otherwise charge himself with this business, not choosing to be responsible for the fatal events which would be produced by the execution of so unreasonable a plan. Camus, the commissioner from the convention, set off for Paris along with general Thouvenot, and the plan was annulled. The minister and his counsellors were well assured, that the general would refuse to obey, but they did not imagine that he would be so methodical upon

upon that occasion, and they hoped to be able to convert his disobedience into a crime.

He again disobeyed another order, which they did not so much as give themselves the trouble to address to him, but he prevented its execution, as soon as he received intimation of it, in consequence of the too just complaints of the Belgians. He had placed colonel Thouvenot at the head of the foundery and arsenal of Mechlin. He was making preparations to cast four-pounders for the infantry, to repair the small arms, to construct new, and mend the old gun carriages. Part of the field artillery belonging to the army had been sent to be refitted. About the middle of the month of December, the minister dispatched orders to transfer all the works from Mechlin to Douay, and to destroy the establishment of Mechlin from the very foundation. This infernal order spread terror throughout Belgium. It was announcing, that they did not think themselves able to remain masters of the country, that they had formed the project of abandoning it, and that they wished to deprive the Im-

perialists of the advantages of this establishment.

Mechlin, notwithstanding its extent, is yet susceptible of being put in a state of defence on account of its canals. It covers Brussels on one side, and ensures the communication with Antwerp. This establishment was necessary at Mechlin, at least so long as there was a French army in the Low Countries ; it forms its sole arsenal. Its removal to Douay would at least retard, and render extremely doubtful, the plan of repairing the arms and the artillery. Its destruction would have been a gross injustice ; it was a national property appertaining to the Belgians, of which they had not any right to deprive them, and which they stood in need of, for arming themselves. In fine, if the destruction of this manufactory should be one day deemed necessary, and proper, it ought only to be carried into execution at the last extremity. The general detailed all these motives, and he prohibited the execution of this perfidious and unjust order. The minister dared not to insist on its fulfilment.

It

It was on the 15th of December that the famous decree was enacted which demonstrated to the Belgians, and every other people who had either invited or received the French, that the convention sent their armies among them, with no other design than to plunder and tyrannise. For since the French had entered the Low Countries, so far from exhorting the Belgians to make a good and speedy use of their liberty, in order to constitute themselves into a nation, to choose representatives, in short, to create a constitution, they had only misled them by means of emissaries, who every where stirred up the populace against the real people, and endeavoured to separate the latter from the clergy and nobility. This decree conferred the power of proconsuls on the commissioners of the convention, who were to be aided in their violence and extortion by a band of other commissioners selected by the jacobins.

They told the Belgians in the preamble, that they were free; they treated them however as slaves, for they did not leave them any administration, and kept them entirely under their own guardianship. They charged themselves

themselves with the sequestration of all the ecclesiastical, which they deemed national property, without caring whether it were the wish of the Belgians to strip the clergy and declare their property national. All this was done in order to oblige them to throw themselves into the arms of France, and in a short time, they employed violence, and the most criminal means, to force the emission of this wish. We have seen in 1793, how much it was constrained, and what little sincerity there was in it.

The general was personally interested that so unjust and impolitic a law should be repealed. It destroyed the effect of his proclamation, and it rendered him the perfidious instrument of slavery, the scourge, the Attila of a people, whose frankness, kindness, and courage, merited a very different treatment. It completely destroyed the resources which might have been found among the Belgians, to support him upon the Meuse. On the contrary, it created more enemies to the French, enemies too, who surrounded, and were of themselves sufficient to chase them away.

The

The commissioners who were at Liege supported the execution of this law. Danton and Lacroix boasted of being the authors of it. The general protested against it, declared that he would not undertake to carry it into execution, wrote to the convention on the subject, and thence forward delivering himself entirely up to his indignation, foreseeing that men so unjust would not stop at this first step, he resolved to repair to Paris, and seek for an opportunity of getting rid of a burden with which he was overloaded.

The trial of the unfortunate Louis XVI was then carrying on at Paris. The commissioners displayed a degree of bitterness, which augured ill. Gossuin, equally stupid and barbarous, said to Camus, when about to set out for the capital: "How happy are you to be able to go to Paris; you can vote against the tyrant; I would give a hundred *Louis* to have that satisfaction." The general conversed with general Thouvenot about this trial, and it was agreed to make use of the officers of the staff, and the *aide-de-camps*, to sound the opinions of the foldiers, and prepare them in favour of Louis; they only
exposed

exposed themselves to no manner of purpose, and an adjutant called Poutrel, a man replete with honour and ability, had nearly become a victim.

The soldiers remained indifferent, even the troops of the line. Besides, this frightful trial had only commenced, and had not as yet assumed that tragical appearance which it evinced, when Dumouriez set out for Paris at the end of December. During the whole of that month, he was a prey to chagrin and indignation ; he left his apartments but seldom, and remained plunged in the bitterest reflections. Such was the life of the man who had saved France in Champagne, and conquered Belgium. It was then that he meditated on the following saying of Plutarch in the life of Cleomenes : " When a thing ceases to be honourable, it is time to see its turpitude, and renounce it."

C H A P. XII.

Reflections on the Campaign in the Low Countries.

THE campaign in the Low Countries, considered in a military point of view, was extremely brilliant and rapid. The Imperialists committed only one fault, and that was, to expose themselves to lose the battle of Gemappe. As they wished to keep their position at Mons, they ought to have defended the wood of Sart, and the position of the mill of Bouffu. There are but few situations that admit of such formidable means of defence as this position. If the station of Gemappe be considered as the citadel, the wood of Sart, and the mill of Bouffu ought to be looked upon as the outworks. As soon as the French were allowed to extend themselves along the plain between the wood of Gemappe,

mappe, this position was no longer valuable, because it had neither extent nor depth, and the river which winded in the rear was an additional danger. On the contrary, by extending the line of defence to Bouffu, there would have been three positions to dispute, and the French would not have been able to have arrived at the last, until after they had lost many men at the two former.

It was not the plan of general Dumouriez to persist with obstinacy. As he was enabled to choose, in respect to his entrance into the Low Countries, he was always sure of dislodging the duke of Teschen, without attacking him; he had only to turn his flanks. This is the plan he would have followed, had he seen the wood of Sart entrenched, and preparations made beforehand for an obstinate defence. He had stationed general Berneron, three days before, in the wood of Berniffart, to menace Ath and Leuze. He would have masked the position of Gemappe, leaving general D'Harville encamped at Quiesvrain, and then marched to Ath, by which means he must have outflanked the position at Mons; and it would have necessarily followed,

followed, that the duke of Teschen would have made haste to reach Brussels, by the road leading through Braine and Hall, in order that his retreat by Hall might not be cut off by means of Enghien.

The truth is, that the duke of Teschen had not a sufficient number of troops to defend the Low Countries, as the inhabitants were not in his favour; what he achieved, therefore, is deserving of praise. His retreat to Liege was bold, and admirably conducted. The Imperialists particularly excel in conducting and employing light troops, and they drew all possible advantage from this talent. It is even astonishing that a rout did not take place, and that he was able to preserve so much order to the last, being basely abandoned by his troops, who accustomed themselves to the most culpable desertion.

The public greatly commended the rapidity of general Dumouriez' invasion, while he himself was disconsolate at its slowness. He lost five days after the battle of Gemappe, because he had neither provision nor forage, and was unable to advance. The afflicting particulars have just been mentioned, in consequence

sequence of which he was bereaved of the fruits of his success. The same occurred after his entry into Brussels, after the engagement at Tirlemont, and after his entry into Liege. Retarded every where, through the fault of the minister Pache, he had always the appearance of attacking too quickly, and pursuing too slowly.

Another disagreeable obstacle proceeded from the delay experienced by general Valence on his taking the field. That general, who was at the head of an excellent army, possessed talents, great courage, and much good will. If he had been able to have filed off towards Charleroi the beginning of November, as was agreed upon in the first plan, he would certainly have prevented the junction of general Clerfait, who arrived with troops that had suffered greatly in Champagne, and would not have been able to have forced a passage, in opposition to the united troops of the generals Valence and D'Harville. If general Clerfait had passed before Valence could have prevented it, then, while Labourdonnaye menaced Tournai, and general Dumouriez threatened Mons, Valence's becoming the operative
I army,

army, would have marched to Nivelles, and thence to Louvain, still outflanking the duke of Teschen, and forcing him to retreat by the Campine, and Ruremonde, instead of falling back by Louvain and Liege.

This branch of the plan having failed in consequence of the forced delay on the part of general Valence, general Labourdonnaye might have supplied his place, had he possessed activity, talents, and inclination. Having twenty thousand men, and battering cannon, on the 3d of November he might have reached the heights of Hertain, Lamain, and Marquain, and assaulted Tournai, at the same time that he might have directed general Duval to march with one fourth of his army, to post himself at Audenarde, in order to become master of the Scheldt.

General Latour being unable to defend both of these places at once, would have been obliged to fall back suddenly, towards the duke of Teschen at Mons. General Dumoriez would then have caused general Labourdonnaye, by that time reinforced with Berneron's division, to advance towards Ath, and force the Imperialists to retreat to Brussels.

Thus, either on the right or left, the general had equally the means of dislodging the duke of Teschen without fighting, and he adopted the latter mode, merely because he was not seconded by movements on his right and left, and because he had discovered that the enemy did not derive all the advantage it might have done from the position it had chosen, in order to stop his progress.

The four engagements with the rear guard at Anderlecht, Cumptich or Tirlémont, Varoux, and Herve, were far more brilliant on the part of the Imperialists than the French. During that of Anderlecht, Dumouriez, rendered impatient in consequence of the delays experienced by him, ventured himself rather unseasonably, at the head of a slender van guard; but as the Imperialists could not suspect this imprudence, they were not enabled to reap any advantage from it. A trifling check might have ensued, but nothing except personal vexation, which would not have had any influence on the remainder of the campaign, could have resulted from it.

The defence made by general Staray at Cumptich,

Cumtich, was well concerted and very intrepid. The attack on the part of the French was weak and tardy, in consequence of the slowness of the march of the two wings. But, on the other hand, the position of the Imperialists on this side of the great Gette was bad. That of Gotzenhoven, between the two Gettes, would have been far better. General Staray was doubtless obliged to cover Tirlemont, to afford time for its evacuation. It appears however by the details of the campaign of 1793, which will be found in the eighth book of these memoirs, that the Imperialists have never been aware of all the advantages of the position of Gotzenhoven, which is one of the best in the Low Countries; it is indeed more favourable against the country of Liege, than Brabant, on account of the large straggling town of Tirlemont, which confines its right flank, and cannot be defended.

At Varoux, general Staray, with a handful of troops, exhibited an excellent system of defence along a very extensive front; and he contracted his line, little by little, without haste, and with much ability and coolness.

The movements on the part of the French wings still continued to be phlegmatick, which rendered the attack on the front slow and circumspect. Besides, general Staray had batteries of heavy cannon extremely well disposed, and served with great precision; these on that day maintained a great superiority over the French artillery, which did not display its usual vivacity.

General Dumouriez remarked during this engagement, that the French soldier reckons exceedingly on the superiority of his artillery, that on the success of this, more or less, depends the confidence and impetuosity of the troops, and that his courage becomes sensibly cooled, if he perceive his artillery receive a check or become disheartened.

At Herve, general Clerfait completely discovered the project of general Dumouriez, and withdrew his advanced guards in good time from Henri-Chapelle; had they remained but two hours later, they would have been cut off, without its being in his power to have saved them. His retreat behind the Herfte, his constancy in maintaining his position with a handful of disorganized troops
in

in want of every thing, his ability in restoring uniformity and courage among them, and in profiting by the involuntary inaction of general Dumouriez, do great honour to this Imperial general, and prepared before hand for the success of the succeeding campaign, while the conduct of the convention, and the minister at war, ensured the disgrace of the French army, and the loss of the Low Countries.

To that campaign may be applied the following line of Horace's art of poetry :

“ *Definit in piscem mulier formosa superne.*”

The plan of the campaign was very grand, very easy in point of execution, and exceedingly useful to France. It was Kellermann's ill timed retreat that occasioned its failure. The separate plan for the invasion of the Low Countries was infallible; it required no more than twenty instead of thirty days for its complete success. It was the minister Pache, and the deputy Cambon, who, not being able to make it entirely miscarry, rendered it useless and dangerous; the first by destroying the army by want, the second by
I
causing

causing an odious and tyrannical system to be adopted for the administration of the Low Countries.

All might have been repaired by the capture of Maestricht and Venlo, at the epoch when general Dumouriez demanded orders for that purpose from the executive power. The unfortunate Lebrun, directed by the perfidious councils of the hare-brained Brissot, prevented this resource ; and afterwards, to complete the ruin of every thing, both of them provoked the declaration of war against England and Holland, at the beginning of 1793, when the French army was totally disorganized, and the people of Belgium entirely alienated.

The campaign of the Low Countries has proved exceedingly brilliant and unfortunate to general Dumouriez. That of Champagne was more skilful, more advantageous, and possesses much more merit in the eyes of well informed military men. Both of them exhibit an astonishing rapidity for history. They are entirely opposite in their natures.

The first presents a system of defence, exact, cool, and circumspect, consisting principally

cipally of well combined marches, and well chosen positions. The second, a rapid series of offensive operations, consisting in the well timed display of superiour means, one pitched battle, four engagements, and two sieges.

Would to God that this latter campaign had never been undertaken, and above all, that general Dumouriez had not been charged with the conduct of it! His successes have given him much chagrin and regret, for they have developed villany, avarice, and barbarity, on the part of monsters who have perverted and dishonoured a nation estimable until then. It will recover from its errors; but how can it efface its crimes?

THE END.

Lately published,

1. A POLITICAL VIEW of the FUTURE STATE of FRANCE. Price 2s. 6d. By General DUMOURIEZ.
2. MADAM ROLAND's APPEAL to IMPARTIAL POSTERITY; four parts, in 2 vols. 12s. in boards.
3. A NARRATIVE of the SUFFERINGS of J. B. LOUVET, one of the proscribed Members of the National Convention: 3s.
4. The LIFE of Abbé SIEYS, written by himself. 2s. 6d.



